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Abstract
This thesis investigates the effects of pressures brought by increasing capital mobility and
interjurisdictional fiscal competition to fiscal policy, focusing particularly on the European Union
and the analysis of policy reforms that can be adopted in such contexts. Firstly, the relationship
between tax competition and economic growth is re-assessed. In a race to attract mobile capital,
jurisdictions compete to offer the highest after-tax rates of return. Governments are driven into
the provision of higher levels of productive public goods, and shift their tax structures, towards
the taxation of the least mobile factors or least distortive tax bases. In an environment of
fixed labour supply, this implies a race to the bottom in capital taxes and a race to the top in
the taxes falling on labour. Taking into account the potential effects of fiscal competition on
fiscal policy, the consequences of different tax harmonization scenarios are also analyzed. The
harmonization of capital taxes leads to a race to the top in taxes on immobile factors. Once tax
rates on mobile factors are fixed, tax competition shifts towards immobile factors. This implies
that the tax burden falls again disproportionately on labour. Only the harmonization of labour
income taxes can avoid this outcome, while leaving room for positive capital income taxes.
Secondly, extending this argument within a more detailed model of labour supply calibrated
to the EU economy, more detailed policy proposals for a European-wide fiscal harmonization
agreement are studied. Labour income and consumption tax harmonization yield potentially
better results than capital tax harmonization, as the main fiscal competition-driven government
investment distortion, resulting in the over-investment on productive public goods at the expense
of merit goods, is minimized. In particular, policy simulation results suggest that indirect
taxes, such as value-added taxes, should become a priority instrument for European-wide fiscal
reforms. Expenditure side reforms are also necessary, in order to address the race to bottom in
the provision of merit goods. Even limited reforms that do not require large increases in the EU
budget, such as the introduction of a common European unemployment insurance system, can
yield interesting results in a context of interjurisdictional fiscal competition.
Thirdly, the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policies across OECD countries is investigated. In
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so doing, a more complete picture of fiscal policy can be obtained, by identifying both the short
term behaviour of discretionary fiscal policies and long term structural fiscal policy trends. Fiscal
policy has become pro-cyclical over recent decades, particularly within the European Monetary
Union. The average level of structural fiscal balances and the responsiveness of fiscal policy to
the level of debt are found persistently weaker beyond the 70 percent debt-to-GDP threshold,
pointing to the relevance of fiscal fatigue episodes. Average fiscal balances and a stronger
responsiveness to debt conditions are also found higher at higher levels of the potential level of
debt service. This is accompanied by a more pro-cyclical response of the fiscal stance. Finally,
the role of fiscal decentralization is also assessed. Two issues remain clear. On the one hand,
fiscal decentralization does not appear to directly affect fiscal performance. On the other hand,
large intergovernmental transfer systems show a persistent negative relationship with the fiscal
stance. Considering the level of sub-national fiscal autonomy also uncovers that this negative
effect becomes stronger when sub-national governments have a wide policy scope. These results
are found particularly worrying as many OECD countries maintain highly decentralized systems
of government, under which large intergovernmental grant systems are kept in parallel with a
significant policy scope at the regional and local level.
The lessons from this thesis have wide implications for the current discussion on the fiscal
architecture of the European Union and for the future design of fiscal reforms. Any future fiscal
reforms that involve only a partial harmonization of corporate taxes, or the mere consolidation
of tax bases such as in current proposals, are unlikely to produce significant results in terms
of limiting the potentially damaging effects of fiscal competition. Instead, these are likely to
generate more regressive income tax structures and produce a heavier reliance on indirect forms
of taxation. Value-added taxes appear as a leading candidate for future European-wide tax
harmonization reforms, given the relative importance in terms of government revenue and their
effectiveness in restraining fiscal competition incentives. Such an instrument can not only equip
member countries with a tax system that is able to limit fiscal competition pressures, but also
provides a fiscal capacity able to finance a larger EU budget. Any fiscal reforms must also
learn from the past. Besides the desirability of ruling out permanent transfers between member
countries, these also need to be able to overcome other potential issues. Namely, European-
wide fiscal reforms ought to ensure that the quality of fiscal policies over the business cycle
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is improved, particularly in countries with larger debt burdens. The fiscal architecture of the
European Union, can also learn from individual country fiscal decentralization experiences. As
both revenue and expenditure side reforms can lead to extensive fiscal transfer systems, both
of cyclical and permanent nature, these ought to be carefully designed so as to ensure fiscal
discretion at the national level is preserved and an alignment of fiscal incentives of different
member countries across the European Union.
iii
iv
Acknowledgements
To my supervisors. I would like to thank Professor James Foreman-Peck, for his constant
advice, guidance and invaluable support, throughout a long period of 6 years, from my MSc
degree in 2012 until the very last days before the submission of this thesis. I would also like
to thank Professor Akos Valentinyi, for the long discussions and all the excellent given advice
during the completion of this thesis.
To all the faculty at the Economics Section of Cardiff Business School. I would like to thank
all the lecturers who have taught me at Cardiff Business School, both inside and outside the
classroom, during seminars, workshops, office hours, coffee breaks, informal meetings, and din-
ners! A special thanks to Professor David Collie, Professor Konstantinos Theodoridis, Professor
Patrick Minford, Dr Andreas Tsopanakis, Dr Anna Kochanova, Dr Ezgi Kaya, Dr Iain Long, Dr
Helmut Azacis, Dr Michael Arghyrou, Dr Samuli Leppala, Dr Sergey Popov, Dr Vasileios Lo-
gothetis, Dr Wojtek Paczos and Dr Yelena Sheveleva. A special thanks also to Professor Helen
Walker. I would also like to thank the administrative staff, who have provided essential support;
a special thanks is due to Elsie. Finally, I would also like to thank my wonderful students, who
have always encouraged me to do better every day and teach the following class with the best
of my abilities and a smile on my face.
To my PhD colleagues. Now this is a particularly difficult part, as I am now lucky to be
able to call them my friends and should thus also be mentioned in the following paragraph. To
all those I have met in the Economics PhD programme. A special thanks to all the student
representatives I had the pleasure to meet at least quarterly over the past five years: Dr Lorant
Kaszab, Dr Nikos Tzivanakis, Dr Georgios Tziatzias, Chaowei Wang, Jonathan Lloyd, Gang
Chen and Yundong Luo.
v
To my friends and family. To my friends, who have been a source of unique support and
have helped me to balance the need to focus on my PhD and to switch off again when needed.
The Cardiff ones: to Robert, from day one a true colleague and friend. To all the nights in spent
together, but also to all the nights out. Also to all the insightful discussions about our work...
and about everything else, sometimes even more insightful! With Tim, we formed the Three
Economics Musketeers and we must have spent together as much time in the office as outside
of it, not always talking about Adam Smith... A special thanks also to Annum, Cassie, Emma,
Harry, Laura, Rachel, Ruimin, and Yue (”Good morning, everyone! Soup?!”). Another special
thanks to Alba, Anna Lena, Dana, Juanma, Liz, and Mauro... and also to Aldina, Emanuela,
Joa˜o, Pedro and Sara. The ’anywhere else ones’: to Afonso, Bruno, Joa˜o Francisco, Jorge,
Ma´rio and Tiago, for all the amazing trips, unforgettable dinners, and endless conversations. To
TAFEP and the NTT, for all the years of endless fun and comradeship. To Andre´ Carva˜o, Carlos
Tulipa, Daniel Strapp, Joa˜o Bicas, Joa˜o Shuips, Ma´rio Batuta and Nuno Mac¸aira! Finally... to
my one and only Steady: to Francisco Ruano, Ivan, Joa˜o Maria, Joa˜o Pedro, Joa˜o Rocha,
Manuel, Miguel, Ruben, Rui Ervilha, Sara and Sofia. I really don’t know how to thank you so
the next round is on me. To Clara, who has been a source of unconditional support, confidence
and affection. Thanks for all the moments of fun and happiness shared together. To my family.
A special thanks and dedication to my parents, who have always supported me without limits.
Without this support, namely throughout my PhD studies, this would have not been possible.
Finally, to all the rest of my family, my grandparents, my uncles, my cousins and goddaughter,
for the continuous support and encouragement (sometimes of the form ”you must really love to
study!”, i.e. ”when are you finally getting a job?!”).
I would also like to acknowledge the financial support from the Economic and Social Research
Council and the Economics Section at Cardiff Business School.
vi
vii
Table of Contents
I Introduction 2
1.1 Main findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Thesis contribution within the wider literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Motivation behind Essays of Fiscal Federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 A brief revision of endogenous growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
II Fiscal Federalism and Tax Competition: a Double-
Edged Sword? 18
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2 Trends in corporate taxation in the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.3.1 Firm, government and household problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.3.2 The role of CES preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.3 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.4 Optimal policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.4.1 Centralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4.2 Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.5 Tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.5.1 Full tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5.2 Capital tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.3 Labour income tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5.4 Simulation of tax harmonization policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
III On the Design of a European Fiscal Harmonization
Agreement 59
viii
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 Data and motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.3.1 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.3.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3.3 Qualitative effects of fiscal shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.4 Optimal policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.4.1 Optimal fiscal policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.4.2 Calibration and model simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.4.3 Tax competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.5 Fiscal harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.5.1 Capital income tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.5.2 Labour income tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.5.3 Consumption tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.5.4 Tax harmonization: a summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.5.5 Federal budget: towards a new EU Cohesion Policy? . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.6 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
IV Fiscal Decentralization and Debt Limits in OECD
Countries 127
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.2 Literature review and motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.2.1 Fiscal reaction functions: theoretical frameowork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.2.2 Fiscal reaction functions: empirical specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.2.3 Fiscal reaction functions: main results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.2.4 Fiscal federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.2.5 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
4.3 Data and methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
ix
4.3.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
4.4.1 Dynamic panel regression estimates: baseline results . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
4.4.2 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
4.5 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
V Conclusion 202
5.1 Lessons from Essays on Fiscal Federalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
5.2 Policy proposals and future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
5.3 Closing remark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
VI Bibliography and Data Sources 214
VII Appendices 231
A Figures (Chapter II) 231
B Mathematical Appendix (Chapter II) 234
C Figures and Mathematical Appendix (Chapter III) 244
D Tables (Chapter III) 260
E Figures (Chapter IV) 262
F Tables (Chapter IV) 265
x
List of Figures
1 Top statutory corporate income tax rates in 4 large EU economies (1982-2017) . 25
2 Top statutory corporate income tax rates in 8 small EU economies (1982-2017) . 26
3 EU-28 average top statutory tax rates (1995-2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4 EU-28 average present discounted value of depreciation allowances (1982-2005) . 28
5 Capital tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
6 Labour income tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
7 Average and standard deviation of top statutory corporate income tax (CIT)
rates in EU countries (1982-2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
8 Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017) . . . . 67
9 Average and standard deviation of top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates
in EU-28 countries (1995-2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
10 Top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017) . . . . . 70
11 Average and standard deviation of top value added tax (VAT) rates in EU-28
countries (2000-2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
12 Top value added tax (VAT) rates in the EU-28 (2000-2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
13 Fiscal shocks: changes in tax rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
14 Fiscal shocks: changes in government expenditure shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
15 Composite fiscal shocks: compensated changes in government expenditure shares 88
16 Composite fiscal shocks: compensated changes in government expenditure shares
and tax rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
xi
17 Cyclically-adjusted primary balances (CAPB) and underlying primary balances (UPB) of 25
OECD countries (1995-2016). Fiscal balances can be separated into a cyclical and a non-cyclical
component. Cyclical influences are associated with variations of the actual output around its
potential level (the output gap). Non-cyclical changes can be seen as a ”cause”, rather than
an effect, of output fluctuations and may be interpreted as indicative of discretionary policy
adjustments. The CAPB refers to general government cyclically-adjusted balances and exclude
net interest payments. UPB eliminate the impact of so called one-off transactions from the
CAPB. One-offs transactions include deviations from trend in net capital transfers and special
one-offs not related to capital transfers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
18 Debt-to-GDP ratios and (potential) debt service of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016)151
19 Underlying primary balances (UPB) and output gap of 25 OECD countries (1995-
2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
20 Share of sub-national expenditures and own revenues, as percentage of total gen-
eral government expenditure and revenue of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016) . . 154
21 Fiscal policy sustainability across OECD countries (1995-2016) . . . . . . . . . . 166
22 Fiscal policy cyclicality across OECD countries (1995-2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
A.1 Average effective tax rates of 4 large EU countries (1982-2005). . . . . . . . . . . 231
A.2 Average effective tax rates of 8 small EU countries (1982-2005). . . . . . . . . . . 231
A.3 Capital tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
A.4 Capital tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
A.5 Labour income tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
A.6 Labour income tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
C.1 Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1982-2017) 1 . . . 244
C.2 Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1982-2017) 2 . . . 245
C.3 Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1982-2017) 3 . . . 246
C.4 Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017) 1 . . . 247
C.5 Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017) 2 . . . 247
C.6 Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017) 3 . . . 248
C.7 Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017) 4 . . . 248
C.8 Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017) 5 . . . 249
xii
C.9 Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017) 6 . . . 249
C.10 Top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017) 1 . . . 250
C.11 Top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017) 2 . . . 250
C.12 Top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017) 3 . . . 251
C.13 Top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017) 4 . . . 251
C.14 Top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017) 5 . . . 252
C.15 Top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017) 6 . . . 252
C.16 Value-added tax (VAT) rates in the EU-28 (2000-2017) 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
C.17 Value-added tax (VAT) rates in the EU-28 (2000-2017) 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
C.18 Value-added tax (VAT) rates in the EU-28 (2000-2017) 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
C.19 Value-added tax (VAT) rates in the EU-28 (2000-2017) 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
C.20 Value-added tax (VAT) rates in the EU-28 (2000-2017) 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
C.21 Value-added tax (VAT) rates in the EU-28 (2000-2017) 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
E.1 Value-added tax (VAT) and top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in 21
OECD countries (1995-2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
E.2 Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in 21 OECD countries (1995-2016)263
E.3 Local autonomy index (1995-2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
xiii
List of Tables
1 Average EU-28 tax rates (1982-2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2 Benchmark model calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3 Optimal policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4 Tax competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5 Capital income tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
6 Labour income tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
7 Consumption tax harmonization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
8 Tax harmonization: summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
9 Joint tax harmonization: summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
10 EU budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
11 Limited EU budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
12 Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): baseline results . . . 172
13 Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): debt thresholds . . 175
14 Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): fiscal rules . . . . . 178
15 Fiscal reaction functions of 21 OECD countries (1995-2016): tax rates . . . . . . 183
16 Fiscal reaction functions of 21 OECD countries (1995-2016): tax rates 2 . . . . . 184
17 Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): alternative debt
thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
18 Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): US output gap . . . 190
19 Fiscal reaction functions of 13 EMU countries (1995-2016): baseline results . . . 194
20 Fiscal reaction functions of 13 EMU countries (1995-2016): debt thresholds . . . 195
D.1 Federal spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
D.2 Federal spending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
D.3 Limited EU budget with common consumption vs. capital income taxes . . . . . 261
F.1 Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): baseline results . . . 265
F.2 Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): potential debt ser-
vice thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
F.3 Fiscal reaction functions of 24 OECD countries (1995-2016): baseline results . . . 267
xiv
F.4 Fiscal reaction functions of 24 OECD countries (1995-2016): debt thresholds . . 268
F.5 Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): sub-national autonomy269
xv
xvi
I
Introduction
1
I Introduction
This thesis investigates the effects of pressures brought by increasing capital mobil-
ity and interjurisdictional fiscal competition to fiscal policy, focusing particularly
on countries in the European Union. The term interjurisdictional fiscal competi-
tion refers to the behaviour of different countries, regions or municipalities in a
context of economic integration. On the one hand, governments ought to respond
to their electorate. On the other hand, the pressure brought by the increasing
mobility of productive factors brings important constraints to the classical trade-
off between efficiency and equity. This thesis studies how these processes affect
fiscal policies at the national level, in particular across the European Union, and
focuses on the analysis of policy proposals that can be adopted in such contexts.
The thesis is divided into five chapters. The current chapter provides an intro-
duction and aims to provide a short overview to unify the work presented in the
following chapters. It also aims to briefly outline the motivation behind the thesis
and highlight the role of different historical and institutional paths in shaping
the concept of fiscal federalism. Chapter Two develops a simple political econ-
omy model that explains the main intuition behind some of the key results in
this thesis. Chapter Three extends this argument and develops a more detailed
model, with endogenous labour supply, calibrated to the EU economy. It also
develops more detailed policy proposals that can form the basis of European-wide
fiscal harmonization agreement. Chapter Four assesses empirically the evolution
of fiscal policy across OECD countries over the last decades, aiming to build fur-
ther evidence and draw lessons from recent experience. Chapter Five analyzes
the main findings of this thesis, focusing particularly on their policy implications,
and proposes future extensions and developments to the current work.
2
1.1 Main findings
Building on the classical literature on fiscal federalism, Chapter Two re-assesses
the relationship between tax competition and economic growth. In a race to
attract mobile factors of production, such as capital, jurisdictions attempt to offer
the highest after-tax rate of return. Governments are driven into the provision
of progressively higher levels of productive public goods, and this leads to large
shifts in tax revenues, from the taxation of mobile factors towards the taxation
of the least mobile and distortive tax bases. In an environment of fixed labour
supply, this implies a race to the bottom in capital taxes and a race to the top in
labour income taxes. This is a fully efficient phenomenon that yields the highest
growth rate of the economy, which occurs irrespective of the initial distribution
of capital in the economy. Hence, the classical link in the political economy
literature between inequality and economic growth is broken. Acknowledging the
constraints brought by tax competition to fiscal policy, Chapter Two also provides
a first analysis of the consequences of potential tax harmonization scenarios. One
result that clearly emerges from this theoretical exercise is that the harmonization
of capital taxes may in fact lead to a race to the top in taxes on immobile factors.
Once tax rates on mobile factors are fixed, tax competition shifts towards immobile
factors, with the aim to achieve the highest rate of return on capital. This implies
that the tax burden once again falls disproportionately on labour. Only the
harmonization of taxes on the immobile factor, labour, can avoid this outcome,
while leaving room for positive capital income taxes.
Building on this intuition, Chapter Three develops an endogenous growth
model with flexible labour supply, calibrated to the EU economy. The main
results of the policy simulations performed in this context yield the three key
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results. Capital income tax harmonization results in a race to the top in con-
sumption taxes, as the least distortive tax base. Labour income and consumption
tax harmonization yield potentially better results, as the main distortion, re-
sulting from the overinvestment on productive public goods, is minimized. In
particular, indirect taxes, such as VAT, should become a priority instrument for
fiscal reforms proposals across the European Union. Expenditure side reforms
are also necessary, as a race to bottom in the provision of public goods with a
welfaristic character, or merit goods, also emerges, simultaneously with a higher
provision of productive public goods. Even reforms that do not require large
increases in the EU budget, such as the introduction of a common European un-
employment insurance system, can exhibit interesting properties in a context of
interjurisdictional fiscal competition, deterring the potentially significant welfare
losses resulting from large shifts in the composition of government spending.
Finally, Chapter Four investigates the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policies across
OECD countries, both in terms of its response to short-term business cycle fluc-
tuations and fiscal sustainability concerns. In so doing, the short term behaviour
of discretionary fiscal policies can be assessed against the long term structural
fiscal policy trends. Fiscal policy has become pro-cyclical over recent decades,
particularly within the European Monetary Union. The average level of struc-
tural fiscal balances and the responsiveness of fiscal policy to the level of debt
are found in this chapter to be persistently weaker beyond the 70 percent debt-
to-GDP threshold, pointing to endogenous debt limits and the relevance of fiscal
fatigue phenomena. However, higher average fiscal balances, as well as a stronger
response to indebtedness conditions, are found at higher levels of the potential
level of debt service. This is also accompanied by a more pro-cyclical response
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to the business cycle, suggesting that fiscal fatigue episodes in countries under
greater fiscal stress may lead to strong constraints on the pursuit of fiscal policy
during economic downturns. The role of fiscal decentralization is also assessed.
Despite the measurement problems associated with fiscal decentralization, due
to the heterogeneity in national political and legal frameworks, two issues re-
main clear. Fiscal decentralization does not appear to affect fiscal performance.
Instead, large intergovernmental transfer systems, show a persistent negative re-
lationship with the fiscal stance, found stronger when sub-national governments
are involved in the provision of a wide array of public services. This result is
particularly worrying given that, in many OECD countries with relatively high
levels of expenditure decentralization, sub-national governments have kept a large
dependence on intergovernmental grants together with a significant policy scope.
1.2 Thesis contribution within the wider literature
The classical theory on fiscal federalism, initially developed as a branch of the pub-
lic finance literature, was pioneered namely by Tiebout (1956) and Oates (1993).
It was extended by several contributions from public choice and political economy
theory to account for the incentives of governments, elected officials and bureau-
crats. Namely, Weingast (1995) introduced the idea of market-preserving feder-
alism, which would promote efficiency through the competition between different
jurisdictions. In Chapter Two, this thesis explores this argument in a context
where jurisdictions have full discretion over capital and labour income tax rates
and the composition of government spending, with a fixed supply of labour. In
the context of a closed economy where households own an heterogeneous stock
of capital, this should lead to the classical political economy result obtained in
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Alesina and Rodrik (1994): higher inequality in capital ownership would result in
more redistributive policies benefiting the labour factor, and this would lead to
a lower equilibrium growth rate. Yet, relaxing the assumption of a closed econ-
omy and introducing perfect mobility of capital, breaks this link. Chapter Two
focuses on the consequences of capital mobility for fiscal policy and for potential
international tax harmonization agreements.
In Chapter Three, this thesis looks further into potential tax harmonization
agreements, dropping the assumption of a fixed labour supply. This modelling
choice, together with the introduction of consumption taxes, allows for a more
detailed characterization of optimal fiscal policy and for a meaningful calibration
of the model to the average EU economy. This chapter thus examines in greater
detail the scope for future fiscal harmonization agreements and contributes to the
large literature on tax harmonization and the fiscal architecture of the European
Union. Unlike the literature on capital tax harmonization (Sørensen 2000, 2004,
Conconi et al. 2008, Bettendorf et al. 2010, and Haufler and Lu¨lfesmann 2015),
it analyses this option in a wider context, where capital is fully mobile but also
when other tax rates are allowed to vary. The resulting policy proposals are also
dramatically different from the literature. Capital income tax harmonization is
no panacea and is indeed likely to do more harm than good, in the medium to
long term. It also contributes to the recent blossoming literature on designing
a fiscal capacity for the European Monetary Union (Bargain et al. 2013, Farhi
and Werning 2017, Abraham et al. 2018b, Abraham et al. 2018a, Dolls et al.
2018), by focusing on the long-term equilibrium properties of both expenditure
and revenue-side fiscal reforms.
Chapter Four contributes to the literature on fiscal reaction functions, pio-
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neered namely by Bohn (1998), by providing a novel characterization of the cycli-
cal behaviour of fiscal policy across OECD countries over the past two decades. It
focuses in particular on the existence of endogenous debt limits, confirming some
of the results from the fiscal fatigue and debt overhang literature (Ghosh et al.
2013, Checherita-Westphal and Zˇdˇa´rek 2017), and on the relationship between fis-
cal decentralization and fiscal performance (Schaltegger and Feld 2009, Baskaran
2010, Asatryan et al. 2015), by profiting from a novel dataset on sub-national
fiscal autonomy.
1.3 Motivation behind Essays of Fiscal Federalism
How far will international economic integration go? This is the question asked
by Dani Rodrik in the wake of the twenty-first century, giving title to a paper
where the Political Trilemma of the World Economy is proposed (Rodrik, 2000).
It is presented as an impossibility theorem between democratic political regimes,
national sovereignty and global economic integration. In short, like in the well-
known impossible trinity of monetary policy (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997), two of
the three, but never have all three in full, can be achieved simultaneously. Three
options emerge at the extremes. The first is to maintain full national sovereignty
together with perfect economic integration, making national policies only respon-
sive to the global forces of the international economy. This would correspond to
a scenario where nation-states would pursue global economic integration at the
expense of any other domestic objectives, which is interpreted as a constraint on
democracy. The convertibility experiment in Argentina during the 1990s provides
a useful illustration of the potential incompatibility of national sovereignty and
full economic integration with a well-functioning democracy. The second option
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is to limit the global integration of national economies, by setting clear bound-
aries on what it can and should achieve. This corresponds to a limited version
of globalization, more similar to the Bretton Woods regime in the postwar pe-
riod, with capital controls and limits to free trade. The third option is a form of
”global federalism”, where the scope of democratic regimes is aligned with that
of global integrated markets, in the sense that common agreements would aim
to deliver better policies, otherwise unachievable due to the lack of coordination.
Yet, taken to an extreme, this would imply a difficult - and perhaps politically
strenuous - downgrade in the role of nation-states, which would have to relinquish
an important part of their sovereignty to supra-national institutions. However
challenging, this has been already partially attained within the European Union.
As experience demonstrates, however, the road is tumultuous.
Having achieved unprecedented levels of economic integration, and despite
some recent protectionist and totalitarian waves, the road towards globalization
seems to be one-way. As Rodrik (2000) suggests, if the aim is to preserve economic
integration, future policy reforms must face the trade-off between democracy and
national sovereignty. The common trade rules under the World Trade Organi-
zation are perhaps the best example of this trade-off; nations have agreed to
constrain their sovereignty, subjecting themselves to a supranational institution
and agreed rules. They made this choice in order to deter competition between
countries, in the form of trade wars, which would potentially generate large wel-
fare losses for them. This can be understood in the present context as a victory for
democracy (or ”mass politics”, in the terminology used in (Rodrik, 2000), assum-
ing democracy can bring about ”optimum”, or at least more welfare-enhancing,
policies from the point of view of a representative economic agent or median voter)
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and economic integration. Exactly in the same fashion, tax competition can de-
generate into a “fiscal war” for attracting mobile tax bases. The case of tax or
fiscal harmonization is thus similar: even restricting national sovereignty, such tax
agreements can pay off and potentially deliver better policies in the long run. In
other words, similarly to existing trade institutions, tax harmonization agreements
can be the best way to solve a Prisoner’s Dilemma for countries facing perfect eco-
nomic integration. After more than sixty years of European integration, although
several cornerstones have been achieved, lessons remain to be learnt. Also aiming
to learn from the past, this thesis is thus an exploration of how different fiscal
reforms can shape the EU economy in the future. Policy proposals, rather than
recommendations, are necessarily given with a word of caution.
The European federalist experience must also necessarily be different from the
American or individual country decentralization processes. First and foremost,
the beginning of the American process of fiscal federalism relies historically on a
”bottom-up” approach, started immediately after the Revolutionary War against
the British, while the European process can be seen as a ”top-down” process,
started in the aftermath of World War II, when sovereign countries aimed to co-
operate economically. This is confirmed by the two founding treaties, the Articles
of Confederation and the Treaty of Rome. While both initially granted very lim-
ited powers to the federal government, the former, ratified in 1781 by the thirteen
founding states, immediately assigned the US federal government with the tasks
of the resolution of bilateral state disputes, diplomatic affairs and defense. The
Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, remained less ambitious, focusing on the deep-
ening the economic relations between the six founding European member-states,
after the Treaty of Paris had established the European Coal and Steel Community.
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The origin of the terms ”fiscal federalism” and ”fiscal devolution” or decentral-
ization also reflects this historical process. While in America this process has
been analyzed from the lenses of a process of political integration between states,
under the common umbrella of a federal government and well-established judicial
powers, in Europe the words devolution and decentralization have prevailed, as
the process has been studied as a result of individual country experiences, de-
centralizing their administrations to state, regional, provincial, municipal or local
governments.
1.4 A brief revision of endogenous growth
The development of models featuring steady-state growth, specifically modelling
the process through which growth can be generated within an economy as a result
of agents and governments economic decisions, arose as a response to the limita-
tions of the classical workhorse of modern growth theory, the Solow model (Solow,
1956), then also further developed famously in the contributions of Cass (1965)
and Koopmans (1965).
Indeed, endogenous growth models have been a further attempt to deliver
answers to essential questions with which economists have been dealing with for
centuries and for which standard neoclassical growth theory provides little or no
guidance. Why has in the past decades average per capita income growth been
so much higher in several developed countries than in developing countries? Why
was average per capita income growth so much higher in the late twentieth century
than in the early eighteenth century? The answers typically found in the Solow
model for these questions relate to differences in Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
across countries and time periods. However, why was TFP different? In other
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words, how were the innovation processes driven and why was the access to or
propagation of these innovations different? The answers to these questions need
to bring the process by which innovations themselves are generated to the heart of
the problem, as a direct result (or at least as a by-product) of economic decisions,
with marginal cost and benefits, made by optimizing agents. To put it another
way, in order to fully grasp the long-run growth process of the economy one cannot
simply assume there are so many young Isaac Newtons sitting in a garden just
below a falling apple.
An easily tractable neoclassical growth model, yet with interesting dynamic
features, provides a useful bridge between the Solow model and endogenous growth
theory, pioneered, among others, by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). The neo-
classical version of the AK model, even not specifically modelling technological
change as an endogenous phenomenon, provides a useful illustration of how neo-
classical models can feature sustained economic growth. One unattractive feature
of this model is that, with a production technology linear in capital, the share of
national income accruing to capital tends to unity, putting it at odds with the well-
established Kaldor facts on the stability of the factor-income distribution. As an
attempt to address this issue, early contributions extended this model to include
physical and human capital, both with linear accumulation functions, and two-
sector models with different factor intensities, such as Rebelo (1991). One common
feature of these and later endogenous growth models is the linearity that ensures
sustained economic growth. It is the underlying process by which (asymptotic)
linearity - as a necessary condition to ensure perpetual or steady-state growth - is
generated that represents the main difference between AK-type and endogenous
growth models. While the latter focus most of the attention on the (endogenous)
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process through which technology develops, the former models do not feature
sustained technological progress and economic growth then arises as a result of
capital deepening, in the broad sense, or the accumulation of productive factors.
This does not imply in itself an inconsistency with the data, particularly taking
into account the recent trends in capital-output ratios and tax policy observed
across developed economies (Alvaredo et al. 2013, Piketty and Zucman 2014,
Auerbach and Hassett 2015, Piketty 2015).
In order to focus on the issue of the effects of fiscal policy on the equilibrium
growth rate and welfare, we thus restrict the analysis to a set of neo-classical
models featuring a balanced growth path, convex production sets, well-behaved
household preferences and competitive market structures (Jones and Manuelli,
2005). Moving away from the world of stationary or pure exogenous growth neo-
classical models, a` la Solow (1956), thus requires to drop one crucial assumption:
that the marginal product of capital is low. With an economy in equilibria with
long-run growth, i.e. in which the marginal product of capital and thereby the
real interest rate remain bounded away from zero, this will depend on a variety
of factors, from preference parameters to fiscal policy.
Bearing this in mind, one can start by gaining some further insight into the
key mechanisms of this class of models by explicitly looking at the social planner’s
problem in a basic one-sector growth model, with preferences given by
max
ct
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
subject to
ct + it ≤ F (kt, lt)
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kt+1 ≤ (1− δ)kt + it
where ct is consumption, kt is the stock of capital, it is the flow of investment and
lt is employment, all in per capita terms, at point t. Assuming a fixed supply of
labour, the Euler equation for such problem can be written as
u′(ct) = βu′(ct+1)[1− δ + rt+1]
With f(k) = F (k, 1), in a competitive economy, it follows that, if limk→∞ β[1 −
δ + f(k)] > 1, then lim supt ct =∞, implying that this type of model can feature
long-run sustained growth. Extending this model to multiple types of capital, the
above constraints change to
ct +
I∑
i=1
iit ≤ F (k1t, ..., kIt)
ki,t+1 ≤ (1− δi)kit + iit
Thus, the analogue to the assumption that the marginal product of capital is
sufficiently bounded away from zero is that there is a homogeneous function of
degree one - i.e. a linear function - in the stocks of capital representing the
lower bound for the production function. This does not in itself rule out the
existence of decreasing returns to scale and this class of models is thus not readily
distinguishable from Solow-Cass-Koopmans type of models. The main difference
can be found on the tail behaviour of the relevant variables and not necessarily
on the nature of the equilibrium path (Jones and Manuelli, 2005).
In order to switch to a model able to account for the effects of fiscal policy on
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the path of the economy, one can assume a utility function of the form u(c, 1−l) =
(cυ(l))1−θ/(1− θ) and look at the problem faced by a representative agent in the
context of a one-sector model with capital taxation:
max
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, 1− lt)
subject to
ct + (1 + τ
i)ptit ≤ wtlt + (1− τ k)rtkt + Tt + Πt
F k = Ak + Fˆ (k)
where Fˆ (k) is a strictly concave function (with limk→∞ Fˆ ′(k) = 0) and it is as-
sumed for simplicity that labour is supplied inelastically and that lump-sum trans-
fers are used to clear the government budget constraint. The equilibrium growth
rate along the balanced growth path satisfies
γθ = β
[
1− δ + 1− τ
k
1 + τ i
A
]
An increase in the effective tax rate on capital, 1− τ k/1 + τ i, will thus unambigu-
ously decrease the equilibrium growth rate. This model thus provides an elemen-
tary illustration of how changes in tax rates may affect the long run growth rate
of the economy and how the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/θ, affects
the magnitude of such effects. Thus, even in this simple example, the importance
of the values of the relevant preference and technology parameters to determine
the quantitative predictions of these models can readily be observed1.
1Jones et al. (1993), for instance, analyzing the optimal choice of distortionary taxes in the context of en-
dogenous growth models, find that the growth effects of switching to an optimal taxation schedule could yield
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In order to fully being able to characterize the effects of fiscal policy on the
long-run equilibrium growth rate of the economy, another underlying implicit
assumption made so far needs to be dropped: that additional revenues from tax
increases are solely used to finance lump-sum transfers to households. In this
context, a seminal contribution is attributed to Barro (1990), which provides an
explicit role for government spending. With a technology given by
yit ≤ Akα1it hα2it G1−α1−α2t
where kit and hit are the amounts of physical and human capital, respectively, and
Gt is the measure of productive goods, taken as given by firms. The government
budget constraint is assumed balanced at all times, with taxes on physical capital,
τ k, and human capital, τh. The equilibrium growth rate can be expressed as
γθ = β
[
1− δk + α(1− τ k)A
]
where A ≡ A1/(α1+α2)(α1τ k + α2τh)(1−α1−α2)/(α1+α2)κ−α2/(α1+α2) and κ represents
the (constant) physical-human capital ratio in the economy. It can thus be shown
that the growth rate of the economy is not a linear function of tax rates. Namely,
intermediate values of tax rates will yield positive growth rates and tax rate
increases do not necessarily entail a lower equilibrium growth rate, if they are
accompanied by increases in (productive) government spending. These features
of the model seem to be important to fit the model to the available evidence on
the US economy, namely given the large increase in government spending in the
substantial growth effects in the US economy, between 1.5% and 3% per year, depending on the version of the
model used, one-sector versus with physical and human capital, fixed versus flexible labour supply or without
versus with endogenous determination of government consumption. Stokey and Rebelo (1995), on the other
hand, in a broad review of growth models with fiscal policy, conclude that changes in tax rates cannot have such
large effects in order to be consistent with the growth patterns observed across the twentieth century. Please refer
to Jones and Manuelli (2005) or Acemoglu (2008) for a more detailed discussion of the workings of endogenous
growth models of fiscal policy with physical and human capital.
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postwar period, from 5 to about 20% of income, excluding defense expenditures.
Hence, as mentioned in Jones and Manuelli (2005), even if not all forms of gov-
ernment expenditure are productive, if the trend in the productive component
follows the general trend in government spending, ignoring these changes would
result in biased estimates of the general equilibrium effects of fiscal policy. While
the models like the one seen in Barro (1990) have nothing to say about the rea-
sons why this the ratio of government spending would necessarily increase, they
provide a useful benchmark for looking at the steady-state effects of more complex
fiscal policy changes2
The models used in the context of Chapter Two and Three will borrow several
elements from this brief discussion and namely from the Barro (1990) background.
The fundamental idea is to have a theoretical framework able to grasp the inter-
connections between fiscal policy and the long-run equilibrium of an economy,
where the process of technological change is reflected by the secular process of
capital accumulation, in the broad sense. Hence, rather than aiming to retrieve
the most detailed image of the underlying mechanics of the process of technological
change, the models used will crucially allow to understand how fiscal policy may
affect these processes, while keeping a tractable format, and enable a meaningful
characterization of the effects of different policy environments, namely in the con-
text of an interconnected global economy where sovereign governments compete
to attract mobile resources to their own jurisdictions and seek to promote the
long-run prosperity of national, regional and local economies.
2In addition, this has served as a motivation behind other fiscal policy models of growth which have later
addressed the issues of tax progressivity or transitional effects (Li and Sarte, 2001). In a similar fashion, Aghion
and Howitt (1998) or Boldrin and Levine (2008) later went on to further develop the technology side and model
it as a purely endogenous phenomenon, bringing further richness to the standard endogenous growth models and
to the analysis of fiscal policy in the context of a growing economy.
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Abstract
Fiscal decentralization, devolution or federalism creates the possibility for tax competi-
tion between jurisdictions. In an endogenous growth model with capital and labour taxation
where governments provide both productive goods and merit goods, we show that tax com-
petition brings growth-maximizing policies. Yet, this translates into a ’race to bottom’ for
the taxation of the mobile factor, capital, together with a ’race to the top’ for the taxation
of immobile factor, labour. Hence, fiscal devolution limits the scope for redistribution and
brings potentially large regional asymmetric effects. Against this background, we examine
several possible tax harmonization scenarios that may be considered in the EU context
where member states are decentralized jurisdictions. Capital tax harmonization avoids a
race to the bottom in capital taxation but implies a race to the top in labour taxation. Only
labour income tax harmonization can avoid the latter, while leaving room for a positive
capital tax.
2.1 Introduction
The process of European economic and political integration can be viewed
through the lenses of the fiscal federalism tradition, as a process of increased
centralization of regulatory and political powers. In particular, the creation of
the European Single Market during the 1990s has integrated national markets,
by abolishing national regulations, border controls and discriminatory regimes
for foreign competitors. The underlying rationale was that this would facilitate
trade between member countries, promote economic efficiency and fuel economic
growth. Yet, by and large, fiscal policy has been left decentralized and member
states have kept virtually full discretion over their tax and spending decisions. A
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large body of literature has developed on the wider implications of the removal
of barriers to the mobility of productive factors across the European Union (EU)
on fiscal policy (Persson and Tabellini 1992, 1996, Ottaviano and Van Ypersele
2005, Wilson and Janeba 2005). In this context, the desirability - or otherwise -
of fiscal policy harmonization and coordination in the EU, triggered famously by
the Delors report, has since become the focus of vivid academic discussions and
was recently brought again to the centre stage of the political debate.
Over the past decades there has also been in many countries, both developed
and developing, a progressive shift of fiscal powers towards sub-central govern-
ments (World Bank, 1998). This process is frequently referred to as fiscal devolu-
tion or decentralization. The early contributors to the fiscal federalism literature,
pioneered namely by Tiebout (1956), viewed the devolution of fiscal powers to
lower layers of government as playing a ’potentially useful role’ in economic de-
velopment (p. 242, Oates 1993). Two of the main economic forces at stake in this
strand of the literature are grounded on population mobility and informational
advantages of local jurisdictions over the preferences of local voters. Together,
those would ensure that policies are tailored locally to different household types
and promote economic efficiency3. Another strand of the literature emphasizes
the so-called market-preserving role of tax competition between jurisdictions with
devolved fiscal powers (Weingast, 1995) to reach a similar conclusion. Put simply,
fiscal federalism was regarded by this first generation of the literature as an institu-
tionally optimal solution which would eventually promote economic development,
on the grounds of increased efficiency and political accountability4. Here we focus
3A recent example of how such ’Tieboutian’ environment can affect fiscal policy, and thereby the allocation
of resources in the economy and long-term growth prospects, is given by Brueckner (2006).
4Note that nothing is here implied regarding the specific design of such institutions. A common view, in this
context, is that the optimal design of federal institutions is likely to vary according to geography, culture, political
regime and degree of economic development, among other regional or local characteristics (Martinez-Vazquez and
McNab, 2003).
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in particular on the mechanism of interjurisdictional tax competition. This al-
lows us at the same time to highlight the scope for potential efficiency-enhancing
reforms and focus on the main trade-offs faced by policymakers attempting to
design an appropriate fiscal architecture in federations of countries or regions.
Different jurisdictions - both cities, regions, states, and countries - may compete
to offer the best possible business environment for firms to invest and set profitable
businesses. An important part of this is to grant adequate infrastructure and
competitive tax regimes. Recent data reveals that the average tax-to-GDP ratio
amongst OECD countries reached 34.3% in 2016, the highest level ever recorded.
Yet, the sources of tax revenues have been dramatically changing over the past
decades. The share of personal income taxes, social security contributions and
value-added taxes are now also at their highest point, at around a quarter of
GDP on average. Namely, VAT revenues reached a peak of 6.8% of GDP, or
about a fifth of total tax revenues, on average (OECD, 2016)5. On a diverging
path, the share of corporate taxes to total revenue in 2014 was 8.8%, down from
11.2% only in 2007.
A substantial fall in statutory corporation tax rates observed across OECD
countries, particularly since the early 1980s, has been documented and focus sub-
stantial research (Devereux et al. 2002, Devereux et al. 2008, Overesch and Rincke
2011). Between 1982 and 2007, statutory tax rates across OECD countries are
documented to have fallen from an average of 47 to 27.5 percent. Virtually all
OECD countries have reduced their statutory corporate tax rates during this pe-
5The collection of government revenue data series starts in 1965. Despite some clear common patterns -
as for example ten OECD countries had in 2015 a standard VAT rate above 22%, against only four in 2008 -,
individual countries have also shown recently some different trends. For instance, between 2007 and 2015, Norway
experienced a fall of around 4 percentage points of the total tax burden. In the same period, Greece recorded an
increase of 5.6 percentage points. Similarly, the rise of VAT rates has frequently been counteracted by a declining
share of revenues from other indirect taxes, such as specific consumption taxes - namely on alcoholic drinks or
fuel - and import tariffs.
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riod (Loretz, 2008). Globalization and technical progress are frequently pointed
as the main drivers lying behind this trend (Onaran et al., 2012). For instance,
Winner (2005) finds a negative impact of capital mobility on the capital tax bur-
den across OECD countries between 1965 and 2000, whereas it exerted a positive
impact on the labour tax burden6. Furthermore, this competition over corporate
tax rates does not seem to be slowing down over time or to become less fierce
within an economic block like the EU. A recent report shows further evidence of
increasing tax competition (OECD, 2017). In 2016 only, eight countries - most
of which EU member states - implemented or legislated corporate tax cuts and
others announced further reductions7. Lastly, the recent corporate tax reforms in
the United States seem nothing but to reinforce these trends.
In this paper, we explore the effects of tax competition on economic growth
and redistribution. In order to do so, we attempt to integrate the insights offered
by the fiscal federalism literature with the ongoing debate on international tax
competition and harmonization. We focus our discussion in particular on the EU
case, as an emerging federal structure. In this context, the EU as a whole can be
viewed as a very particular federation of countries, consisting of a group of decen-
tralized jurisdictions with perfect capital mobility and frictionless trade between
each other but preserving nearly full fiscal and political discretion. The federal
or central government can be considered to have negligible fiscal capacity. We
6Existing empirical evidence shows, however, significant volatility with respect to measures and datasets used
(Adam et al., 2013). Furthermore, the downward trend observed in personal income tax rates until recently
suggests this decline in corporate tax rates cannot be explained solely by the forces of globalization and capital
mobility. At the same time, the path of corporate tax revenues relative to GDP does not seem to exactly follow
that of the tax rates (Loretz, 2008). This can be partly attributed to the broadening of corporate tax bases in
the 1990s and 2000s, frequently associated with comprehensive tax reform packages. Yet, the above does not
necessarily imply that governments do not engage in tax competition or that firms do not engage in strategic
tax planning. On the contrary, recent studies point towards significant revenue losses across OECD countries
related to transfer pricing strategies of multinational firms (Davies et al., 2014).
7Most notably, Hungary, with a sudden cut from near 20% to only 9%, making it the country with the
lowest statutory corporate tax rate within the EU, after decades during which Ireland had a notorious ’lead’,
keeping a 12.5% statutory corporate tax rate. Other EU countries which legislated or announced further cuts
are Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Slovak Republic, Italy, Spain, France and Germany.
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start by reconsidering the main trends in taxation across the EU since the early
1980s. The main aim of this paper is to assess the current institutional setting,
in an environment of declining corporate tax rates and fully decentralized fiscal
policy, against other possible options, such as partial or full tax harmonization.
The effects of such options are considered in the context of a parsimonious en-
dogenous growth model with government spending, following namely Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986), Barro (1990) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994). The model
features two types of publicly-provided goods, a productive public good and a
merit good, similarly to Hatfield (2015). The merit good enters a Constant Elas-
ticity of Substitution (CES) utility function, while the productive public good is
a labour-augmenting factor of production8 Focusing on the optimal policy choices
for governments brings us to the core of the trade-off between economic growth
and inequality. The spirit of our paper is thus closest to Alesina and Rodrik
(1994). We explore in particular the consequences of tax competition between
jurisdictions induced by capital mobility.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we show that a world of
perfect capital mobility and full fiscal powers for decentralized governments max-
imizes economic growth. Yet, this comes at a cost. sub-central governments are
forced into a race to the bottom in capital taxation, which is accompanied by a
race to the top in the labour income tax burden. Governments of decentralized
jurisdictions are induced to favour pro-growth policies and the scope for redis-
8One can think of the productive public good as being, by and large, any ”pro-growth” government expen-
diture, which contributes directly towards increasing the productive potential of the economy. Items in this
category - which can also be interpreted broadly as public capital - can range from direct investments on R&D
activities, financial support for high-tech SMEs or provision of productive infrastructure and investments in hu-
man capital. Merit goods can in turn be understood as goods or services which may also be privately provided
but whose characteristics are usually perceived as essential. For this reason, merit goods are frequently associated
with the idea of universal or unconditional provision. Alternatively, we can refer to this category as referring
to government expenditure with a purely ”redistributive” character. Items such as in-kind benefits, family al-
lowances, social care, social housing, or recreational and cultural services can fit into this category (Fiorito and
Kollintzas, 2004).
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tributive policies becomes highly constrained. Secondly, we bring forward several
tax harmonization scenarios under this framework, worth considering namely in
the EU context. Most of the current debate focuses on the desirability, or oth-
erwise, of having a common fiscal capacity that potentially allows EU member
countries to better respond to asymmetric shocks (viz. Abraham et al. 2018a).
The present paper focuses instead on the potential international tax agreements,
across the EU or more broadly, that would allow countries to respond to the new
challenges brought by capital mobility and international tax competition. The
options outlined here can be seen as the main paths ahead that can be considered
by European policymakers.
In the next section, we explore the main trends in corporate taxation across
the EU. In section 3, the baseline theoretical model is outlined. In section 4,
we consider optimal policy issues. Namely, we compare various scenarios, under
full centralization and decentralization of fiscal powers. We also consider several
possible tax harmonization options. In the final section, we offer some concluding
remarks.
2.2 Trends in corporate taxation in the EU
Soon after the European Single Market was established, in 1992, the so-called
Ruding Committee, appointed by the European Commission to analyze and pro-
pose tax reforms in a landscape of increasing economic integration between mem-
ber states, recommended a minimum statutory tax rate of 30% on corporate
income in all EU countries. Only Ireland exhibited at the time a corporate tax
rate lower than this threshold9. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, one
9At 10% in 1992, which then slightly increased to 12.5% in 2003, as can be seen from Figure 1. Note however
that these numbers ”hide” the full story of the Irish case. The effective 10% corporate tax rate was introduced in
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third of EU member states had statutory corporate tax rates at or below that
point (Devereux et al., 2002). By 2016, all but three EU member states10 had
corporate tax rates below 30% and the EU-28 average top corporate tax rate had
fallen to 22.5%, from 32% in 2000 (European Commission, 2016).
From Figures 1 and 2, we can explore more in depth some of the above men-
tioned trends11. Indeed, what perhaps stands out the most is the marked down-
ward trend in corporate tax rates. Three out the four large countries identified
had corporate tax rates above 50% in 1983, averaging 52.2% with the exception of
Italy which then had a steady increase until its peak in 1997 at 52%. Just twenty
years later, by 2003, all had corporate tax rates below 40%, with the average down
to 35.8%. In 2017, the corporate tax rate in the United Kingdom hit an all-time
low of 19% and the other three European large economies have their corporate
tax rates around 30%.
The average amongst the 12 countries stands in 2017 just above 25%. All the
8 small EU economies have their corporate tax rates consistently below 30% since
2010, with the exception of Belgium (and a small corporate tax hike in Portugal
between 2012 and 2014). Furthermore, if we look further at Figures 1 and 2, we
can conclude that corporate tax cuts were not exclusive to smaller EU economies
(the absolute decrease was actually slightly larger for the four largest economies).
1981 (at the time only for trading manufacturing profits, but the definition of ’manufacturing’ was later updated
to include, for instance, financial services) to replace the previous Export Sales Relief system, first introduced in
1956. This system, under which all exports were effectively exempt from corporate taxation, had to be phased
out under Ireland’s EU membership, in order to comply with European treaties. From 1998, this tax regime was
again at odds with EU legislation and was replaced by the current 12.5% corporation tax, which applies to all
firm’ trading profits.
10The only exceptions are Belgium, France and Malta. In the case of Belgium, a 3% crisis surcharge applies
since 1993 and the recent rise seen in France can be explained by a temporary surcharge applied between 2011
and 2015 to large companies only. In Malta. the top statutory tax rate does not take into account the corporate
tax refund system.
11We use available data from the European Commission and the Institute for Fiscal Studies for 12 EU countries,
from 1982 until 2017. These countries are, in alphabetical order, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and United Kingdom. We then divide them into two sub-
groups of large and small economies for illustrative purposes and analytical convenience.
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Figure 1: Top statutory corporate income tax rates in 4 large EU economies (1982-2017). The blue line tracks
the evolution of top statutory corporate income tax rates in EU countries. Country coverage: France, United
Kingdom, Germany and Italy. The dashed red line highlights the 30% minimum threshold initially put forward
by the Ruding Committee, at the launch of the European Single Market. The figure depicts a downward trend
in corporate taxation across the EU, with a first wave of corporate income tax cuts in the late 1980s, in France
and in the United Kingdom, and a second wave in the late 1990s and early 2000s, most pronounced in Germany
and Italy.
Moreover, since 1992, when the European Single Market was launched, all the EU
economies reduced corporate income tax rates, with the exception of France and
Ireland, which remained fairly stable over the period.
After inspecting Figure 3, the same conclusion is confirmed, although over a
shorter time span. Since the early days of the European Single Market, there
was effectively a significant race to bottom in capital tax rates. Although this
decline seems to be sharper until the early 2000s, it must be noted that, on the
one hand, the then pre-accession EU member countries had, already in 1995, an
average corporate tax rate lower than the EU-15 average, at 31.4% against 38%
in the EU. On the other hand, by 2004, year of the biggest EU enlargement, this
gap had even further widened, with an average top statutory corporate tax rate
of 21% in the thirteen new member countries against 31.4% in the EU-15. The
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Figure 2: Top statutory corporate income tax rates in 8 small EU economies (1982-2017). The blue line tracks
the evolution of top statutory corporate income tax rates in EU countries. Country coverage: Austria, Belgium,
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. The dashed red line highlights the 30% minimum
threshold initially put forward by the Ruding Committee, at the launch of the European Single Market. The
figure depicts a generalized downward trend in corporate taxation across the EU, with most countries now under
the 30% barrier.
adjustment between 2004 and 2017 was then mostly due to EU-15 countries, which
have since then slashed corporate taxes to an average of 25.5%, against 17.7% in
Eastern economies. Hence, the apparently milder decrease in corporate tax rates
since the mid-2000s, rather than suggesting an appeasing downward pressure on
capital taxation in the EU, point towards the opposite direction. Instead, EU-
15 countries seem to have responded to the new competitive pressures, brought
by the expansion of the European Single Market towards Eastern Europe, and
imposed further corporate tax cuts. Quite interestingly, this was achieved in a
period of high financial instability, while many EU-15 countries faced important
fiscal constraints.
At the same time, the corporate tax rate cuts just mentioned were accompanied
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Figure 3: EU-28 average top statutory corporate income tax rates (1995-2017). Country coverage: all EU-28
countries. The figure depicts a markedly downward trend in corporate taxation across the EU, which appears
stronger in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with smoother path after the mid-2000s.
by a broadening of the corporate tax base12. The definition of the tax base is,
however, extremely complex in this case13. We use a common proxy for the tax
base, based on the present discounted value (PDV) of depreciation allowances, as
a percentage of the initial investment. This measure would be zero in the absence
of depreciation allowances and one if investments could be immediately deducted.
Figure 4 thus shows a steady broadening of the tax base from the early 1980s
until the mid-2000s in the twelve EU countries identified above. It is interesting
to note that, on the one hand, compared to the fall in corporate tax rates, this
broadening of the tax base appears rather mild over twenty years. On the other
hand, behind this average lie somewhat different trends. Austria, Ireland and the
United Kingdom, for instance, undertook large tax base broadening reforms over
12As can be seen in Appendix A, Figures A.1 and A.2, effective corporate tax rates have followed the same
downward trend between 1982 and 2005. The data was collected from the Institute for Fiscal Studies.
13The definition of the corporate tax base involves a wide range of legislation, covering namely allowances for
capital expenditures, the deductibility of pension contributions, or the valuation of assets and inventories and
the extent to which different expenses can be deducted (OECD, 2007).
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Figure 4: EU-28 average present discounted value of depreciation allowances (1982-2005). The definition of the
corporate tax base involves a wide range of legislation, covering namely the extent of depreciation allowances for
capital expenditures and the deductibility of different expenditure categories. This measure equals zero without
any depreciation allowances and one if all investments could be immediately deducted.
the years, particularly in the late 1980s in the case of the latter two. Greece,
Portugal and Spain, which exhibited the largest tax bases (lower values for the
PDV of allowances), tightened their tax bases over the period. Finally. in the
case of Belgium and the Netherlands, on the other hand, the PDV of depreciation
allowance remained unchanged over the entire period.
In sum, EU countries have engaged in extensive corporate tax cuts since the
late 1980s. Albeit slightly offset by tax base enlargements in some countries,
this plunge in corporate tax rates appeared far more profound than that initially
thought and even recommended, at the outset of the European Single Market.
Furthermore, rather than seeming to diminish after an initial transition period,
it has continued far beyond the early 2000s, mostly driven by EU-15 countries
facing further competition from Eastern European economies.
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2.3 Model
Each individual i in a jurisdiction j is endowed with an initial amount of capi-
tal, kij(0). The initial distribution of capital in each jurisdiction can be described
by a distribution F (.), which may vary across different jurisdictions. This het-
erogeneity between agents’ capital endowments also represents thus a source of
heterogeneity between jurisdictions. Different initial endowments of capital will
be mirrored into different consumption and income levels between individuals,
as all other endowments and characteristics are assumed to be otherwise equal.
Namely, they will have namely the same endowment of time and labour produc-
tivity. A continuum of infinitely-lived individuals (i ∈ (0, 1)) live in each of the
J jurisdictions (j = 1, ...J) of a closed economy. In an endogenous growth frame-
work, we develop a continuous time model in the spirit of Barro (1990), Alesina
and Rodrik (1994) and Hatfield (2015). Capital can be invested, k˙ij(t), and used
to produced the final good, yj(t), or used for consumption, c
i
j(t). Firms producing
the final good operate in perfectly competitive markets. Hence, factors are paid
their marginal products and profits are zero in the whole economy. The factors of
production are capital kj(t), labour lj(t) and a productive public good gj(t). In
addition, there is also a publicly-provided good hj(t), which can be used for con-
sumption only and can be seen as a merit good, or a purely (in-kind) redistributive
good in nature.
In the initial period, t = 0, all the individuals in each jurisdiction j vote for
their preferred policy set, choosing the capital tax rate, τKj , the income tax rate,
τLj , as well as the share of total revenues to be allocated to each publicly provided
good, gj(t) and hj(t), βj and (1 − βj), respectively. After this set of policies
(τKj , τ
L
j , βj) is chosen, individuals choose their consumption and where to invest
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their capital. The total amount of capital invested in each jurisdiction j at time
t is thus
kj(t) ≡
∑
{j∈J}
∫ 1
0
kijι{j=dij(t)}di
and the total amount of capital in the economy is
k(t) ≡∑{j∈J} ∫ 10 kij(t)di.
The subscript dij(t) highlights the possibility that different individuals in a given
jurisdiction j can invest in different jurisdictions and thereby obtain different rates
of return on their capital holdings. Although the whole economy is assumed to
be closed, which is reflected in the second identity above (i.e. the total amount of
capital in the whole economy equals the sum of capital holdings of all individuals),
capital can move costlessly across all J jurisdictions. Individuals cannot move
across jurisdictions.
2.3.1 Firm, government and household problems
The production function in this economy is Cobb-Douglas, with capital share α
(α ∈ (0, 1)) and features the three factors of production discussed above, capital,
labour, and the productive public good:
yj(t) = Agj(t)
1−αkj(t)αlj(t)1−α. (1)
Firms, operating in a perfectly competitive environment, set the wage rate,
wj(t), equal to the marginal productivity of labour, and the rental rate of capital,
rj(t), equal to the marginal productivity of capital. Each individual is endowed
with one unit of labour, lij(t) = 1. The government funds the provision of the
productive public good and the merit good out of capital and labour income tax
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revenues14:
gj(t) + hj(t) = τ
K
j kj(t) + τ
L
j wj(t)lj(t) (2)
We can also rewrite this into two budget constraints, in order to identify the
share of government revenues spent on the productive public good and the merit
good, βj and 1− βj:
gj(t) = βj
[
τKj kj(t) + τ
L
j wj(t)lj(t)
]
(2’)
hj(t) = (1− βj)
[
τKj kj(t) + τ
L
j wj(t)lj(t)
]
(2”)
The utility of each individual can be represented by the following CES func-
tion15: ∫ ∞
0
e−δt log
[
η
1
σ
c c
i
j(t)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h hj(t)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
dt (3)
where δ is the continuous time discount factor, ηc and ηh are preference pa-
rameters, ηc + ηh = 1. The parameter σ represents the elasticity of substitution
between private consumption, cij(t), and the merit good, hj(t), provided by the
government.
The budget constraint faced in any period by an individual i can thus be
expressed as:
k˙ij(t) = (rdij(t)(t)− τKdij(t))k
i
j(t) + (1− τLj )wj(t)lij − cij(t) (4)
14Another option would be to have two government budget constraints, effectively having hypothecated taxes,
where possibly the merit good would be funded out of capital taxes. These budget constraints could be written
as gj(t) = τ
K
j kj(t) + τ
L
j wj(t)lj(t) and hj(t) = θjkj(t).
15The idea that the direct effect of government spending on private consumption and, hence, on the utility
of the representative household should be accounted for in general equilibrium models dates back at least from
Barro (1981). We use a CES specification to also account for the related question of the relationship between
private consumption and government spending, while providing a flexible analytical framework. See for example
Amano and Wirjanto (1998) for a very similar treatment of the utility function. We leave further discussion on
this issue to the next sub-section.
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Note again that individuals may choose, at least in principle, to have their
capital stock, kij(t), invested across many different jurisdictions, with different
levels of capital taxes and gross rates of return on capital. Thus rdij(t)(t) and
τK
dij(t)
correspond to the average gross return and tax rate on the stock of capital
of an individual, obtained across all J jurisdictions. The net rate of return on
labour also depends on the jurisdiction j choice of taxes and on wages, but note
in this case that individuals do not have the choice to relocate to neighbouring
jurisdictions and, hence, the labour income tax term, τLj , is indexed only by j.
As we shall see, in equilibrium there will be only one net rate of return on cap-
ital, both under a single centralized government and decentralized governments.
The former case, by definition, implies one single set of policies (τKj , τ
L
j , βj), to
which also corresponds a single gross rate of return on capital, rj(t). The latter
case entails a Bertrand-type competition for capital between all J jurisdictions,
where these will attempt to maximize the net rate of return on capital in order to
attract investment. Furthermore, with no adjustment costs or any costs of moving
capital across jurisdictions, a ’winner-takes-all’ equilibrium is obtained, in which
all jurisdictions are forced to offer the maximum rate of return on capital16.
2.3.2 The role of CES preferences
The use of a CES utility function enables us to consider the cases when private
consumption, cij(t), and the consumption of the merit good, hj(t), provided by
the government are not independent of each other or, in other words, when the
degree of substitutability between the two goods is different from one. Hence, we
can consider the cases when private consumption and merit goods are Edgeworth-
16To avoid multiple equilibria or, in other words, equilibria where some jurisdictions end up with zero capital,
we use the additional assumption of a slight home bias, as in Hatfield (2015). This is equivalent to stating that
individuals facing equal rates of return will choose to invest in their own jurisdiction.
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substitutes (σ > 1) or complements (σ < 1). This approach will thus enable us to
grasp the different optimal policies, depending on the relationship between these
two aggregates. In particular, given the nature of the merit good delivered by
the government, we will devote special attention to the case of complementar-
ity between both goods17. We thus explore a model that features two types of
good provided by the government. Although this does not bring major qualita-
tive changes to the dynamic behaviour of individuals, the effective growth rate
of the economy can however be slightly altered, depending on the equilibrium
set of policies, (τKj , τ
L
j , βj). In this context, the optimal policy may change sig-
nificantly, in order to account for the relationship between the two aggregates.
Namely, depending on the level of Edgeworth-substitutability or complementar-
ity between private consumption and the merit good, it might be either increasing
or decreasing in key parameters of the model.
Bearing this in mind, before we explore the equilibrium of our model more
in depth, it is worth defining the merit good. Generally, this merit good can be
interpreted in light of the redistributive role of the government. This may come in
various forms: redistributive transfers - such as subsistence income, food stamps
or housing benefits -, or any social, cultural and recreational services directly
provided by the government. In addition, education and healthcare - although also
with a clear productive role - are also typically understood as merit goods, given
the widespread perception of the desirability of their universal provision. Items
that fit into this category are also be generally referred to as welfare expenditures
and account for up to two thirds of aggregate government spending in most OECD
17Note that this complementarity can be seen both between and within categories. For instance, a healthier
individual may want to increase her demand for a wide array of consumption categories. On the other hand, a
lack of quality or quantity in the provision of some merit goods - for instance, social care or free school lunch
programmes - may increase the private consumption of these items.
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countries. These expenditures also account for most of the rise in public spending
during the 1980s and the 1990s (Fiorito and Kollintzas, 2004). In order to avoid
an overlap with potential ”productive” public spending categories, we can focus
in particular on those categories of public spending which can be considered as
strictly ”non-productive”, such as in-kind benefits, social care or cultural and
recreational services.
Recent studies generally suggest these public expenditure items are strongly
complementary to private consumption (Fiorito and Kollintzas 2004, Bouakez and
Rebei 2007). The discussion around the relevance for fiscal policy of the substi-
tutability or complementarity of public spending and private consumption has
developed significantly since the early contribution of Aschauer (1985) and it is
part of a wider literature on the response of economic aggregates to changes in
government spending (Barro, 1981). Although the empirical evidence appears
still rather inconclusive (see, for instance, Aschauer 1985, Campbell and Mankiw
1990, Graham 1993, Ni 1995, Amano and Wirjanto 1998, Okubo 2003, Fiorito and
Kollintzas 2004, Bouakez and Rebei 2007, Ercolani and e Azevedo 2014; among
others), two apparent features seem worth to highlight in the context of our dis-
cussion. Firstly, when the data is disaggregated into different categories of public
spending, merit goods tend to be complementary to private consumption, whereas
public goods, in the strict sense, tend to be substitutes to private consumption.
Secondly, once we compare different periods, public spending as an aggregate
appears to have become increasingly complementary to private consumption over
time, given the general increase in welfare spending and the changing composition
of general government spending18.
18A similar point is made by Gal´ı et al. (2007), in the context of an assessment of the relevance of the positive
co-movement between government spending and private consumption in the context of business cycle models.
This apparent relationship implies that standard macroeconomics models would prove unfit to assess the effects
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2.3.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this model is defined as a set of policies for each jurisdiction j,
(τKj , τ
L
j , βj), corresponding to a path of consumption, capital and investment de-
cisions for all individuals, {cij(t), kij(t), dij(t)}, and wages, rental rates, production
and government expenditure decisions in each jurisdiction {wj(t), rj(t), yj(t), gj(t), hj(t)}
such that (i) each individual maximizes her utility, taking the paths of wages and
rental rates of capital in each jurisdiction as given, (ii) wages and rental rates
of capital are given by the marginal productivity of labour and capital in each
jurisdiction and (iii) agents vote on a set of policies, taking as given the policies
chosen by other jurisdictions and understanding the path of the economy resulting
from the set of policy choices. This latter point is particularly important in the
context of our political economy equilibrium under decentralized governments and
full tax competition between jurisdictions. The only difference between agents is
the jurisdiction j where they live and their initial level of wealth kij(0).
Consider now the problem of an individual i endowed with an initial amount
of capital kij(0), maximizing utility, (15), subject to the budget constraint, (16):
max[cij(t),kij(t)]∞t=0
∫∞
0
e−δt log
([
η
1
σ
c cij(t)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h hj(t)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
)
dt
s.t.
k˙ij(t) = (rdij(t)(t)− τKdij(t))k
i
j(t) + (1− τLj )wj(t)lij − cij(t).
Taking as given the set of policies (τKj , τ
L
j , βj) and corresponding net rate of
return on capital ψj = rj(t)− τKj , we may rewrite the problem using the following
current-value Hamiltonian (Acemoglu, 2008):
of fiscal policy.In particular, the assumption that public and private consumption are independent - or, in other
words, that private consumption and the level of the merit good are separable in the utility function - seems to
become rather problematic.
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Hˆ(cij(t), k
i
j(t), µ(t)) ≡
e−δt
{
log
[
η
1
σ
c cij(t)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h hj(t)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
+ µ(t)
[
ψjk
i
j(t) + (1− τLj )wj(t)lij − cij(t)
]}
After obtaining the first-order optimality conditions, we can write the following
Euler equation for the path of consumption:
cij(t) = c
i
j(0)e
(ψj−δ)t (5)
Furthermore, we can define the initial consumption of individual i in region j,
cij(0), with capital holdings k
i
j(0) as:
cij(0) = δk
i
j(0) + (1− τLj )wj(0)lij (6)
Hence, combining (21) and (6), we obtain the consumption level for each individual
i in each period t:
cij(t) =
(
δkij(0) + (1− τLj )wj(0)lij
)
e(ψj−δ)t.
Individuals will thus use their labour income plus a fraction δ of their capital
stock in order to finance their consumption in each period. Those with higher
initial capital endowments will thus consume more than those with lower capital
endowments, given that the wage rate and the labour income tax are the same
for all individuals in each jurisdiction. Individuals who rely relatively less on
capital and more on labour income in order to finance their consumption will also
tend to prefer a policy set that features higher taxes on capital (given the lower
opportunity cost of capital taxation) and lower labour income taxes.
Substituting back into (16) we can also show that capital grows at the same
rate as wages, consumption and output in each economy:
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k˙ij(t) = ψk
i
j(t)+(1−τLj )wj(t)lij−
(
δkij(0)+(1−τLj )wj(0)lij
)
e(ψj−δ)t = (ψj−δ)kij(t)
given the equilibrium wage rate wj(t) = wj(0)e
(ψj−δ)t.
We can furthermore re-write our (6) as a function of constants, which will be
important when solving for the optimal policy:
cij(0) =
(
δκij + ωj
)
kj(0) (7)
Hence, we obtain that initial consumption is a function of parameters of the
model and the initial amount of capital in each jurisdiction j, kj(0). We obtain
here two important ratios: the relative capital holdings of agent i in jurisdiction
j, κij ≡
kij(0)
kj(0)
, and the after-tax wage-capital ratio of economy j, ωj ≡ (1−τ
L
j )wj(0)l
i
j
kj(0)
.
It can also be verified that ωj is constant with respect to time, given that the
wage rate grows at the same rate as the capital stock in each jurisdiction. The
relative capital holdings of each individual are also constant, as the (net) rate
of return on capital is the same for all individuals in equilibrium and constant
over time, irrespective of their initial amount of capital. Since capital grows at a
constant rate for every agent and relative capital holdings are determined solely
by the initial endowment, capital inequality persists over time in this economy.
The level of income and consumption inequality also remains constant over time,
given the policy set (τKj , τ
L
j , βj).
2.4 Optimal policy
In order to obtain the optimal policy, we first solve for the utility function
with the equilibrium choices made by the an individual i, given the policy set
chosen by the government, (τKj , τ
L
j , βj). We then reach an indirect utility form,
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where we have the present value of an individual’s utility expressed as a function
of parameters. Finally, we can obtain the optimal policies for the government.
For a policy (τKj , τ
L
j , βj) to be chosen in equilibrium, at least half of the agents i
in a jurisdiction j have to favour that policy over the set of all the other feasible
policies. This is a corollary of the median-voter theorem, which we apply in
this context. The preferences of individuals over policy sets do not change over
time (since κi is constant) and we work under the assumption that governments
can commit to the policies announced at time t = 0. Hence there are no time-
consistency issues and allowing for repeated votes on the set of policies would not
alter the results.
Under this framework, we can consider either the case of the existence of a cen-
tralized government or, instead, the existence of many decentralized governments,
one in each jurisdiction j, with full fiscal powers. The key difference in this con-
text between a central government and decentralized, or sub-central, governments
lies on the fact that the central government faces no mobility of, or competition
for, capital. Thus, the central government, by and large, regards capital as largely
an immobile factor19. sub-central governments, on the other hand, face full mo-
bility of capital, which results in an extreme Bertrand competition for capital.
Labour is assumed to be an immobile factor throughout this exercise20. Let us
now move towards the analysis of the equilibrium under centralization, with one
single central government with full fiscal powers. We then move on to explore
the equilibrium under decentralization, with J decentralized governments with
19We can drop the jurisdiction subscript in our analysis of the centralized government policy, as centralization
in this case is equivalent to having only one jurisdiction j. We can also think that all j jurisdictions have the
same set of policies (τK , τL, β) and, hence, same choices made by individuals and growth rate, ψ − δ.
20The assumption of immobility across jurisdictions is used in order to make a clear distinction between mobile
and immobile factors of production. It is possible, however, to drop the assumption of a fixed individual supply
of labour and allow for an explicit labour-leisure choice. The next chapter considers a more complete model of
endogenous growth with flexible labour supply.
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full fiscal powers facing perfect capital mobility across borders. We will focus in
particular on the implications of perfect capital mobility on the political economy
equilibrium under decentralization.
2.4.1 Centralization
In order to solve for the optimal policy of the central government, let us obtain the
utility of agent i as a function of parameters and policy set (τKj , τ
L
j , βj). Hence,
defining the equilibrium growth rate of the economy as ξ = ψ − δ and combining
(15), (21) and (6)21:
V (ξ, ωj;κ
i
j) =
ξ(τKj , τ
L
j , βj)
δ2
+
1
δ
σ
σ − 1 log
[
η
1
σ
c (δκ
i
j + ωj)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h
(
(1− βj)(
τLj
1− τLj
ωj + τ
K
j )
)σ−1
σ
]
+
1
δ
log(kj(0))
(8)
We recall at this point that κij is the parameter capturing the relative capital hold-
ings of agent i and is invariant over time. A capital-poor agent will have a low κij
and a capital-rich agent will have a high κij. The after-tax wage-capital ratio of
economy j, on the other hand, is common to every agent in a given jurisdiction
j and dependent on the set of policies chosen by the government in each jurisdic-
tion. Thus, ω(τKj , τ
L
j , βj) reflects economic conditions of each jurisdiction j. This
ratio will also be invariant with respect to time and will not depend on the relative
abundance of capital in each region. The after-tax wage-capital ratio could hence,
in principle, be the same across many different jurisdictions, if these would have
21We assume that, along the balanced growth path, we must have
c˙ij(t)
cij(t)
=
h˙j(t)
hj(t)
.
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the same equilibrium set of policies (τK
′
, τL
′
, β′) (which is indeed the case for a
centralized government). Nonetheless, as this ratio partly reflects the equilibrium
set of policies chosen in each jurisdiction, which in turn is defined by the (initial)
distribution of capital in each jurisdiction j, it will be most likely to vary across
each of the J different jurisdictions (under decentralized governments). The in-
tuition is simple: jurisdictions with more unequal capital distributions will have
a poorer median voter, who demands more redistribution. Hence, more unequal
jurisdictions will tend to have a higher equilibrium after-tax wage-capital ratios.
Jurisdictions with less unequal capital distributions (with a richer median voter)
will tend to have a less redistributive policy set and will thus tend to have lower
after-tax wage-capital ratios. In this context, ωj will thus depend on individual
preferences and on the distribution of capital in each jurisdiction. We shall return
to this point when we analyse optimal policy issues under decentralization.
A closer inspection of (8) reveals that the utility of each agent can be expressed
as a function of a growth term, the initial level of utility, and a term reflecting the
initial state of the economy. When choosing the policy set, a government changes
the first two terms. The trade-off between present consumption and long-term
economic growth is thus clear. A further interesting feature is that, similarly to
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), although κij is not affected itself by the policy chosen
by the government, it affects the equilibrium optimal policy (under centralization),
as we shall see later, in a political economy equilibrium. By the same token, the
after-tax wage-capital ratio is increasing in the capital tax, τKj , and thus a higher
τKj effectively implies a transfer of wealth, through an increase in (relative) wages,
from capital-rich to capital-poor individuals, who rely relatively more on labour,
rather than capital, income. Hence, we can write the wage to capital ratio as:
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wj(t)
kj(t)
≡ A(1− α)( τLj
1−τLj
ωjlj + τ
K
j )
1−αl−αj
The median-voter will typically require a high τKj for redistributive purposes.
The political economy equilibrium (under centralization) will, in general, feature
a capital tax that will not maximize economic growth. For a policy set (τK , τL, β)
to be chosen in political equilibrium, under centralization, at least half of the
agents i in a region j have to favour that policy over the range of all the other
feasible policies. The policy chosen by the central government maximizes the
welfare of the median-voter22:
(τK
med
, τL
med
, βmed) = arg max
(τK ,τL,β)
{
V (ξ, ω, β;κmed)
}
(9)
Note that this policy will not, in general, strictly maximize economic growth. It
is important to stress at this point that the median voter will typically demand
more redistribution (higher capital taxes, lower labour income taxes) than optimal
from the point of view of the aggregate growth rate of the economy. Hence, under
no capital mobility, a centralized government will respond to the median voter
and set the equilibrium policy (τK
med
, τL
med
, βmed)23.
2.4.2 Decentralization
Under decentralized fiscal powers, each of the J sub-central governments in each
jurisdiction now face full capital mobility. With tax competition over mobile
factors, the policy response will necessarily be different. In the knowledge that,
in order to attract capital to their own jurisdiction, governments have to offer the
22Further details on this result (Proposition 1) and detailed model derivations are presented in Appendix B.
23Note that, in a world of capital controls between jurisdictions (we could in principle think of this as the EU
pre-European Single Market case or, more generally, as the cases when there is limited or no capital mobility
between neighbouring countries), the optimal policy would again be (τKj
med
, τj
Lmed, βmedj ), where each sub-
central government would respond to the median-voter in its own jurisdiction.
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highest possible net rate of return on capital, these will engage in a ”race to the
top” involving the highest possible rates of return on capital and lowest capital
taxation. A first-mover would have, in this context, the immediate benefit of
attracting all the capital in the economy (leaving all the other jurisdictions with a
zero amount of capital). Hence, governments are immediately driven towards an
environment of extreme Bertrand competition for capital. In equilibrium, every
jurisdiction will offer the same net rate of return on capital and the assumption of
a slight home-bias will imply no further capital movements will take place. The
policy chosen by sub-central governments thus maximizes the net rate of return
on capital24:
(τK
∗
, τL
∗
, β∗) = arg max
(τKj ,τ
L
j ,βj)
{
Aα
[
βj
(
τKj +
τLj
1− τLj
ωj
)]1−α
− τKj
}
(10)
This policy will, by definition, maximize economic growth. It will not however
respond to median-voter redistributive preferences, as before. In other words,
median-voters of different jurisdictions, understanding the new constraints im-
posed by capital mobility between jurisdictions, will demand that the sub-central
governments choose the growth maximising policy set, (τK
∗
, τL
∗
, β∗). Accordingly,
with perfect capital mobility, full fiscal discretion for sub-central governments im-
plies that equilibrium policy sets do no longer reflect the distribution of capital
in different jurisdictions. This breaks the link between economic growth and in-
equality found namely in Alesina and Rodrik (1994), as jurisdictions with a priori
different initial distributions of capital, will necessarily offer the same growth-
maximising policy set in decentralized political economy equilibrium. Note in
particular that the share βj of government revenues spent on the productive pub-
24Further details on this result (Propositions 2 and 3) are presented in Appendix B.
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lic good will, in equilibrium, tend to unity. This implies that the merit good is
not provided under decentralization. All the revenues from capital and labour
taxation will be directed towards the productive public good, in order to achieve
the objective of maximizing the rate of return on capital. We will now explore
this point as well as the wider implications of (10) more in depth. We then move
on to compare, in the next section, the decentralized political economy equilib-
rium with other possible scenarios, namely under which some or all tax rates are
harmonized across jurisdictions.
By looking at (10), we can observe that a positive capital tax rate, τKj > 0,
could in principle be sustained as an equilibrium. Indeed, for a small enough
labour income tax, τLj , decentralized governments with full fiscal discretion will
choose to raise τKj until the maximum net rate of return on capital is reached,
the exact level of which depends namely on the capital share α. Yet, sub-central
governments will primarily raise the net rate of return on capital through higher
labour income tax rates. The rationale for this is that, on the one hand, labour
income taxes do not have a (first-order) negative effect on the net rate of return on
capital. On the other hand, the second-order effects of the policy set (τKj , τ
L
j , βj)
on the net rate of return on capital, through the wage-capital ratio, also have to
be taken into account. Let us have a closer look at the after-tax wage-capital
ratio, before moving on to further considerations on the decentralized political
economy equilibrium:
ωj ≡ (1−τ
L
j )wj(t)
kj(t)
= (1− τLj )(1− α)(
τLj
1−τLj
ωjlj + τ
K
j )
1−αl−αj
An increase on productive public spending, gj(t), strictly increases the wage rate.
This also increases the (pre-tax) wage-capital ratio. In terms of the effects on the
after-tax wage-capital ratio, ωj, this will depend on whether this higher spending
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is financed out of capital or labour income taxes. The after-tax wage-capital
ratio will strictly increase with higher capital taxes, whereas it will show a hump-
shaped response to changes in labour-income taxes. On the whole, however, the
equilibrium policy set under decentralization (τK
∗
, τL
∗
, β∗) will bring the two tax
instruments to the extreme: there will be a race to the top to tax labour, the
immobile factor, driving τL
∗
to one, and a race to the bottom in capital taxation,
the mobile factor, driving τK
∗
to zero. This result is similar to the classical optimal
taxation literature (Ramsey, 1927). We shall return to this result later on, when
we discuss different institutional alternatives available in this context. Before
moving on to the next section, we can summarize the results just obtained: in an
environment of perfect capital mobility, full fiscal decentralization, featuring sub-
central governments with complete tax and spending discretion, yields a political
economy equilibrium with policy set (τK
∗
, τL
∗
, β∗) = (0, 1, 1).
2.5 Tax harmonization
In order to discuss tax harmonization more in depth, let us briefly outline and
explore the set of options that can be considered in this context. We will look
at three benchmark scenarios in this context: full tax harmonization, capital tax
harmonization and labour income tax harmonization. Any tax harmonization
initiatives that can be undertaken in the future at the EU level can be thought
to belong to any of these categories. Firstly, let us look at the case of full tax
harmonization. In the context of the European Union, this would resemble to
a multilateral tax agreement between all member countries, with the tax rates
to be negotiated and set periodically by the European Council. Alternatively,
one could also think of a pure form of centralization of fiscal powers, whereby
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the European Commission would gain full tax setting discretion but with public
spending remaining largely at the discretion of EU member countries. This type
of more ambitious tax agreement can furthermore be understood as a step short
of a full EU Fiscal Union, under which a federal government would be given
significant spending powers. Secondly, we may consider capital tax harmonization.
This hypothesis is frequently discussed, namely in the context of the European
Union, but more broadly in the context of international tax competition issues.
We assume in this case that an homogeneous capital tax rate is set by a central
government and that sub-central governments are responsible for setting labour
income tax rates, as well as retaining full discretion over the composition of public
spending. Finally, we have the scenario under which only labour income taxes are
harmonized. Although perhaps frequently overlooked, this option has markedly
different implications from capital tax harmonization. We finally compare the
three options, by analyzing their basic qualitative properties.
2.5.1 Full tax harmonization
The case of full tax harmonization corresponds to a scenario under which a central
or federal government has full tax setting powers. Let us first clearly highlight the
differences between this case and one of full centralization of fiscal powers. If the
central government would also retain public spending powers, then the equilib-
rium obtained here would be equivalent to the centralization equilibrium outlined
above. In the context of the EU institutional design, this amounts to having the
European Commission with full fiscal discretion over tax setting and public spend-
ing issues. In other words, this would correspond to the concept of a complete
monetary and fiscal union at the EU level, with a large federal budget, covering es-
sential parts of public spending categories, from unemployment insurance, defense
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and infrastructure investment to healthcare and education spending. The equi-
librium obtained, similarly to the centralized case discussed before, would imply
that the central or federal government would respond to the policy preferences of
an ”EU median voter”. Note again that, under this scenario, the policy objective
will not necessarily involve maximising the rate of return on capital and, hence,
the growth rate of the economy.
The alternative we discuss here - perhaps less likely to raise eyebrows, namely
in the European context - is to have full tax harmonization. In this case, common
tax rates or tax rate thresholds are agreed upon between different jurisdictions,
with the objective of mitigating potential damaging effects of aggressive tax com-
petition. In the European context, this would imply that EU member countries
and the European Commission would agree to a common taxation framework, yet
leaving full (de jure) fiscal discretion over the composition of public spending at
the national level. We can formalize this scenario in terms of a different budget
constraint and objective function for sub-central governments. Hence, the budget
constraint of sub-central governments would be:
gj(t) + hj(t) = τ
Kkj(t) + τ
Lwj(t)lj(t) (2a)
This (consolidated) budget constraint can again be rewritten as:
gj(t) = βj
[
τKkj(t) + τ
Lwj(t)lj(t)
]
(2a’)
hj(t) = (1− βj)
[
τKkj(t) + τ
Lwj(t)lj(t)
]
(2a”)
Note that the policy chosen by sub-central governments still has to satisfy in this
case the condition for maximising the net rate of return on capital. sub-central
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governments face perfect capital mobility and, in this context, however there will
not strictly exist tax competition between jurisdictions, there will be a ”public
spending composition” competition. Hence, the race to maximize the rate of
return on capital persist, but will now only feature a single policy instrument:
β∗ = arg max
βj
{
Aα
[
βj
(
τK +
τL
1− τLω
)]1−α
− τK
}
(10a)
Hence, it is immediately apparent that the only equilibrium is achieved for βj = 1.
2.5.2 Capital tax harmonization
Capital tax harmonization is often presented as one option that would be able
to undermine international tax competition and, thereby, mitigate the adverse
consequences of free movement of capital, within the EU but also in broader
contexts. This option can also be seen as a more modest version of the one
analyzed before, where full tax harmonization was achieved. Here, instead, tax
rates or (minimum) thresholds are only set on capital taxes. In the European
context, this would imply common capital taxation principles and an equalization
of (effective) capital tax rates, with EU member states keeping full discretion
over labour income taxation and public spending. We can again formalize this
in terms of a different budget constraint and objective function for sub-central
governments.
The budget constraint of sub-central governments would be:
gj(t) + hj(t) = τ
Kkj(t) + τ
L
j wj(t)lj(t) (2b)
Which can again be rewritten as:
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gj(t) = βj
[
τKkj(t) + τ
L
j wj(t)lj(t)
]
(2b’)
hj(t) = (1− βj)
[
τKkj(t) + τ
L
j wj(t)lj(t)
]
(2b”)
Once again, the policy chosen by sub-central governments has to satisfy the con-
dition for maximising the net rate of return on capital, now with two policy
instruments. With the capital tax rate fixed, sub-central governments will com-
pete to attach mobile factors through labour income tax rates and, again, through
the composition of public spending:
(τL
∗
, β∗) = arg max
(τLj ,βj)
{
Aα
[
βj
(
τK +
τLj
1− τLj
ωj
)]1−α
− τK
}
(10b)
Again, the only equilibrium for the composition of public spending is achieved for
βj = 1. Furthermore, similarly to the decentralization case presented above, the
race to maximize the rate of return on capital will entail a race to the top in labour
income taxes. With the capital tax rates set centrally, sub-central governments
will use their public spending powers and set τLj , βj = 1
25. Hence, capital tax
harmonization, by not eliminating one critical source of tax competition - or, in
other words, by not being able to prevent that sub-central governments engage in
a competition for capital using labour income taxation and set the highest possible
tax rates on this factor (τLj = 1) -, will result in the lowest after-tax wage-capital
ratio (ωj = 0). This result is thus similar to case of full fiscal decentralization.
Before moving on to the final tax harmonization option, it is important to stress
again that both full fiscal decentralization and capital tax harmonization will
25To avoid this result, we could have a utility function featuring a disutility of labour supply. The key result
would, however, remain qualitatively similar. Labour income taxes would again be set to the maximize the
rate of return on capital, which would be the maximum tax rate tolerated by individuals, now with a trade-off
between higher tax revenues and the disincentive to work.
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entail maximum income and consumption inequality between individuals with
different initial capital endowments.
2.5.3 Labour income tax harmonization
Labour income tax harmonization is perhaps a less commonly discussed option in
this context. Within the EU, in particular, a few modest common labour market
initiatives have certainly been put forward over the whole European economic
integration process. The recent discussions on a common European unemployment
insurance mechanism (e.g. Abraham et al. 2018a) can also be interpreted as a
form of labour market integration. Labour income tax systems are, however,
generally perceived to be largely part of a set of issues that are bound to be under
the discretion of national governments. Similarly, in federal countries, regions
or states are often left with significant discretion over labour income tax rates
and regulations. This scenario can be viewed once again as a by-product of full
tax harmonization. Common tax rates or tax thresholds are instead set only
over labour income, rather than capital. In the European context, this would
imply common labour income taxation principles and an equalization of EU labour
income tax rates, as well as labour market regulations. This would leave full
discretion to EU member countries on capital taxation and, as before, over public
spending. If we formalize again the problem in terms of the budget constraints
and objective function for sub-central governments, we obtain the following:
gj(t) + hj(t) = τ
K
j kj(t) + τ
Lwj(t)lj(t) (2c)
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The (consolidated) budget constraint can again be divided into two different bud-
get constraints:
gj(t) = βj
[
τKj kj(t) + τ
Lwj(t)lj(t)
]
(2c’)
hj(t) = (1− βj)
[
τKj kj(t) + τ
Lwj(t)lj(t)
]
(2c”)
The policy chosen by sub-central governments satisfies again, in equilibrium, the
condition for maximising the net rate of return on capital, with two policy instru-
ments:
(τK
∗
, β∗) = arg max
(τKj ,βj)
{
Aα
[
βj
(
τKj +
τL
1− τLωj
)]1−α
− τKj
}
(10c)
Again, the equilibrium achieved features βj = 1. Hence, any scenario with public
spending powers devolved to sub-central governments will imply that all tax rev-
enues are spent exclusively on productive public goods. Under this framework,
interjurisdictional competition for capital precludes spending on merit goods. Yet,
contrary to full fiscal decentralization and to capital tax harmonization, the race
to maximize the rate of return on capital does not also entail any longer a race to
the top in labour income taxation. Instead, capital tax rates will be set by sub-
central governments to compete for mobile factors. With labour income tax rates
fixed, this implies τKj ≥ 0. Labour income tax harmonization, by being effectively
able to rule out the possibility that sub-central governments take advantage of
the immobility of the labour tax base and set τLj = 1, will also prevent that a zero
after-tax wage-capital ratio (ωj = 0) is reached in equilibrium. In the following
numerical simulations, we will compare the above results and devote particular
attention to their implications from an EU policymaking perspective.
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2.5.4 Simulation of tax harmonization policies
In order to highlight the main qualitative features of the various different tax
harmonization environments just described, we will now turn to the graphical
illustration of a numerical simulation of our model. The following numerical ex-
amples are based on similar parameter values chosen for the key variables, namely
for the continuous-time discount factor, δ, the capital share, α, and preference pa-
rameters ηc and ηh
26.
The capital tax harmonization case, outlined in the previous section, is depicted
in Figure (5). Looking at the two surfaces plotted in the graph, we can identify
two key facts. On the one hand, capital tax harmonization leads to a race to the
top in labour income taxation, in order to maximize the rate of return on capital.
This happens irrespectively of the level at which capital tax rates are harmonized.
This can be seen by looking at the bottom graph in figure (5). By picking any
level of τKj , fixed by the central government or agreed upon between sub-central
governments, the implication is that a race to the top in labour income taxation
would immediately follow. On the other hand, the after-tax wage-capital ratio will
be driven to zero, which implies an extreme form of (after-tax) income inequality.
Labour income is fully taxed in order to subsidize capital owners. This suggests
that a scenario under which only capital taxation is harmonized, both at the rate
and the base level, is likely to amplify the competition for capital over labour
income tax rates.
The scenario of labour income tax harmonization is in turn illustrated in Fig-
ure (6). Looking again at the two surfaces, we can observe that this leads to a
26For further details on the numerical values of these parameters and the two-dimensional figures corresponding
to the three-dimensional ones shown below, please refer to Appendix B.
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Figure 5: Capital tax harmonization (τj - capital tax, φj - labour income tax) - after-tax wage-capital ratio
(ωj) and net rate of return on capital (ρj). The level of the (after-tax) wage-capital ratio (top graph) and the
net rate of return on capital (bottom graph) are plotted for different values of the labour income tax rate and
the capital tax rate. With capital tax harmonization, i.e. holding τj constant, it can be observed that there is a
”race to the top” in φj so to maximize the net rate of return on capital (bottom graph), leading to a progressive
decrease in the (after-tax) wage-capital ratio.
markedly different outcome. On the one hand, labour income tax harmonization
does not necessarily result in a race to the bottom in capital taxation. One can
observe instead, by considering different levels of labour income taxation along
the axis, that sub-central jurisdictions do no longer have the incentive to engage
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in a race to the bottom in capital taxation. Instead, for most levels of the labour
income tax the growth-maximising policy set implies a positive capital tax rate
in equilibrium, τKj > 0.
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Figure 6: Labour tax harmonization (τj - capital tax, φj - labour income tax) - after-tax wage-capital ratio
(ωj) and net rate of return on capital (ρj). The level of the (after-tax) wage-capital ratio (top graph) and the
net rate of return on capital (bottom graph) are plotted for different values of the labour income tax rate and the
capital tax rate. With labour income tax harmonization, i.e. holding φj constant, it can be observed that there
might be a non-zero capital tax rate, τj , that maximizes the net rate of return on capital (bottom graph), for
small enough levels of labour income taxation. Holding φj constant also implies that the (after-tax) wage-capital
ratio does not follow a decreasing path with the (constrained) maximization of the net rate of return on capital.
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On the other hand, the after-tax wage-capital ratio is not driven to zero, which
precludes the extreme result observed in the previous scenarios, under which
labour income is fully taxed in order to subsidize capital income. Finally, note
that the full discussion has so far resulted in a zero level of the merit good, in
equilibrium, as sub-central governments facing perfect capital mobility are forced
to set βj = 1.
2.6 Conclusions
Is fiscal decentralization good for economic growth? The forces of tax com-
petition suggest this is indeed the case. When some productive factors enjoy
free mobility, government can use their tax and spending powers to attract these
factors to their own jurisdictions. This also implies that the fiscal discretion of
jurisdictions becomes constrained by the free mobility of mobile factors across
borders. Economically integrated jurisdictions will thus tend to reduce the tax
burden on mobile factors and increase the tax burden on immobile factors of
production. The choice over public expenditures also becomes constrained. Juris-
dictions facing full capital mobility will be driven to implement pro-growth over
redistributive policies. Hence, fiscal decentralization in a world of perfect capital
mobility is growth-maximizing. This was labeled as the Political Trilemma of the
World Economy (Rodrik, 2000). Closer to the public finance tradition, this is
the primary driving force at the heart of the idea of market-preserving federalism
(Weingast, 1995).
Where does the EU stand in this discussion? The trends over the past decades
clearly indicate that EU countries have already undertaken a first wave of large-
scale corporate tax rate cuts. This was frequently accompanied by tax base en-
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largements and, perhaps more importantly, by an expansion towards other tax
revenue sources, for instance to consumption and labour income taxation. The
largest reductions in corporate tax rates in the past decades across OECD coun-
tries were indeed observed within this area, not least because of the degree of
geographical, regulatory and economics proximity between jurisdictions. In this
context, the EU presents itself as a unique laboratory for exploring the effects
of tax competition, The creation of the European Single Market, with perfect
mobility of goods and factors of production, has given rise to a very peculiar
institutional setting, under which perfectly economically integrated jurisdictions
with virtually full fiscal discretion coexist. Given the limits to the broadening
of tax bases and to further consumption tax increases, EU countries are thus
increasingly likely to have to face the choice between raising revenue through
taxes on capital or through taxes falling on labour. Existing data suggests that
larger countries, facing substantial competition from neighbouring jurisdictions,
are already engaging in more aggressive tax setting behaviour. Furthermore, the
tax reforms in the United States, as a distinct foreign competitor, are likely to
trigger a EU response. The re-appearance of this issue in the policy agenda of
many EU countries suggests that these trends are unlikely to be toned-down in
the foreseeable future.
This paper points towards various directions. The current status quo, with
countries enjoying full fiscal discretion to compete for capital, is likely to produce
the highest aggregate growth, while exacerbating economic inequalities. At the
other end, jurisdictions can aim for further centralization of fiscal powers. In the
EU, this could eventually lead to a fiscal union, which many have argued would
be the most desirable way to complement the existing monetary union. Yet,
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political feasibility and a long tradition of gradual institutional change is likely
to hinder such a large shift of fiscal powers from national jurisdictions towards
a federal level. Nonetheless, between the current institutional setting of nearly
full national fiscal discretion and a complete fiscal union, a wide array of options
is at the disposal of policymakers. The arduous task of trying to mitigate the
harmful effects of aggressive tax competition between jurisdictions, while leaving
room for sufficient fiscal discretion at the national level, seems to bring forward
tax harmonization as an increasingly worthy candidate, at the EU level but also
more broadly.
But which taxes should be harmonized? The present paper explores various
available options. Full tax harmonization - which would likely prove difficult to
achieve even between economically integrated jurisdictions like the EU - would
be equivalent to a partial fiscal union. In this scenario, all tax rates would be
set centrally or agreed upon in multilateral tax agreements between jurisdictions
and national governments would keep (de jure) discretion over the composition
of public spending. As we have shown, this does not correspond to a de facto
discretion over public spending, as the public provision of merit goods would be
severely constrained as a result of the persistent competition to attract mobile
factors. Capital tax harmonization, a recurrently debated option in this context,
would in turn lead to a race to the top in labour income taxation and not be
able, on its own, to avoid a result under which immobile tax bases are effectively
taxed away to subsidize capital. With fully integrated capital markets, the har-
monization of labour income taxes and regulations provides the only option able
to prevent in practice a subsidy to capital owners, through heavier labour tax-
ation and looser labour market regulations. In the EU, but also elsewhere, any
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decisions on tax harmonization will thus necessarily depend on the ultimate policy
objectives of governments and voters. The policy options presented in this paper
have been kept simple to ensure model tractability. In order to assess the wider
welfare implications of each of these tax harmonization options, a richer model
is no doubt needed. Moreover, within each of different scenarios proposed here,
several options may be at the disposal of policymakers and worth exploring in this
context. One issue is clear however from our analysis: growing interjurisdictional
capital mobility and tax competition bring important constraints to the difficult
trade-off between economic growth and redistribution.
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III On the Design of a European Fiscal Harmonization
Agreement
Abstract
Fiscal competition can bring large welfare losses and imply significant shifts in tax and
spending structures of developed economies. Some form of fiscal coordination is thus com-
monly advocated in order to prevent such type of non-cooperative Nash equilibria. But
how should policymakers design a fiscal harmonization agreement in the European Union?
Recent tax harmonization proposals have focused on corporate income tax harmonization.
This paper proposes a different approach. Several policy scenarios are examined within an
endogenous growth model with flexible labour supply calibrated for the EU economy. Two
main messages emerge from the policy simulations. Firstly, capital income tax harmoniza-
tion is no panacea. Indirect taxes, such as VAT, should become priority targets of fiscal
reforms proposals. Secondly, expenditure side reforms are also needed. Even limited EU
budget increases, such as the introduction of common welfare programmes like a European-
wide unemployment insurance system, can go a long way in preventing significant welfare
losses from fiscal competition.
3.1 Introduction
Deepening economic integration in an environment of nearly perfect capital
mobility brings new challenges for policymakers. Governments may be tempted
in this context to compete with each other for mobile resources and tax bases,
trying to offer the highest rate of return or lowest price on these factors, namely
by providing investment subsidies or productivity-enhancing public investments,
and undercutting each other’s capital income taxes. The downward trend in cor-
porate tax rates in the past decades, seen namely across the European Union
(EU) as the rules of the Single Market entered into force and removed any lasting
capital controls, certainly seems to confirm the latter incentive. Aggressive tax
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competition may generate adverse effects for all countries and imply large wel-
fare losses. Furthermore, becoming the main driver of national fiscal policies, it
may culminate in significant shifts in the tax and spending structures of different
governments. Against this background, several tax harmonization initiatives have
been proposed and debated by European policymakers. While these contributions
have taken several forms over the years and the discussion has evolved since the
early Tinbergen Report in 195327 or the proposals put forward by the Ruding
Committee (Ruding, 1992), one common denominator can readily be identified:
all the tax harmonization proposals have mostly focused on capital income taxa-
tion.
Either of the form of tax base harmonization (Bettendorf et al., 2010), the
aim of the so-called CCCTB project, or through more ambitious tax rate har-
monization proposals (Sørensen 2000, 2004, Zodrow 2003, Mendoza and Tesar
2005, Conconi et al. 2008, Haufler and Lu¨lfesmann 2015), the literature can be
said to reach a common ground: in principle, tax harmonization can deliver non-
negligible welfare gains, particularly at the bottom of the income distribution
(Sørensen, 2000). In practice, however, it may prove politically very challenging
to achieve a common European agreement on the matter. The recent hesitant
movements towards tax base harmonization certainly seem to confirm this issue.
At the EU level, the recent sovereign debt crisis has also relaunched the debate on
fiscal reform (Van Rompuy et al. 2012, Juncker et al. 2015, European Commission
2017a, 2017c, Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. 2018) and several proposals for completing the
Economic and Monetary Union have recently been put forward (Allard et al. 2013,
27Written in the wake of the Treaty of Paris, in 1951, which established the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, this report is formally known as the ”Report on the Problems Raised by the Different Turnover Tax
Systems Applied Within the Common Market”, and was chaired by the Dutch economist and Nobel-prize winner
Jan Tinbergen.
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Bargain et al. 2013), focusing mostly on the macroeconomic stabilization prop-
erties of such reforms (Farhi and Werning 2017, Abraham et al. 2018b), and in
particular on the optimal design of a common European unemployment insurance
system (Beblavy´ and Maselli 2014, Abraham et al. 2018a, Dolls et al. 2018).
This paper studies the scope for tax harmonization in the EU and, in particular,
the consequences of different tax harmonization scenarios are investigated. From
the lenses of an endogenous growth model with flexible labour supply, government
fiscal policies are obtained as a product of government expenditure composition
and choices of consumption, capital and labour income tax rates. The endogeneity
of labour supply is an essential ingredient to obtain real effects of government
consumption expenditure (Turnovsky, 2000)28.
Our analysis of fiscal policy focuses on three main issues. First, we characterize
optimal fiscal policy in steady state and we calibrate our growth model for the
average EU economy. Consumption and leisure should be taxed uniformly at the
optimum. Furthermore, with government expenditures set at their optimal levels,
capital should not be taxed. We show that moving from the current benchmark
to optimal fiscal policy would generate significant welfare gains. This would also
imply significant shifts in the tax structures of EU economies, namely in labour
income tax structures and consumption tax rates. It would also lead to large
changes in revenue sources, from a system predominantly reliant on income tax
revenues towards an indirect tax system, heavily reliant on consumption taxes.
Secondly, we focus on the role of tax competition between EU countries. In a
context where capital is fully mobile, households will aim to invest their capital
28We consider two main types of expenditure. Government consumption expenditure can be thought as gov-
ernment expenditure with a welfaristic nature, on merit goods and income maintenance. Government production
expenditure has a productive character and can include public infrastructure, as well as R&D expenditure or
targeted training programmes.
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in those jurisdictions that offer the highest (after-tax) rates of return. Hence, ju-
risdictions compete with each other to attract mobile factors. Without any form
of tax coordination, jurisdictions are driven into a form of non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium, where governments shift their tax and spending structures to benefit
(mobile) production factors, at the expense of income distribution and of expen-
diture on public goods that directly benefit (immobile) households. As economies
converge to this equilibrium, we observe that this implies a large subsidization
of capital, either through direct subsidies or, alternatively, through higher-than-
optimal productive public expenditure, working effectively as a form of indirect
capital subsidization. This tax competition equilibrium also implies very high
taxes on consumption and a ”race to the bottom” in government consumption
expenditure, which lead to potentially substantial welfare losses.
Finally, we analyse several different scenarios of fiscal harmonization and how
these might restrain competitive pressures at the country level and help to pre-
vent the large welfare losses implied by unfettered fiscal competition between EU
countries. The results from our ”theory with numbers” exercise point towards
several directions. Capital income tax harmonization, implying a common tax
rate (or a minimum tax threshold) on capital income for all EU countries neces-
sarily avoids a race to bottom in capital taxation. Yet, it implies a shift of fiscal
competition towards immobile tax bases and towards de facto subsidies to capital,
through an over-investment in productive public goods. Other options studied in
this context are the harmonization of labour income tax and of consumption tax
rates. Both lead to qualitatively similar effects, as these can be seen as implicit
taxes on consumers. On their own, the harmonization of consumption or labour
income tax rates can lead to smaller welfare losses than capital tax harmonization.
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This can be explained by the fact that a race to the top in taxes on consumption
and leisure is avoided. The harmonization of consumption taxes, in particular,
dramatically restrains the scope for over-investment on productive public goods
and thereby minimizes potential welfare losses from fiscal competition.
The above tax harmonization scenarios fail to tackle another important dis-
tortion introduced by interjurisdictional fiscal competition: the race to the bot-
tom in government consumption expenditure. In this vein, expenditure-side fiscal
reforms are also considered. Even a fairly limited increase in the EU budget,
with consumption-targeted expenditures, delivers interesting welfaristic proper-
ties, particularly when coupled with consumption tax harmonization. The opti-
mal fiscal harmonization scenario implies a significant increase in the EU budget,
with consequently a greater need for expanding EU own resources, for instance via
the centralization of consumption tax revenues. In this case, EU countries, with
full discretion over income taxes and government expenditures, are also induced
to set taxes and government production expenditures optimally.
Having shed light on the implications of potential tax harmonization and
expenditure-side fiscal reforms - which could, in principle, be implemented in
a federation of countries like the EU -, the question of income inequality and
redistribution still remains. Optimal fiscal harmonization in the EU may im-
ply consumption rather than capital or labour income tax harmonization and a
larger federal budget. Yet, this scenario also implies zero capital income taxes,
in equilibrium. The current model is silent on the distributional effects of these
fiscal reforms. However, acknowledging that the harmonization of consumption
taxes may imply very large shifts in VAT structures across the EU, one possible
avenue to explore is to consider the introduction of progressive consumption tax-
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ation in the EU context29. This might not only be more feasible at the federal
rather than at the country level, but it has the benefit of financing both the EU
and national budgets through a tax scheme that, absent lump-sum, discrimina-
tory or extensive time-consistent wealth taxation, potentially implies the least
distortive properties. Another possible avenue for further fiscal reforms brings us
to the realm of wealth taxation (Diamond and Saez, 2011). This paper somehow
complements this literature, particularly in the context of fiscal competition, by
shedding light on the potentially malign implications of focusing solely on capital
income tax harmonization at the EU level.
In the next section, the recent taxation trends in the EU are re-assessed. In
the third section, the model is presented and the main mechanisms through which
fiscal policy works are examined. In the fourth section, the issue of optimal fiscal
policy is addressed. The framework for the model simulations is also set, as the
benchmark calibration is discussed. The equilibria under the benchmark scenario,
optimal policy and tax competition are then explored. In the fifth section, we
discuss different fiscal harmonization scenarios and explore their implications in
detail, before offering some concluding remarks, in the final section.
3.2 Data and motivation
Corporate income tax (CIT) rates have been steadily declining in the European
Union since the early 1980s. The average EU-28 statutory CIT rate is 21.9% in
2017, down from 34.7% in 1995. Going further back, the average statutory CIT
rate in the EU was above 50% in 198230.
29This goes along the recent discussion on progressive taxation and proposals by Auerbach and Hassett (2015),
Mankiw (2015), Piketty (2015), or Fullerton et al. (1983).
30The reported averages going back to the period prior to 1995, reflect the available data gathered by the
Institute for Fiscal Studies for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
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As can be seen from Figure 7, EU CIT rates have been steadily declining
over the period. Furthermore, a convergence of CIT rates can also be observed,
particularly since the mid-1990s. Looking at individual country paths uncovers
another characteristic of this downward trend in CIT rates. With the exception
of France, the general downward trend in CIT rates appears more volatile in
’peripheral’ than in ’core’ EU economies (Figures C.1, C.2 and C.3 in Appendix).
Four out of the five EU core economies saw their CIT rates gradually decrease
over the 35-year period, with little or no temporary spikes. In addition, while the
three largest economies - France, Germany and the United Kingdom - had started
the period with CIT rates above 50%, these were all below 40% by the late 1990s
(2001, in the case of Germany), converging with the CIT rates in ’peripheral’
economies. The latter had CIT rates around 40% already in the early 1980s (with
exception of Portugal) and saw this gap close significantly until the late 1990s.
Together, these factors can explain the fast convergence of EU CIT rates in the
late 1990s, shown in Figure 7.
The case of Italy is perhaps the more peculiar, with an increase in the top
statutory CIT rate from below 40% in 1982 to above 50% until 1997. On the
other hand, Finland and Sweden more than halved their top statutory CIT rates
during that period, coinciding with the pre-accession to the EU and the Single
Market. A similar, but less pronounced, path can also be observed in Austria.
By the early 2000s, all the twelve EU countries had CIT rates below 40%. Ten
out of the twelve countries had CIT at or below 30% in 2017. The exceptions are
Belgium and France, which stand out as the two EU countries with highest CIT
rates.
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Norway. For comparison purposes, the US statutory CIT rate was 49.6%
in 1982, falling to 38.4% in 1987 and remained broadly constant until 2017.
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Figure 7: Average and standard deviation of top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in EU countries
(1982-2017). Country coverage: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The figure depicts a global downward trend in corporate taxation
across the EU, which is accompanied by a period of marked convergence of top statutory CIT rates since the
late 1990s.
Turning our attention to the EU-28 countries (together with Iceland and Nor-
way), Figure 8 shows a similar picture, from 1995 to 2017. The four largest EU
economies saw their average top statutory CIT rates decline steadily over the
period, despite a temporary spike in France in the early 2010s (Figure C.4). A
similar picture emerges from the Benelux and Austria, with the largest drops
observed during the early 2000s (Figure C.5). In the case of Nordic countries,
Denmark and Iceland were the only countries with top statutory CIT rates above
30% in 1995, and saw these rapidly converge to levels below 25% by 2017, with
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Figure 8: Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017). Country coverage: all
EU-28 countries plus Iceland and Norway. EU-28 countries are divided into country groups. The four EU largest
economies are France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg
(Benelux) are grouped with Austria. The three Nordic countries - Denmark, Finland and Sweden - are grouped
with Iceland and Norway. The GIPS countries include Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spaon. The three baltic
countries - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - are shown together with the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia,
forming the group of North Eastern European (NEE) economies. South Eastern European (SEE) economies
include Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia, as well as Cyprus and Malta. The figure depicts a
global downward trend in corporate taxation throughout the period, broadly accompanied by a convergence of
tax rates within country groups, with the exception of GIPS countries.
all five countries showing top CIT rates within a narrow 5% interval (Figure C.6).
In turn, the only lasting period of divergence in CIT rates can be observed in
the so-called GIPS countries. This can largely be attributed to the progressive
decrease in the top statutory CIT rate in Ireland, from 40% in 1995 to 12.5%
in 200331. Yet, by 2010 all remaining countries had top statutory CIT rates at
or below 30%32. Finally, the Eastern European economies also experienced large
CIT rate drops, with most of the convergence occurring in the late 1990s and early
31Focusing on top statutory CIT rates hides, however, the full Irish story. A special 10% CIT rate was in
fact introduced in 1981, initially only for manufacturing companies, but later extended to include, for instance,
financial services. This replaced the previous ’Export Sales Relief’ system, first introduced in 1956, under which
all exports were effectively exempt from corporate taxation. Yet, the special 10% rate also had to be phased out
under EU laws and was replaced by the current 12.5% corporation tax, which applies to all firms’ trading profits.
32The temporary spike in Greece and Portugal after 2010 is most likely to reflect short-term budgetary pressures
and can be traced to the peak of the EMU sovereign debt crisis and the conditional bailout programmes (Figure
C.7).
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2000s, again coinciding with the pre-accession period. Hungary, in turn, with the
lowest top statutory CIT rate of all Eastern European economies at the beginning
of the period, already below 20% in 1995, halved its top statutory CIT rate to just
above 10% in 2017, making it the EU country with the lowest top statutory CIT
rate (Figures C.8 and C.9)33. Thus, with somehow different timings and despite
some temporary spikes seen in some countries, top statutory CIT rates have been
fastly declining in the EU.
The fall of top statutory CIT rates is observed across most OECD countries
and has been focus of substantial research (Devereux et al. 2002, Devereux et al.
2008, Overesch and Rincke 2011). Virtually all OECD countries have reduced
their CIT rates between 1982 and 2007 (Loretz, 2008) and recent reports show
evidence of increasing tax competition in recent years within the EU (OECD,
2017). In the opposite direction, the average tax-to-GDP ratio amongst OECD
countries reached 34.3% in 2016, the highest level ever recorded. The share of
personal income taxes, social security contributions and value-added taxes are at
their highest point, at around a quarter of GDP on average, or three quarters of
total tax revenue. Namely, VAT revenues reached a peak of nearly 7% of GDP,
or about a fifth of total tax revenues (OECD, 2016). The sources of tax revenue
have thus been dramatically changing over the last decades.
Personal income tax (PIT) rates have shown interesting paths over the last
decades. Underlying the general downward trend that can be observed across
the EU, particularly from 1995 until the late 2000s, top statutory PIT rates have
been diverging significantly since the early 2000s (Figure 9). Disaggregating by
country groups, allows us to get a neater picture of what happened over this
33The notable exceptions to this trend are Malta, with a flat rate of 35% over the entire period, while Estonia
and Slovenia had a somewhat delayed response, just after 2004.
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Figure 9: Average and standard deviation of top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in EU-28 countries
(1995-2017). Country coverage: all EU-28 countries plus Iceland and Norway. The figure depicts a global
downward trend in personal income taxation, accompanied by a considerable divergence of top PIT rates since
the early 2000s.
period, particularly since the early 2000s, when top statutory PIT rates started
to diverge. Looking at the bottom two graphs of Figure 10, we can immediately
disentangle a decreasing trend in Eastern European countries which started, by
and large, in the late 1990s and lasted until the late 2000s34.
Five out of the eleven Eastern European economies more than halved their top
statutory PIT rates during this period and all had lower PIT rates in 2017 than in
1995, with the exception of Slovenia. The remaining four graphs in Figure 10 show
34The divergence in top statutory PIT rates of SEE countries can be explained by the relatively high top PIT
rates of Croatia and Slovenia, which remained in the 40-50% band throughout the entire period. In the same
period, for example, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania more than halved their top PIT rates, from 40-50% to
10-20%. Malta maintained a constant 35% rate, while Cyprus slightly decreased the top PIT rate from 40 to
35% (Figure C.15).
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Figure 10: Top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017). Country coverage: all
EU-28 countries plus Iceland and Norway. EU-28 countries are divided into country groups. The four EU largest
economies are France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg
(Benelux) are grouped with Austria. The three Nordic countries - Denmark, Finland and Sweden - are grouped
with Iceland and Norway. The GIPS countries include Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spaon. The three baltic
countries - Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - are shown together with the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia,
forming the group of North Eastern European (NEE) economies. South Eastern European (SEE) economies
include Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia, as well as Cyprus and Malta. The figure shows that
the downward trend in the EU can be mostly attributed to the considerable slump in top PIT rates in Eastern
European economies. The divergence of tax rates within the EU, can also be explained by the fall of top PIT
rates in both NEE and SEE economies, as well as the recent increases in GIPS countries.
no clear marked trend. It is worth noting however the convergence of PIT rates in
the four largest economies in the EU towards the 45-50% level, mostly explained
by the large drops in France and Germany (Figure C.10). On the other hand,
GIPS countries experienced a slight increase in top PIT rates over the period,
particularly in the 2008-2012 period.
Consumption tax rates, unlike CIT or PIT rates, followed a markedly increasing
path across the EU, between 2000 and 2017 (Figure 11). Most notably, this
increase in VAT rates is common to all country groups (Figure 12). Furthermore,
with a few exceptions, all countries have increased their VAT rates over this
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Figure 11: Average and standard deviation of top value added tax (VAT) rates in EU-28 countries (2000-
2017). Country coverage: all EU-28 countries. The figure depicts an upward trend in personal income taxation,
accompanied by a convergence of top VAT rates since the early 2000s.
period35. Illustrating this fact is that all but five EU-28 countries have VAT rates
at or above 20% in 2017, while in 2000 only thirteen countries had VAT rates
above this level.
The trends in CIT, PIT and VAT rates described above point very clearly
towards several directions. First of all, the secular decrease in CIT rates across
the EU-28 is clear. Secondly, top statutory PIT rates have also steadily decreased
across the EU-28. While these drops were felt most strongly in Eastern European
countries, they were also a common feature of recent tax developments in Nordic
35Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and Bulgaria have maintained VAT rates constant between 2000 and
2017, at levels at or above 20%. Czech Republich and Slovakia are the only countries which experienced an
overall decrease in VAT rates over this period (Figures C.16-C.21).
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Figure 12: Top value added tax (VAT) rates in the EU-28 (2000-2017). Country coverage: all EU-28 countries
plus Iceland and Norway. EU-28 countries are divided into country groups. The four EU largest economies are
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (Benelux) are
grouped with Austria. The three Nordic countries - Denmark, Finland and Sweden - are grouped with Iceland
and Norway. The GIPS countries include Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spaon. The three baltic countries -
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania - are shown together with the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, forming the
group of North Eastern European (NEE) economies. South Eastern European (SEE) economies include Bulgaria,
Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia, as well as Cyprus and Malta. The figure shows the upward trend in
VAT in the EU is common across most country groups. The general convergence of VAT tax rates within the
EU is also a common feature across different country groups.
countries, France, Germany and the Benelux. The observed divergence in PIT
rates is perhaps best explained as a product of the large drops in Eastern Europe
since the late 1990s, rather than by the increase in PIT rates of GIPS countries
after 2008, which appears to be rather cyclical. Finally, the increasing trend in
VAT rates is common to virtually all EU-28 economies. Although this shift seems
more modest in terms of scale, it became particularly strong in the last decade,
as the average EU-28 VAT rate increased by 2 percentage points (Table 1), and
comparable to the generalized drops in CIT rates in terms of scope, as 26 out of
28 EU economies have maintained or increased their VAT rates during the period.
Looking at effective tax rates confirms the trends identified above. In addition,
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the observed rise in effective labour tax rates between 2007 and 2017, together
with the marked fall in top statutory PIT rates documented since 1995, points
towards a decrease in progressivity in labour income tax schedules across the EU.
Table 1: Average EU-28 tax rates (1982-2017). Country coverage: all EU-28 countries. As for 1982, the same
sub-sample of EU countries from Figure 7 is used. Effective tax rates are taken from the Taxation Trends in
the European Union report (EC - DG Taxation and Customs Union, 2018). The methodolody for computing
implicit and effective tax rates is in accordance with standard practice, explained in detail in Appendix B of the
abovementioned report. This table confirms the trends described above: the marked decrease in top-statutory
CIT rates since the early 1980s is a result of two large waves of CIT rate decreases, firstly in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, and then in the early 2000s. The decrease in PIT rates appears to have been stronger until the late
2000s and have stabilized since then. On the other hand, the increase in VAT rates appears stronger after the
late 2000s. Available computations of effective tax rates seem to broadly follow these trends.
Top statutory tax rates 1982* 1995 2000 2007 2017
CIT 50.8% 34.7% 31.8% 24.3% 21.9%
PIT 47.1% 44.7% 39.6% 39.2%
VAT 19.3% 19.6% 21.5%
Effective tax rates 2007 2017
Capital 22.1% 20.1%
Labour 35.4% 36.1%
Consumption 19.5% 20.6%
3.3 Model
Introducing flexible labour supply into a model of endogenous growth implies
that the equilibrium growth rate of the economy is now influenced by all fiscal
variables introduced in this framework, namely taxes on capital income, labour
income, and consumption, and both government consumption and production
expenditure. This allows our model to better capture the real effects of taxes
and government expenditure on the economy. Capital, labour income, and con-
sumption taxes can however produce different general equilibrium effects, both of
different magnitudes and through different mechanisms. In addition, government
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expenditure on both consumption and productive goods also becomes part of the
trade-off loci that describe and determine the equilibrium of the economy. Thus,
different types of government expenditures also have different effects on aggregate
variables. These two features are of particular relevance in the context of our
analysis of optimal fiscal policy and of different fiscal harmonization scenarios.
Several papers have introduced endogenous labour supply into growth models
(see for instance Rebelo 1991, Stokey and Rebelo 1995, Benhabib and Perli 1994,
Ladro´n-de Guevara et al. 1997, and Turnovsky 2000). The scope and focus of our
model is most closely related to Turnovsky (2000), insofar as our ultimate goal is
to analyse the effects of fiscal policy on the long-run equilibrium of an economy,
through the effect of different government tax and spending decisions on growth
and welfare outcomes.
3.3.1 Environment
A closed economy consists of J jurisdictions, sharing a common market. House-
holds are born in a given jurisdiction j, j = 1, ..., J , and cannot move across
jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction is populated by N identical households, each with
an infinite planning horizon and a full understanding of the path of the economy.
The representative agent in this economy is endowed with a unit of time, which
can be allocated to leisure, l, or to work, 1− l, and capital, kj, which is assumed
to be infinitely durable. Output of the representative firm, yj, is determined by a
Cobb-Douglas production function:
yj(t) = A
′Gj(t)αkj(t)1−α(1− lj)α ≡ A′
(Gj(t)
kj(t)
)α
(1− lj)αkj(t) (11)
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where Gj(t) denotes the flow of productive government spending
36. We further-
more impose the restriction 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The representative firm faces perfect
competition in both factors and final goods markets. Productive factors are paid
according to their marginal physical products, positive but diminishing, and there
are non-increasing returns to scale in private factors. We can thus write the real
wage rate and the (gross) rate of return to capital as:
wj = MPL ≡ ∂yj
∂(1− lj) = α
yj
1− lj , r
k
j = MPK ≡
∂yj
∂k
= (1− α)yj
kj
(12)
There are however constant returns to scale in capital and government produc-
tion expenditure. This ensures perpetual endogenous growth, as the production
function is linearly homogeneous in the two factors that can be accumulated. The
government decides in each period on the share of aggregate output, gj, to be
spent on the productive public good37:
Gj(t) = gjYj(t) (13)
Combining (13) and (11), we thus obtain our expression for the aggregate output
in economy j in each period t, Yj(t):
Yj(t) = (Ag
α
j )
1
1−α (1− lj) α1−αKj (14)
36This type of spending can be thought of any government expenditure that increases the productive potential
of the economy. This can be either pure infrastructure spending or can be considered as government R&D
expenditures, including on human capital formation. Furthermore, we assume that this type of government
goods or services are not subject to congestion costs, so that Gj(t) is a pure (productive) public good. In the
spirit of AK models, the capital stock of the economy can be thought of an aggregate of physical and human
capital.
37We focus here on the equilibrium in a decentralized market economy. Further considerations and comparisons
between the equilibria under a centrally planned economy and a decentralized outcome are left to the Optimal
Policy section, where optimal fiscal policy in the decentralized market economy aims to replicate the equilibrium
in the centrally planned economy.
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Households in the decentralized market economy purchase consumption goods
and re-invest their capital out of the proceeds from after-tax income, generated
by their labour and capital holdings. The objective of the representative household
is to maximise her own welfare, given government decisions, which is defined by
the following intertemporal isoelastic utility function:
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
1
γ
[
cjl
θ
jH
η
j
]γ
dt (15)
subject to the budget constraint:
k˙j(t) = (1− τKdij )r
k
dij
kj(t) + (1− τLj )wj(t)(1− lj)− (1 + τCj )cj(t)−
T
N
(16)
where τK , τL and τC denote the tax rates on capital income, labour income and
consumption, respectively. The household’s share of lump-sum taxes, T/N , is
in the policy simulations set to zero38. In other words, the government budget
constraint has to clear in every period, without resorting to deficit-financing and
rulling out the use of lump-sum taxation.
Regarding capital income taxation, the subscript dij on both the (gross) rate
of return and the tax rate, highlights the fact that households can decide to
invest their capital holdings in any of the j jurisdictions, paying the implied tax
rate, according to the principle of source taxation. Hence (1 − τK
dij
)rk
dij
is the
average (after-tax) rate of return earned on the stock of capital kj(t) invested in
each period by the representative household39. Finally, government consumption
38Even though lump-sum taxation is assumed away in the following sections, where different tax harmonization
are analyzed, it is kept in the model namely in order to allow for one-off policy simulations, such as uncompensated
increases or decreases in government spending shares or tax rates. The following parametric restrictions are also
imposed: −∞ < γ ≤ 1, η > 0, θ > 0, as well as the following joint restrictions: γ(1 + η) < 1, (1 + η + θ)γ < 1.
39Facing equal (after-tax) returns, households will prefer to invest in their home jurisdiction. This can be
interpreted as a ”home investment bias” and avoids multiple equilibria in our model.
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expenditure, Hj, is also set as a fraction of aggregate output:
Hj(t) = hjYj(t) (17)
In the absence of debt, the government chooses tax rates and the level of govern-
ment expenditures that satisfy the balanced-budget rule, in each period:
τLNjw(1− lj) + τKrkKj + τcCj + Tj = (gj + hj)Yj (18)
Finally, before moving on to the equilibrium of the model, we can sum the house-
hold budget constraint, (16), over all the N households in the economy to obtain
the aggregate resource constraint of each economy j:
K˙j = (1− hj − gj)Yj − Cj (19)
3.3.2 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this environment is achieved when firms maximise their profits,
consumers maximise their utilities, and all markets clear. Furthermore, equilib-
rium across the J jurisdictions, implies that the after-tax rate of return on capital
is equalized across all countries. With perfect capital mobility, any deviation from
the equilibrium (after-tax) rate of return in a jurisdiction would imply full cap-
ital inflows into or outflows from this economy. All jurisdictions thus enter into
a Bertrand competition for capital, offering the same (after-tax) rates of return.
Hence, the equilibrium can be defined as a set of policies for each jurisdiction j,
(τKj , τ
L
j , τ
C
j , gj, hj), corresponding to a path of consumption, labour, savings and
investment decisions for all individuals, {cij(t), lij(t), kij(t), dij(t)}, and wages, rental
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rates and production decisions in each jurisdiction {wj(t), rj(t), yj(t)} such that
(i) households maximise their utility, taking the paths of wages and rental rates of
capital in each jurisdiction as given, (ii) wages and rental rates of capital are given
by the marginal productivities of labour and capital and (iii) governments decide
on a set of policies, taking as given the policies chosen by other jurisdictions and
understanding the path of the economy resulting from those policy choices.
Carrying out the consumer optimization problem and aggregating over the N
households leads to the macroeconomic equilibrium which, under plausible con-
ditions, always lies on a balanced growth path40. Defining Ω(lj) ≡ αθ(1−α)
(
lj
1−lj
)
,
enables us to write the following four optimality conditions, which represent the
macroeconomic equilibrium in each jurisdiction j:
1− β
Ω(lj)
(Cj
Yj
)
=
(1− τLj )
(1 + τCj )
(20)
ψj =
1
1− γ(1 + η)
[
(1− τKj )(1− β)
( Yj
Kj
)
− ρ
]
(21)
ψj =
[
(1− gj − hj)−
(Cj
Yj
)]( Yj
Kj
)
(22)
Yj
Kj
= (αgαj )
1
1−α (1− l) α1−α (23)
40In a centrally planned equilibrium, the benevolent social planner chooses the paths of aggregate capital, K,
consumption, C, and leisure time, l, such that the utility of the representative agent is maximized, subject to
the aggregate resource constraint of the economy. Deriving the optimality conditions for this problem, yields five
conditions that define the equilibrium. These include the intratemporal optimality condition, the Euler equation
or intertemporal optimality condition, the resource constraint of the economy and the production function, as in
the decentralized equilibrium. In addition, the sixth optimality condition represents the shadow value of output.
Another difference with the decentralized equilibrium is that, since there are no taxes in this economy, these
necessarily do not show up in the equilibrium conditions. These conditions determine jointly the equilibrium
leisure time, the consumption-output and output-capital ratios, the relative value of output to capital, and the
equilibrium growth rate of the economy along a balanced growth path. Unless otherwise stated, throughout this
chapter upper case letters generally stand for aggregates, whereas lower case letters denote per capita variables.
Please refer to Appendix C for more details on the derivation of the social planner’s equilibrium.
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Equation (20) represents the intra-temporal optimality condition, between con-
sumption and leisure time. It states that the marginal rate of substitution between
labour (or output) and consumption equals the relative price of output in terms
of consumption. The household takes the size of government as given (i.e. in-
dependent of his decisions) and responds to tax incentives. The fact that higher
consumption taxes reduce the equilibrium consumption-income ratio is straight-
forward. Having elastic labour supply brings an additional factor into the equa-
tion, as a higher tax on labour income, given leisure time lj, also reduces this
ratio. Given output, a higher tax on wages reduces after-tax income. Equation
Equation (21) represents the Euler equation, where the relevant return is the net
private (after-tax) rate of return on capital. This corresponds to the usual equilib-
rium condition equating the growth rate of the economy to the difference between
the rate of return on capital and the intertemporal rate of time preference, or dis-
count rate, multiplied by the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Note that
this condition is slightly modified by the presence of government consumption in
the household’s utility function. Equation (22), in turn, is simply the aggregate
resource constraint (19), re-written per unit of capital stock. The left-hand-side of
the equation also stands for the equilibrium growth rate of the economy. Finally,
equation (23) is the production function (14), again re-written per unit of capital.
In order to obtain the RR locus, along which the equality of the growth rates of
capital and consumption is ensured, we substitute for (Y/K) from (23) into (21)41.
The long-run equilibrium of the economy is obtained by equating this locus to the
PP locus, which ensures equilibrium in the product market. We can obtain the
latter by substituting for (C/Y ) and (Y/K) into (22). An increase in leisure time
41Contrary to that of the centrally planned economy, this locus is always negative, as there is an ”externality”
of government consumption expenditure which is now ignored by the representative household.
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unambiguously reduces the output-capital ratio, as well as the return to capital
and the growth rate. This also increases the consumption-output ratio, which
has a negative effect on the rate of growth of capital. As l increases, employment
decreases and the marginal productivity of labour consequently increases. The
trade-off along this locus thus becomes steeper as l increases. The two loci de-
termining equality of consumption and capital growth rates and product market
equilibrium, RR and PP respectively, jointly determine the long-run equilibrium
of the economy42. The RR locus represents the combinations of long-run supply
of labour (or leisure time) and growth rate of the economy along which the equal-
ity of growth rates of (or after-tax rate of return on) capital and consumption is
ensured. In a decentralized market economy, this trade-off is always negative, as
agents take the level of government spending as given. A higher fraction of time
devoted to leisure reduces the marginal productivity of capital and the growth
rate of consumption must fall accordingly, and so does the growth rate of the
economy43. The PP curve, in turn, is always downward sloping. A higher frac-
tion of time devoted to leisure reduces the marginal productivity of capital and
its after-tax rate of return and increases the C/Y ratio. This has a negative effect
on the rate of growth of the economy. As the employment rate decreases, i.e.
as l becomes higher, the marginal product of labor increases, and the trade-off
42The two trade-off relationships that define the RR and PP curves are both non-linear and impose restrictions
on the model, so that a balanced growth equilibrium exists. It can be shown that a unique balanced growth
equilibrium exists if and only if γ < ρ
(1−gj−hj)(αgαj )1/(1−α)(1+η)
. This is obtained from setting l = 0 in
the equilibrium loci of the centrally planned economy and imposing that RR has to lie below the PP locus, as
otherwise the existence an equilibrium cannot be ensured, given that the PP locus becomes steeper as l increases.
43In a centrally planned economy this is not necessarily the case. If individuals value government consumption
spending, i.e. for η > 0, for reasonably high levels of leisure time this effect is dominated by the effect a
varying equilibrium leisure time produces on government spending. An increase in l reduces output, thereby
mechanically decreasing total government spending. This, in turn, has an negative effect on the marginal utility
from consumption, providing further incentives for individuals to reduce consumption. This implies that the
savings rate increases and more investment, which translates into a higher equilibrium growth rate of the economy.
As the employment rate increases, l decreases, this effect becomes partially offset by the direct effect of leisure
time on the marginal productivity of capital. Please refer to Appendix C for more details on the equilibrium in
a centrally planned economy.
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along this locus becomes progressively steeper. This mechanism is equivalent to
that observed in the planner’s problem, where the PP curve also unambiguously
exhibits a negative slope. The RR and PP loci can be expressed as follows:
ψj =
1
1− γ(1 + η)
[
(1− τKj )(1− α)(Agαj )
1
1−α (1− lj) α1−α − δ
]
(24)
ψj =
[
(1− gj − hj)−
1− τLj
1 + τCj
Ω(lj)(1− α)
]
(Agαj )
1
1−α (1− lj) α1−α (25)
3.3.3 Qualitative effects of fiscal shocks
Having obtained the two curves that determine the equilibrium of the economy,
(24) and (25), we can analyse qualitatively the effect of changes in each of the five
fiscal instruments in our economy. Composite changes in these fiscal instruments
(as is required to ensure revenue-neutral changes) require a more detailed analysis
and we leave these exercises for the next sections, where optimal fiscal policy
is characterised and different tax harmonization scenarios are studied, within a
calibrated growth model. The effects of changes in any of the tax rates, τK , τL or
τC , have similar qualitative effects on both the fraction of time devoted to leisure,
lj and the equilibrium growth rate of the economy, ψj:
∂ψ∗j
∂τ ij
< 0
∂l∗j
∂τ ij
> 0 i = C,K,L (26)
Hence, an increase in tax rates leads to a decrease in both the equilibrium growth
rate and the fraction of time spent working. Yet, note that the underlying mech-
anisms behind these qualitatively similar responses are different.
As can be seen from Figure 13, a decrease in labour income tax rates, τL, leads
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to a downward shift in the PP curve and a corresponding small shift of the equilib-
rium along the original RR locus. Given leisure, there is an immediate decrease in
the growth rate of the economy and an increase in the consumption-output ratio.
The return on consumption is now lower and agents shift away from consumption
and leisure, increasing working hours. This leads to an increase in output and the
equilibrium growth rate of the economy. A decrease in consumption taxes, τC ,
has similar effects on the PP curve and the dynamic equilibrium of the economy
moves in the same fashion along the original RR curve. The downward shift in
the PP curve illustrates an immediate decrease in the growth rate of the econ-
omy, given working hours or leisure. As the economy adjusts along the original
RR curve to its new long-run equilibrium, there is a shift away from consumption
and from leisure into work. The growth rate of the economy is higher in the new
equilibrium, with more time devoted to work and a higher marginal productivity
of capital.
In turn, a decrease in the capital income tax rate, τKj , produces similar quali-
tative effects but through a more complex mechanism. As it produces an upward
rotation of the RR locus, this implies that, given the fraction of time devoted to
work, there is an immediate increase of the growth rate of the economy. This
increases immediately the return on consumption, which causes the reverse effect
and a substitution away from leisure towards labour. This increases progressively
the rate of return on capital, equalizing to the growth rate of consumption.
The increase in employment in the economy increases output and leads to a
further increase in the growth rate of the economy. The ultimate equilibrium is
now reached along the original PP curve, with a higher fraction of time devoted
to work, (1− lj), and a higher equilibrium growth rate, ψj.
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Figure 13: Fiscal shocks: changes in tax rates. This figure depicts the qualitative general equilibrium effects
of one-off decreases in different tax rates, through their implications for the two loci that define the equilibrium
in the economy, PP and RR. Tax decreases are implicitly compensated by an increase in lump-sum taxes, so
to keep a balanced government budget. Leisure time varies along the horizontal axis, whereas the growth rate
of the economy can be read along the vertical axis. Any one-off decrease (financed via lump-sum taxes) in tax
rates leads to a higher growth rate of the economy, despite the different underlying mechanisms behind these
equilibrium changes. A decrease in the capital income tax rate, τK , leads to an increase in the net rate of return
on capital and, hence, an upward shift in the RR locus. The new equilibrium, along the original PP locus,
features a higher growth rate of the economy and a slight decrease in leisure time. The effects of a decrease in
the labour income tax rate, τL, and the consumption tax rate, τC , are similar. They affect the intra-temporal
decision margin of individuals and both lead to an increase in working hours (decrease in leisure time). The
growth rate of the economy also increases slightly, as the new equilibrium features a higher marginal productivity
of capital.
Looking at the effects of changes in government consumption and production
expenditure, we can again identify the following common qualitative effects:
∂ψ∗j
∂gij
,
∂ψ∗j
∂hij
> 0
∂l∗j
∂gij
,
∂l∗j
∂hij
< 0 (27)
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Yet, again, different types of government expenditure work through different
channels. An increase in government production expenditure produces differ-
ent changes from an increase in government consumption expenditure. As can be
seen from Figure 14, an increase in government consumption expenditure causes
a downward shift in the PP curve, which ultimately leads households to substi-
tute away from consumption and leisure towards labour. The main effect of this
increase is thus through the intratemporal decision margin of households. More
working hours lead to a higher equilibrium growth rate. The effects of an increase
in government consumption expenditure, hj, are thus similar to those of a decrease
in either labour income or consumption tax rates.
An increase in government production expenditure has similar qualitative prop-
erties, increasing the amount of hours worked and the equilibrium rate of return
on capital, but with an additional effect. This is analogous to that of a decrease in
the capital income tax rate. Additional productive government spending increases
the productivity of labour and this induces households to shift further away from
leisure and into work, which reinforces the initial increase in the growth rate of
the economy. In the bottom graph of Figure 14, it can be observed that, in ad-
dition to the movement in the PP locus, the RR locus shifts upwards, reflecting
this shift in leisure time after an increase in the marginal return to work. Note
finally that the real effect from government consumption expenditure is relatively
uncommon in the endogenous growth literature. In the present case, however,
government consumption expenditure does not simply crowd out private con-
sumption - leaving no real effects on the long-term macroeconomic equilibrium -
due to its impact on the labour-leisure margin. A one-off increase in government
consumption expenditure is accompanied by an increase in lump-sum taxation,
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Figure 14: Fiscal shocks: changes in government expenditure shares. This figure depicts the qualitative general
equilibrium effects of (one-off) increases in the share of government consumption and production expenditure,
respectively, through their implications for the two loci that define the equilibrium in the economy, PP and RR.
Any one-off increase (financed via lump-sum taxes) in government spending leads to a higher growth rate of the
economy. Yet, different underlying mechanisms are at work behind these equilibrium changes. An increase in
government consumption expenditure, hj , affects primarily the intra-temporal decision margin of individuals and
leads to an increase in working hours (decrease in leisure time). The growth rate of the economy also increases
slightly, as the new equilibrium, along the original RR locus, features a higher marginal productivity of capital.
In turn, an increase in government productive expenditure, gj , leads to a direct increase in the rate of return
on capital and, hence, to an upward shift in the RR locus. The PP locus also shifts in a similar fashion to the
increase in government consumption spending, but now the effects are milder. The new equilibrium features a
higher growth rate of the economy and an unambiguous increase in working hours, as both movements in the
RR and the PP loci reinforce each other.
so that the government budget constraint clears, and this implies a decrease in
individual wealth. This has the effect of raising the marginal utility of wealth
and consumption, thereby inducing households to increase working hours, which
increases the equilibrium growth rate of the economy. This effect is similar to
that of a decrease in consumption or labour income taxes. We can also derive
a further relationship, between the (qualitative) effects of increasing government
expenditure:
∂ψ∗j
∂gij
>
∂ψ∗j
∂hij
> 0
∂l∗j
∂gij
<
∂l∗j
∂hij
< 0 (27’)
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Looking at the effects of mixed changes in government expenditures, Figure 15 de-
picts the effects of a re-balancing of government expenditures, i.e. of proportional
increases in a given category of government expenditure through a corresponding
decrease in the other category. Note that this does necessarily mean that these
changes are revenue-neutral, since they have different effects on the equilibrium of
the economy. More careful policy simulations are performed in the next section,
analyzing optimal fiscal policy and different tax harmonization scenarios. Figure
16 shows the effects of increases in government consumption and production ex-
penditure together with increases in capital and labour income taxes, respectively.
The effects of mixed fiscal policy changes are necessarily just the reflection
of those just seen, with one-off changes in government expenditure or tax rates.
Yet, these allow to better grasp the qualitative effects of more complex fiscal pol-
icy reforms, through composite changes in government expenditures and taxes.
In Figure 15, it is apparent that a re-balancing of government expenditure to-
wards consumption expenditure implies a downward shift in the PP curve, with
households substituting away from consumption and leisure towards labour. This
effect is again similar to that of a decrease in labour income taxes or consump-
tion taxes. However, this increase in government consumption expenditure is now
obtained at the expense of lower government productive expenditure. This has
an effect similar to an increase in capital income taxes. The RR locus is shifted
downwards, which implies that, given the fraction of time devoted to leisure, the
growth rate of the economy is now lower. This decrease in the return on con-
sumption causes a substitution away from labour. The rate of return on capital
thus also decreases. The PP locus is shifted upwards, reflecting a further shift
on intratemporal decisions away from labour towards leisure. The final effect is
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obtained by aggregating both effects. The growth rate of the economy is unequiv-
ocally reduced, while the effect on labour hours is ambiguous, depending on the
relative magnitude of the shifts in the PP curve, given the downward shift of RR.
The case for a re-balancing of government expenditures towards productive ex-
penditure, at the expense of government consumption expenditure, produces the
opposite effects. The final result (bottom graph in Figure 15) is an upward shift
on both the RR and the PP loci. The effect on the growth rate is now positive,
while the effect on working hours is again ambiguous.
The cases depicted in Figure 16 are now meant to highlight two ”opposite”
cases. On the one hand, an increase in government consumption expenditure
financed via an increase in the capital tax rate is expected to deliver the worst
outcome in terms of the growth rate of the economy. This is accompanied by a
decrease in leisure time, given the downward shift of both the PP and the RR loci.
Contrary to the effects of the tax cuts depicted in Figure 13, an increase in capital
income taxes, τK , now produces a downward rotation of the RR locus and implies
an immediate decrease of the growth rate of the economy, given leisure time. At
the same time, as households substitute away from labour towards leisure, the
decrease in total working hours in the economy leads to a further decrease in the
growth rate of the economy. The increase in government consumption expenditure
causes a downward shift in the PP locus, leading households to substitute leisure
for labour. This partially counteracts the effect of a higher capital income tax
rate and rebalances the long-term equilibrium of the economy towards a slightly
higher equilibrium growth rate.
On the other hand, an increase in government productive expenditure financed
out of higher labour taxes produces an upward shift of the RR curve, while it shifts
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Figure 15: Composite fiscal shocks: compensated changes in government expenditure shares. This figure
depicts the qualitative general equilibrium effects of shifts in the composition of government expenditure. The
key mechanisms are illustrated by the shifts in both PP and RR curves. Underlying these shifts are the offsetting
mechanisms produced by the two different types of government expenditure. The final equilibrium effects can
be seen as a by-product of those analyzed in the previous figure. An increase in government consumption
expenditure, hj , compensated by a decrease in government production expenditure, gj , affects both the intra-
temporal and the inter-temporal decision margins of individuals. While it leads to an unambiguous decrease
in the growth rate of the economy, as the decrease in government production spending decreases the marginal
productivity of capital, the effect on leisure time is ambiguous. On the one hand, individuals will want to
work less due to an substitution effect related to the decrease in the marginal productivity of capital. On the
other hand, the income effect implies that they will want to increase their working hours, as now any given
labour market equilibrium will imply lower returns. The PP locus becomes flatter. An increase in government
production expenditure, gj , compensated by a decrease in government consumption expenditure, hj , leads to
opposite effects. The PP locus becomes steeper and the RR is shifted upwards. The final effect on the (net)
rate of return on capital is unambiguously positive, while the labour supply effect will depend on the relative
magnitudes of the substitution and income effects.
the PP curve downwards. An increase in the labour income tax rate, τLj , leads to
an upward shift in the PP curve. Given leisure, there is an immediate increase
in the growth rate of the economy and the consumption-output ratio increases.
Households are driven away from the labour market and decrease their working
hours. This leads to an immediate decrease in output and the growth rate of
the economy, with a lower return to capital and consumption. The increase in
productive expenditure has an opposing effect, towards higher working hours and
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equilibrium growth rate. The productivity of labour increases and induces house-
holds to shift further away from leisure and into work, reinforcing the increase in
the growth rate of the economy. The RR locus also shifts upwards, in addition
to the movement in the PP locus, reflecting the shift in working hours after an
increase marginal returns. The final effect in terms of both equilibrium leisure
time and growth rate of the economy is ambiguous and depends on the relative
magnitudes of the shifts in tax rates and government production expenditure.
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Figure 16: Composite fiscal shocks: compensated changes in government expenditure shares and tax rates.
The final equilibrium effects can be seen as a by-product of those analyzed in the previous figure. An increase
in government consumption expenditure, hj , financed via an increase in capital income taxes, τ
K , implies a
downward shift in the PP and RR loci. The final effect on the (net) rate of return on capital is unambiguously
negative while the labour supply effect is ambiguous. For small shifts in the RR locus, it is possible that the
labour supply effects of an increase government consumption expenditure outweigh the effects on the effects of a
decrease in the (net) rate of return on capital. An increase in government production expenditure, gj , financed
via an increase in labour income taxes, τL, have an ambiguous effect on the equilibrium labour supply, but a
positive effect on the growth rate of the economy (proportional to the (net) rate of return on capital), as the
upward shift of the RR curve is reinforced by a the rotation of the PP locus. The qualitative effect appears
similar to that of a one-off increase in government production expenditure, only now the labour supply effects
are further dampened by the increase in taxation of the labour factor.
Finally, the effects of changes in government expenditure financed via distor-
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tionary taxes can be, in general, expressed more formally as follows:
(∂ψ∗
∂zj
)
τ ij
=
(∂ψ∗
∂zj
)
T
+
∂ψ∗
∂τ ij
∂τ ij
∂zj
z = g, h i = C,K,L
3.4 Optimal policy
In this section, we look more in depth at optimal fiscal policy in a decentralized
market economy. We first derive analytically the expressions that characterize
optimal government expenditure shares and tax rates. Second, we calibrate our
model to an average EU-28 economy and discuss the main parameters and key
facts that each attempt to target. We focus in particular on the calibration of the
fiscal parameters for the average EU-28 economy, as the main benchmark against
which we aim to assess the subsequent policy scenarios. We start then by looking
at different policy scenarios around optimal fiscal policy.
Thirdly, bearing in mind the competitive pressures faced by EU jurisdictions
in the context of a perfectly mobile capital tax base, we focus in particular on
the outcomes that maximise the (after-tax) rate of return on capital. These are
the equilibria which, in a (uncoordinated) fiscal competition environment, are
consistent with full capital mobility. Having the first insights on the incentives
of EU jurisdictions setting fiscal policy in an environment of fiscal competition,
we move on to look at a broader scope of fiscal policies, where tax rates are also
allowed to move freely, within pre-defined bounds. We characterize the ”extreme
tax competition” equilibrium as a theoretical point to which EU jurisdictions can
be thought to converge in the long run, according to our theoretical framework,
in the absence of any tax harmonization agreements (or limits to factor mobil-
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ity). In a nutshell, this is our equivalent to a Nash equilibrium without (fiscal)
coordination. With this basic framework in mind, the next section looks more
closely at policy scenarios involving several different types of fiscal harmonization
agreements. These include simple tax harmonization agreements as well as wider
EU fiscal agreements, with scope for a larger EU budget or, in other words, partial
centralization of spending powers in some areas.
3.4.1 Optimal fiscal policy
In order for a government in the decentralized economy equilibrium to obtain
the optimal fiscal policy, it must be able to replicate the first-best equilibrium
obtained by a benevolent social planner in the centrally planned economy. The
optimal government expenditure shares on productive and consumption goods
and services, respectively, can be obtained by deriving the optimality conditions
with respect to these two variables44:
gˆj = α hˆj = η(1− β)Ω(lj) (28)
Bearing these optimal expenditure shares in mind, one can obtain the optimal
tax rates in the decentralized economy, which will ensure that the optimality con-
ditions in decentralized equilibrium can exactly replicate the first-best allocation
optimality conditions in the centrally planned equilibrium. The optimal capital
income tax rate is obtained by ensuring the two intertemporal optimality con-
ditions are equal, so that the Euler equation (21) equals that of the centrally
44Please refer to Appendix C for more details on the equilibrium in a centrally planned economy. The optimal
policy conditions presented in this subsection are those that can replicate, in the context of a decentralized
equilibrium, the first-best equilibrium obtained under a centrally planned economy. The resulting conditions
thus represent the optimal fiscal policy rules that, given production and preference parameters, mimic the first-
best allocation. These are simply obtained by
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planned economy. Hence, the capital income tax rate must satisfy:
1− τKj =
1− gj − hj + η(C/Y )
1− gˆj (29)
Equality of growth rates are ensured if the capital income tax rate is set to equate
the private (after-tax) rate of return on capital with the social rate of return
on capital. The optimal capital tax rate will crucially depend on the deviation
in the total share of government expenditure relative to its optimum level. The
composition of these government expenditures, i.e. the specific shares of gov-
ernment production and consumption expenditure, are in this case irrelevant to
the problem of setting the optimal capital tax rate. Recalling (28) and that
( ˆC/Y )j = (1 − β)Ω(lj), it is straightforward to see that, if gj + hj ≷ gˆj + hˆj,
then τKj ≷ 0. Hence, if the aggregate government expenditure share is above its
optimum level, this has a negative effect on the social rate of return on capital.
Yet, households fail to ”internalize” this negative spillover produced by excessive
government spending and over-invest. With higher-than-optimal aggregate gov-
ernment expenditure, this can be corrected by setting a positive capital income
tax rate. Similarly, one can obtain the optimal tax rates on consumption and
labour income, which ensure equality of intratemporal optimality conditions, (20)
and (20A), respectively. Consumption and labour income tax rates must satisfy:
1− τLj
1 + τCj
=
1− gj − hj + η(C/Y )
1− gˆj (30)
Again, the composition of government expenditures is orthogonal to the problem
of setting the optimal labour income and consumption tax rates. A similar condi-
tion holds for the optimal level of the tax rates, if aggregate government expendi-
tures are not at their optimum level: for gj +hj ≷ gˆj + hˆj, 1−τLj ≶ 1+τCj . In this
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case, if government spending is above the optimum, this distorts the intratemporal
decisions of households. The distortion can be corrected by setting a higher tax on
labour, thereby giving an incentive for agents to devote more time for leisure, as
they are working more hours than optimum. In particular, this means that there
should be a ”decoupling” between the tax on leisure and on consumption, the two
”goods” from which households derive utility. By decreasing the tax on leisure,
relative to consumption, this gives the incentive to shift away from consumption
and labour towards leisure. If aggregate government expenditure is below its op-
timum level, then a higher tax on leisure (lower labour income tax rate) relative
to consumption, implies a shift away from leisure towards work and consumption.
Finally, if government expenditures are set optimally gj + hj = gˆj + hˆj, then:
τKj = 0 τ
L
j = −τCj (31)
Hence, optimal fiscal policy implies that the capital income tax rate should be
set to zero. Furthermore, the optimal tax on labour income should be exactly
symmetric to the tax on consumption. Hence, a negative labour income tax can
be interpreted as a tax on leisure. The above expression states a general principle
of public finance: the two goods from which households derive utility should be
uniformly taxed at the optimum45.
Before moving on to discuss the calibration of our model, let us introduce a
measure of welfare, which will be our ”barometer” for comparing different policy
scenarios, namely the gains from moving from the benchmark economy into an
45Looking at (18) and substituting for equilibrium wages and the intratemporal optimality condition evaluated
at the optimum, the first-best optimum can be achieved for τˆLj (α −
Ω(lj)
1−α )Yˆ + T = (gˆj + hˆj)Yˆ . This implies
that an equilibrium without lump-sum taxation can only be achieved for α <
Ω(lj)
1−α . The first-best optimum
is thus achieved by imposing a consumption tax to counteract the ”subsidy” given to leisure: τˆLj = −τˆCj =
η(1−α)Ωˆ(lj)+α
α−(Ωˆ(lj)/1−α)
< 0.
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optimal policy equilibrium. The measure of economic welfare corresponds to the
optimized utility of the representative household, obtained by evaluating (15) at
its optimum, where the j subscripts are dropped for presentation purposes:
W =
1
γ
cγ0 l
θγhηγ
(
Y
K
)ηγ
Kηγ0
ρ− (1 + η)γψ (32)
Having fully characterized the optimal fiscal policy in the decentralized economy
and obtained a welfare function, we can focus on the calibration of our model
with the aim of performing simulations of alternative fiscal policy scenarios.
3.4.2 Calibration and model simulations
It is important to stress from the outset that the simulations presented henceforth
should be seen as ”theory with numbers” only. These are intended to provide a
picture of the order of magnitude of the potential welfare gains or losses from
fiscal policy changes, rather than exact estimations of welfare deviations. We
start by looking at a benchmark economy and assess whether our model fits key
moments, such as the growth rate of the economy and average leisure time (or
working hours), based on a calibration for an average EU-28 economy. We then
look at how shifts towards optimal policy (and around this point) may affect these
variables as well as economic welfare. Further simulations are performed in the
next section, with the aim of highlighting how tax competition may alter the fiscal
incentives of jurisdictions facing full capital mobility. In particular, we focus on
how the equilibria here described are shifted and how different fiscal harmonization
scenarios may restrain the changes induced by competitive pressures.
The benchmark economy is calibrated to mimic an average EU-28 economy.
Starting with the production side of the economy, we calibrate α to obtain a share
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of physical capital of around 0.3. Having an ”AK economy” implies that capital
is to be interpreted as an aggregate measure including both physical and human
capital. If we consider the share of human capital to account for about 2/3 of
the aggregate measure of capital, we thus obtain that 1 − α = 0.92 and, hence,
a share of 1/3 of output going to physical capital. The productivity parameter
A is calibrated as a ”growth residual”, given all remaining parameters, to target
the EU-28 average growth rate in the 2000-16 period, at around 1.5% (according
to World Bank data). This calibration also implies that government production
expenditure is a pure ”labour-augmenting” technology.
Table 2: Benchmark model calibration. A detailed description of the model parameters is provided in the main
text. These are divided into production, preference and fiscal policy parameters. The benchmark calibration
attempts to reflect an average EU-28 economy and enable meaningful fiscal policy simulations. The small value
for α is related to the ”AK economy” structure of the model: aggregate capital is to be interpreted as a composite
measure of physical and human capital. With a share of two-thirds of human capital in the aggregate capital
measure, about one-third of output accrues to physical capital. The other main targeted moments are the average
EU growth rate in the 2000-16 period, at around 1.5%, and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of around
0.5 (IES = (1−γ)−1). Fiscal parameters are chosen to replicate EU averages. According to the structure of the
model, the capital tax τK is a composite measure of the average top statutory corporate and income tax rates
across the EU. The labour tax τL mimics a (weighted) average of the implicit tax rate on labour across the EU.
Production parameters Preference parameters
A 0.2 γ -1
α 0.08 θ 0.3
η 0.3
ρ 0.05
Fiscal parameters
hj 0.2 τ
C 0.2
gj 0.2 τ
L 0.38
T & 0 τK 0.31
Similarly, looking at preference parameters, the equality between θ and η,
as both parameters are calibrated to a value of 0.3, implies purely ”leisure-
augmenting” government consumption expenditures. Another implication of this
calibration is that the optimal ratio of government consumption expenditure to
private consumption is about 0.3. The parameter γ is calibrated to obtain an
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES = 1/(1 − γ)) of 0.5, fitting a well-
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established empirical fact that this is close to but smaller than unity. Finally, ρ
is set to 0.05, also similar to values generally found in the literature.
Turning now to the fiscal parameters, these are calibrated to target key mo-
ments of available EU fiscal data (European Commission, 2017b). Looking first at
the revenue side of the government budget constraint, the consumption tax rate,
τC , is set to 20% in order to fit the average implicit tax rate on consumption for
the EU-28, at around 20.5% in 2015 (20.4% in the Eurozone). The implicit tax
rate is used, rather than just an average VAT measure, as it provides a composite
measure, including VAT as well as excise duties (namely on tobacco, alcohol and
energy)46. The average implicit tax rate on consumption is thus the ratio of all
consumption taxes to the final consumption expenditure of EU households. The
tax rate on labour income, τL, is set to target the implicit tax rate on labour.
This is calculated as the ratio of taxes and social contributions to the total com-
pensation of employees and payroll taxes. Although the average EU-28 implicit
tax rate on labour income was at 36% in 2015, this is set at a slightly higher level
to capture a higher implicit tax rate in Eurozone countries (close to 39% in the
same year) and the upward trend observed in the data47. Note also that labour
and consumption taxes together account for around 80% of total EU tax revenues.
Turning now to to the tax rate on capital income, τK , it is important to recall
that capital is in this model an aggregate measure of physical capital, as well
as human capital. Hence, the tax rate on capital income must reflect this fact
and represent a composite measure of physical as well as human capital taxation.
46Despite significant differences in the relative importance of underlying components on the overall implicit
tax rate, VAT accounts for between 65 and 75% of this measure. The highest value is recorded in Sweden, just
above 75%, whereas in Greece only 54% is accounted for by VAT revenues. The average VAT tax rate in the
EU-28 is at 21.5%.
47Once again, the average tax rate ”hides” significant differences between EU countries. While Belgium shows
the highest implicit tax rate on labour income, at around 44%, closely followed by Italy and Austria, Malta,
Bulgaria and the United Kingdom reach implicit tax rates on labour income below 25%
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Starting with physical capital taxation, the most important source of government
revenue is the corporate income taxation. The average EU-28 top statutory tax
rate on corporate income is 22% in 2017, down from 29% in 2002 and following
a secular downward trend (for reference, the average top tax rate on corporate
income in 1982 was 47% across the OECD). Similarly, the effective EU-28 tax
rate on corporate income is at 21% in 2016 and has followed a similar trend in
the EU since 2002 (i.e. indicating that statutory corporate tax rate cuts were
not accompanied by a broadening of corporate tax bases)48. Having our average
tax rate on physical capital, we consider the taxation on human capital. Here, we
consider the top personal income tax rate as the main indicator. The average EU-
28 top personal income tax rate was 39% in 2017. Once again, this has followed a
markedly downward trend over the past decades49. Our calibration of the capital
income tax rate is an average between these two measures, i.e. the average EU-28
top statutory corporate tax rates and top personal income tax rate50.
Finally, for completeness, note that another measure could be considered both
for the labour income and the capital income tax rate. While the implicit tax rate
on labour income reflects the average tax burden shared across the entire income
distribution, the top personal income tax rate reflects the tax burden at the top
of the income distribution. Another measure, the tax wedge, reflects how the
tax burden is shifted between the bottom and the top of the income distribution.
The tax wedge is the difference between total labour costs to the employer and
48Note that the effective tax rate measure is not exactly similar to the implicit tax rate we mentioned before.
This is an indicator of the tax rate on a given investment, after applying basic tax rules, namely taking into
account different depreciation allowances in national systems, largely based on the methodology defined by
Devereux and Griffith (1999) or Devereux (2008).
49As a general reference, the average personal income tax rate in the EU-28 countries was above 45% in the
late 1990s. Several differences arise between EU countries, as it ranges from above 55% in Sweden or Portugal
to at or below 15% in Hungary, Czech Republic in Bulgaria.
50We use a simple average rather than a weighted average, as for the measure of capital itself, in order to
account for the fact that different tax retention provisions across different countries may imply that some of the
income accruing to ”human” capital can in fact pay a lower tax rate, closer to the corporate tax rate.
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the net pay of the employee. The underlying idea is that policymakers can target
directly the bottom of the income distribution and, in order to boost employability
in this cohort of the population, cut labour costs at lower levels. Yet, given
the mixed picture across EU-28 countries and wide fluctuations across relatively
short periods of time, we do not consider this measure in our calibration. All the
parameters are summarised in Table 2.
With the benchmark calibration set, we perform various numerical simulations,
with different policy scenarios. The parameters set out to represent a benchmark
average EU-28 economy lead to a plausible equilibrium, shown in the first row of
Table 3. The average growth rate of the economy is targeted directly to reach an
average of 1.5%. This also implies a net (after-tax) rate of return on capital of
around 8% and a fraction of time spent in leisure activities of 0.78. The fraction
of hours devoted to work is thus 0.22, which implies about 1900 hours of work in
the year, i.e. around 48 weeks with weekly 40h of working time. The measure
of welfare is not given in the benchmark scenario as it is meant to serve only as
a comparison between different policy scenarios. The benchmark scenario should
thus, again, be interpreted as a theoretical ”average” EU economy. For this reason,
we have set gj and hj to clear the government budget constraint, while at the
same time keeping an ”agnostic” view on the relative composition of government
expenditures of EU countries. We only kept in mind the need to keep plausible
values for lj and ψj, given the choices of tax rates. In addition, given that several
”merit goods” provided by EU governments, such as housing benefits or universal
healthcare, can be considered as also having a productive role, this assumption
does not seem problematic for the validity of the following policy simulations.
Before moving on to analyzing the policy scenarios set out in Table 3, one item
98
is important to mention. The item representing lump-sum taxes, t = T/Y , is
meant to reflect the restriction that lump-sum taxation has to be greater than
but close to zero. Given its effect on welfare and the potential undesired effects
on the subsequent analysis of different fiscal policy scenarios, we restrict this to
be within a narrow interval from the benchmark, close to a value of about 0.0351.
Moving into the first-best policy regime has wide equilibrium implications in
all variables, as can be seen in the second row in Table 3. Namely, the growth rate
of the economy is almost doubled, from 1.48 to 2.9%, and this leads a significant
increase in economic welfare of the order of 15− 20%. The first striking element
is perhaps the large shift in taxation implied by the first-best optimal policy
scenario. The labour-leisure choice is in this case subsidized at 55%, while the
tax rate on consumption is set at 55%, implying a dramatic rise in the levels
seen in the benchmark economy. Finally, as already discussed, optimal fiscal
policy involves abolishing capital taxation. These shifts also imply a move into a
”regressive” taxation scheme, with a heavy reliance on indirect taxation and zero
capital taxes, as well as a large shift in working hours. Households in this scenario
spend about one third of their time in labour market activities.
Interestingly, a policy reform which would almost mimic the first-best alloca-
tion under the optimal policy scenario, involves eliminating income taxes. This is
shown in the third row of Table 3, where we can observe that, in terms of both
the equilibrium growth rate and welfare, this delivers similar results to optimal
policy. The main difference is that, given that there is also no subsidy to labour
income, the consumption tax rate is slightly lower (τC = 47%), and leisure time
is higher (l = 0.74), implying a relatively small shift from benchmark. From this
51Some simulations bring this value up to 0.04, but this is merely a result of the clearing of the government
budget constraint and the approximation to two decimal places.
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point of view, this can be considered as the second-best policy scenario.
Table 3: Optimal policy. A detailed description of different scenarios presented in this table is offered in the
main text. For comparison purposes, three scenarios are first highlighted: the benchmark and optimal policy
scenarios are first presented, including the fiscal parameter values and corresponding simulations of equilibrium
values of leisure hours, ”budgetary surplus” (compensated by assumption with lump-sum taxes or transfers),
(net) rate of return on capital, equilibrium growth rate and welfare changes, with respect to the benchmark case.
The third scenario, featuring zero income taxes, closely mimics the first-best policy, apart from the equilibrium
leisure time. The remaining policy scenarios are presented sequentially, where labour income and consumption
taxes are set to the optimal level and not allowed to vary. The relatively large welfare effects, when deviating
more from the benchmark or optimal policy scenarios are justified namely by the form of the welfare function.
Namely, larger changes in the equilibrium growth rate, ψj , imply important deviations in the equilibrium. On
the other hand, the large changes in government consumption expenditure implied by some policy scenarios, also
imply large welfare deviations. The more extreme policy simulations are reported in the last rows with the aim
to improve intuition rather than represent realistic policy scenarios.
τK τL τC hj gj lj t (1− τ)rj ψj ∆W
Benchmark 0.31 0.38 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.78 0.03 8.41% 1.48%
Optimal policy 0.00 -0.55 0.55 0.17 0.08 0.66 0.04 11.69% 2.91% 17.94%
Zero income taxes 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.17 0.08 0.74 0.04 11.41% 2.79% 17.14%
hj too small -0.13 -0.55 0.55 0.08 0.08 0.68 0.04 13.15% 3.54% 8.85%
gj too large 0.13 - - 0.17 0.17 0.64 0.04 10.92% 2.57% 11.04%
gj + hj ”optimal” 0.00 - - 0.08 0.17 0.66 0.04 12.50% 3.26% 2.92%
Lowest hj + high gj 0.00 - - 0.01 0.24 0.65 0.03 12.88% 3.43% -76.02%
Capital subsidies -0.23 - - 0.01 0.08 0.69 0.04 14.27% 4.03% -54.75%
The remaining policy scenarios presented in Table 3 are meant to explore the
area around optimal policy, particularly on the expenditure side. These are aimed
at uncovering some likely incentives of governments facing full capital mobility.
This implies that governments engage in fiscal competition to attract mobile fac-
tors. Hence, we can interpret the (after-tax) rate of return on capital, (1− τK)rj,
as the objective function of different jurisdictions. Holding labour income and
consumption taxes constant, the first two policy simulations show the results of
reducing government consumption expenditure, with the revenue being instead
directed towards direct capital subsidies (row 4), and of increasing government
production expenditure, with revenue being raised by an increase in capital in-
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come taxes (row 5). The latter policy involves a larger shift in working hours
(relative to benchmark) and a decrease in the growth rate. The former case im-
plies a significant increase in the growth rate, while the welfare gains from this
policy shift are only nearly half of those observed under optimal fiscal policy.
Another policy scenario, depicted in row 6, considers a shift in government
expenditure shares, from consumption towards production expenditure, keeping
the aggregate size of government expenditures constant. This is a ”hybrid” of
the two simulations seen in rows 4-5, but is illustrative of policymaker incentives
facing fiscal competition. This revenue-neutral shift implies larger growth gains
than optimal policy, but almost eliminates any welfare gains from the policy shift.
Without access to (direct) capital subsidies, as is plausible to assume in the context
of EU competition regulations, the expenditure-side incentive for policymakers is
clear: government production expenditure is largely above the optimum, while the
reverse happens to government consumption expenditure. This ”misallocation”
effect of government expenditure is the source of the very limited welfare gains (or
losses), despite a large growth dividend. Governments, rather than aiming to set
optimal expenditure shares (given optimal tax rates), instead induce a distortion
in the economy, leading individuals to over-invest and substitute away from leisure
into work. The main mechanism is similar to one analyzed in the previous section,
with a re-balancing of government expenditure (Figure 15). We refer henceforth
to this as a fiscal competition-induced government investment distortion.
The last two rows of Table 3 aim at bringing more intuition about this distor-
tion, which is key in our model. Holding again labour income and consumption
taxes constant, we observe that the incentive for governments without access to
capital subsidies is indeed to engage in a ”race to top” in government production
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expenditure, while reducing consumption expenditure to its minimum. Yet, we
observe that this form of ”indirect” capital subsidization generates a distortion
which is significantly larger than when governments have access to direct capi-
tal subsidies. This is because government production expenditure, unlike direct
capital subsidies, introduce (direct) distortions both on inter-temporal decisions
of households, i.e. on consumption-savings decisions, and on the intra-temporal
choice between labour and leisure. This induces agents to reduce their leisure time
(despite a slight counteracting effect due to the reduction in government consump-
tion expenditure) below the optimum, while providing an incentive to over-invest.
Instead, direct capital subsidies only imply the latter distortion. Government pro-
duction expenditure goes to its optimum level and capital subsidies lead house-
holds to over-invest, even taking into account small aggregate size of government
expenditure. This yields a larger growth rate of the economy, while implying
smaller welfare losses. The labour-leisure margin is also indirectly affected, as
now households have the incentive to increase leisure (relative to the first-best
allocation), given the sub-optimal size of government aggregate expenditures.
3.4.3 Tax competition
Once we allow all tax rates to move beyond optimal policy, we can uncover further
incentives of policymakers in a environment of full capital mobility and interjuris-
dictional fiscal competition. Table 4 compares the outcomes under several different
policy scenarios with the first-best optimal policy.
Rows 2-5 (Table 4) depict the cases under which governments have no access
to direct capital subsidies. Tax boundaries are set somehow arbitrarily52, again
52We assume upper and lower boundaries, for consumption and labour income taxes respective, at the 90%
level.
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in an exercise of ”theory with numbers”, without harming the key economic in-
tuition from the model simulations. Three fiscal incentives clearly emerge from
these four policy scenarios. Governments facing tax competition engage in a race
to the top in the least distortive tax base, i.e. consumption taxes, in order to
maximise the (after-tax) rate of return on the most mobile tax base. Further-
more, consumption is taxed, not only to fund productive government spending,
but also subsidize the labour-leisure choice of individuals. The growth-maximising
case implies ψj = 3.63%, while the time households spend at work is close to 40%.
This is the first of two scenarios, which we refer to as the two ”extreme tax compe-
tition” equilibria cases, where the fiscal competition-induced government invest-
ment distortion is exacerbated. The over-investment in government productive
expenditure indirectly subsidizes capital and generates considerable distortions,
leading to over-investment and a significant decrease in leisure time, both relative
to the benchmark and the (first-best) optimal policy scenario. The welfare losses
relative to benchmark are also potentially very significant, particularly in this first
”extreme tax competition” equilibrium.
Allowing for capital subsidies implies a significantly different outcome, as dif-
ferent distortions are here at play (rows 6-9 - Table 4). Although the race to
the top on consumption taxation is once again clear - the revenues of which are
now directed towards direct capital subsidies rather than to increasing govern-
ment production expenditure -, the incentive to set the labour income tax as a
subsidy for the labour-leisure choice of households is now weakened. At the same
time, note that it is also not used as another source of tax revenue to subsidize
capital. Instead, the labour income tax rate is set at an ”optimum” level, from
the point of view of maximizing the (after-tax) rate of return on capital. This
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Table 4: Tax competition. A detailed description of different scenarios presented in this table is offered in the
main text. For comparison purposes, the benchmark and optimal policy scenarios are again presented in the
first two rows. All fiscal parameter values are presented, together with corresponding simulations of equilibrium
values of leisure hours, ”budgetary surplus” (compensated by assumption with lump-sum taxes or transfers),
(net) rate of return on capital, equilibrium growth rate and welfare changes, with respect to the benchmark
case. The remaining policy scenarios are divided in two sections, depending on whether (direct) capital subsidies
are allowed or not. Different equilibria are presented sequentially. Labour income and consumption taxes are
allowed to vary within bounds (−τL, τC ≤ 90%). The reported changes in welfare are again relative to the
benchmark economy. The large welfare effects in most policy simulations are justified namely by the form of the
welfare function. Larger changes in the equilibrium growth rate, ψj , imply important (persistent) deviations in
the equilibrium. The deviations from the benchmark or optimal policy set are sizeable. On the other hand, the
large changes in government consumption expenditure implied by all alternative policy scenarios, also imply very
large welfare deviations. The more extreme policy simulations, with reported welfare changes of above 100%,
are explained by the extreme size of the distortions and are reported with the aim to improve intuition rather
than represent realistic policy scenarios. Compared with the four scenarios featuring direct capital subsidies, it
is however worth noting that these imply significantly smaller distortions.
τK τL τC hj gj lj t (1− τ)rj ψj ∆W
Benchmark 0.31 0.38 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.78 1.48%
Optimal policy 0.00 -0.55 0.55 0.17 0.08 0.66 0.04 11.69% 2.91% 17.94%
τK ≥ 0%
0.00 -0.90 0.55 0.01 0.22 0.62 0.04 12.90% 3.44% -68.66%
0.00 -0.55 0.90 0.01 0.34 0.65 0.03 13.30% 3.61% -108.66%
0.00 -0.90 0.90 0.01 0.32 0.61 0.04 13.34% 3.63% -89.44%
0.00 0.00 0.90 0.01 0.36 0.73 0.04 13.05% 3.50% -108.39%
Capital subsidies
-0.15 -0.55 0.90 0.01 0.24 0.67 0.04 14.75% 4.24% -71.35%
-0.41 -0.55 0.90 0.01 0.08 0.70 0.04 16.29% 4.91% -55.70%
-0.40 -0.70 0.90 0.01 0.08 0.69 0.04 16.26% 4.89% -55.18%
-0.45 0.00 0.90 0.01 0.08 0.78 0.04 16.30% 4.91% -61.90%
implies that the level chosen will respond to the trade-off between providing an
incentive to invest while not acting as a disincentive for households to spend more
time at work. Comparing rows 7-9, allows us to shed light on this issue. On the
one hand, a larger incentive to the labour-leisure choice, relative to the optimum,
immediately reduces the growth rate. On the other hand, progressively decreas-
ing this incentive in order to marginally increase capital subsidies yields a positive
growth dividend. The final result, in this particular case, is that leisure time is
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higher than in the optimal policy scenario, similar to the benchmark economy,
and, by implication, also substantially higher than in the previous extreme tax
competition scenario, without capital subsidies. The welfare losses, relative to
benchmark, are also significantly lower, when allowing for capital subsidies. It
also delivers the highest (after-tax) rate of return on capital and highest growth
rate of the economy (ψj = 4.91%), above three times the benchmark growth rate.
In a nutshell, fiscal competition profoundly alters the incentives of policymak-
ers. The potential welfare losses, as result of competitive pressures can also be
quite sizable. In particular, the incentive for governments to dramatically shift
their revenue sources from direct (and progressive) towards indirect (and least
distortive) taxes is clear. Similarly, the potential shift on the government expen-
diture side is apparent from our analysis. Governments facing fiscal competition
will have the incentive to re-direct tax revenues towards expenditures that (di-
rectly or indirectly) subsidize capital and thereby maximise the after-tax rate of
return on this factor. Bearing this in mind, we now turn our attention towards
the policy implications of the above in terms of the design of potential EU fiscal
harmonization agreements.
3.5 Fiscal harmonization
That the consequences of interjurisdictional fiscal competition for fiscal policy
and welfare can be significant is not new. This has been subject of a substantial
body of research over the last few years (Winner 2005, Loretz 2008, Keen and
Konrad, Lehmann et al. 2014), highlighting the effects and potential risks of
unfettered tax competition on government policies. The previous section has
highlighted the main trends that can emerge in fiscal policy across the EU - both
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on the revenue and on the expenditure side - as a result of competitive pressures
to attract mobile capital. Two main shifts emerge: on the one hand, there will be
a tendency of governments to raise tax revenues through the least distortionary
taxes, and the less ”mobile” tax bases, leading to an even greater reliance on
indirect taxation, namely VAT. This is consistent with the findings of Loretz
(2008), indicating that increasing fiscal competition is inducing a significant shift
towards consumption taxes. On the other hand, there is a fiscal competition-
induced government investment distortion, which implies that policymakers tend
to overspend on government productive goods and services, at the expense of
government expenditure that benefits households’ welfare. We will now look at
how different fiscal harmonization agreements may be able to prevent such large
shifts and ultimately ensure that international economic integration does not bring
about significant damage to economic welfare across the EU.
3.5.1 Capital income tax harmonization
We start with a simple policy simulation, implying that a minimum threshold or
common rate for capital income taxes is imposed across the EU at 10%. This value
is chosen, albeit somehow arbitrarily, to stand in the interval between the bench-
mark economy and optimal policy. Table 5 illustrates various policy scenarios,
under which both labour income and consumption taxes, as well as government
expenditures, are allowed to vary, in order to uncover the incentives of policymak-
ers setting fiscal policy, under capital income tax harmonization.
Perhaps the first striking fact is that, once again, the three main incentives
identified earlier, under full fiscal competition, clearly emerge: different jurisdic-
tions (i) engage in a race to the top in consumption taxes, in order to (ii) (over-
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)spend on government productive activities and (iii) subsidize the labour-leisure
choice of individuals. Yet, the growth-maximising case now necessarily implies a
smaller growth rate (ψj = 3.16%) and less leisure time, with households spending
now over 40% of their time at work. This also implies an even larger government
investment distortion, with a higher capital income tax rate, as governments now
compensate for this by further increasing government production expenditure.
Hence, by introducing a new distortion via above-optimum capital taxation (and
also necessarily higher than the uncoordinated fiscal competition equilibrium), the
harmonization of capital income taxes exacerbates another distortion, the fiscal
competition-induced government investment distortion, and result sin even larger
welfare losses. In other words, capital income tax harmonization, rather than
preventing harmful fiscal competition between jurisdictions, shifts competition
towards other tax bases and actually intensifies fiscal competition. Furthermore,
insofar as it may even exacerbate existing expenditure-side distortions, this is
likely to come at no gain in terms of distributional effects or social welfare.
Particularly given the relatively limited importance of corporate taxation in
the aggregate tax revenues of EU countries (and across the OECD, in general),
one message is thus clear: capital income tax harmonization is unlikely to deter
fiscal competition. Instead, it produces further distortions, namely on the govern-
ment expenditure side. This also suggests that the distributional effects of capital
income tax harmonization cannot be taken for granted.
3.5.2 Labour income tax harmonization
Considering now the imposition of a minimum threshold (or common rates) for
labour income taxes across the EU, these are chosen again to stand in the interval
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Table 5: Capital income tax harmonization. A detailed description of different scenarios presented in this
table is offered in the main text. For comparison purposes, the benchmark and optimal policy scenarios are
again presented in the first two rows. All fiscal parameter values are presented, together with corresponding
simulations of equilibrium values of leisure hours, (net) rate of return on capital, equilibrium growth rate and
welfare changes, with respect to the benchmark case. Labour income and consumption taxes are allowed to
vary within bounds (−τL, τC ≤ 90%). The reported changes in welfare are again relative to the benchmark
economy. The large welfare effects in the presented policy simulations are justified namely by the form of the
welfare function. Larger changes in the equilibrium growth rate, ψj , imply important (persistent) deviations in
the equilibrium. The deviations from the benchmark or optimal policy set are sizeable and the large changes in
government consumption expenditure implied by all alternative policy scenarios again imply very large welfare
deviations. The more extreme policy simulations, with reported welfare changes of above 100%, are explained
by the extreme size of the distortions under such equilibria and are reported with the aim to improve intuition
rather than represent realistic policy scenarios. The order of magnitude can nonetheless be compared both to
the benchmark or the optimal policy cases and other policy simulations. It is namely worth comparing the
(growth-maximizing) equilibria under capital income tax harmonization and full tax competition (Table 4): the
harmonization of capital taxes only leads to a further distortion in government production expenditure, leading
to a further decrease in leisure time and the growth rate of the economy.
τK τL τC hj gj lj ψj ∆W
Benchmark 0.31 0.38 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.78 1.48%
Optimal policy 0.00 -0.55 0.55 0.17 0.08 0.66 2.91% 17.94%
τK = 10%
- -0.55 0.55 0.01 0.31 0.64 3.00% -93.77%
- -0.90 0.55 0.01 0.29 0.60 3.02% -84.99%
- -0.90 0.90 0.01 0.39 0.59 3.16% -129.18%
- -0.70 0.90 0.01 0.40 0.61 3.15% -138.68%
between the benchmark economy and optimal policy. The scenarios presented in
Table 6 consider τL = 20%. Various policy scenarios are illustrated, with capital
income and consumption taxes, as well as government expenditures, allowed to
vary. The benchmark and optimal policy scenarios, discussed at length in the
previous section, are also presented, to allow for simple comparisons.
Two main incentives identified earlier are now present: governments engage
in a race to the top in consumption taxes, in order to fund productive govern-
ment spending. Allowing for capital subsidies, implies that policymakers will have
the incentive to set government production expenditure at the optimal level, and
instead directly subsidize capital. Assuming no capital subsidies, the growth-
maximising case now implies a smaller growth rate (ψj = 3.44%) than under full
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tax competition, but higher than that implied by capital income tax harmoniza-
tion. Leisure time increases, relative to both optimal policy and capital income
tax harmonization, with households spending now approximately the same time
at work as in the benchmark economy. Although the tax burden on labour income
is now lower and government production expenditure higher than in the bench-
mark economy, consumption taxes are also higher and government consumption
expenditure is again driven to its lowest level.
Table 6: Labour income tax harmonization. A detailed description of different scenarios presented in this
table is offered in the main text. For comparison purposes, the benchmark and optimal policy scenarios are
again presented in the first two rows. All fiscal parameter values are presented, together with corresponding
simulations of equilibrium values of leisure hours, (net) rate of return on capital, equilibrium growth rate and
welfare changes, with respect to the benchmark case. Labour income and consumption taxes are allowed to
vary within bounds (−τL, τC ≤ 90%). The reported changes in welfare are again relative to the benchmark
economy. The large welfare effects in the presented policy simulations are justified namely by the form of the
welfare function. Larger changes in the equilibrium growth rate, ψj , imply important (persistent) deviations in
the equilibrium. The deviations from the benchmark or optimal policy set are sizeable and the large changes in
government consumption expenditure implied by all alternative policy scenarios again imply very large welfare
deviations. Note that, despite resulting in an equivalent decrease in government consumption expenditure,
the magnitude of the welfare drop is less significant once (direct) capital subsidies are allowed. The order of
magnitude can be compared to that of other policy simulations, both the two baseline cases presented in-table
and other alternative policy simulations, for instance under capital income or consumption tax harmonization.
τK τL τC hj gj lj ψj ∆W
Benchmark 0.31 0.38 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.78 1.48%
Optimal policy 0.00 -0.55 0.55 0.17 0.08 0.66 2.91% 17.94%
τL = 20%
0.00 - 0.70 0.01 0.32 0.77 3.36% -91.80%
0.00 - 0.90 0.01 0.37 0.77 3.44% -116.73%
-0.46 - 0.90 0.01 0.08 0.82 4.85% -59.02%
The counteracting effect of consumption taxes and government production ex-
penditure on leisure time can be seen by comparing rows 3 and 4. This explains the
very small effect on leisure time, while the growth rate is significantly higher than
in the benchmark case and in first-best optimal policy. The fiscal competition-
induced government investment distortion plays again an important role on the
latter, while the distortion introduced by labour income taxes (relative to the op-
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timal policy scenario) does not seem to produce significant changes at this margin.
Instead, labour income tax harmonization has an effect on the intra-temporal de-
cision margin between labour and leisure, namely by preventing a ”race to the
top” in the subsidy to labour. Allowing for capital subsidies leads to a different
equilibrium. While maximizing the (after-tax) rate of return on capital, it also
does not further accentuate the government investment distortion. It does, how-
ever, again imply that consumption is taxed to subsidize capital, with potentially
strong distributional effects. Labour income tax harmonization - both with or
without direct capital subsidization - implies smaller welfare losses than capital
income tax harmonization, which is partially explained by the smaller distortions
created by this policy. Nevertheless, it also implies a shift towards indirect taxa-
tion, particularly for lower levels of labour income taxation. Hence, the potentially
large welfare losses can once again be traced to the two main distortions induced
by fiscal competition: the progressive shift towards consumption, or indirect, tax-
ation and the government investment distortion, which translates into a large shift
in the composition of government expenditure.
3.5.3 Consumption tax harmonization
Looking now at the scenario of consumption tax harmonization (or of an agree-
ment over maximum VAT rate thresholds) across the EU, this is again chosen to
stand in the interval between the benchmark economy and optimal policy. The
scenarios presented in Table 7 consider τC = 40%. Different policy scenarios are
considered, where capital income and labour income taxes, as well as government
expenditures, are allowed to vary. Again, the benchmark economy and first-best
optimal policy are presented.
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The harmonization of consumption taxes has now a crucial effect, as it acts
on a key distortion induced by fiscal competition, unlike capital or labour income
tax harmonization. Government can no longer rely on consumption taxation,
or on the least distortive tax base, as means to raise government revenues to
be channeled towards capital subsidies, either in direct or indirect form. Hence,
without a ”race to the top” in consumption taxes, we can look first at a scenario
where this is the only tax in the economy, with income taxes being abolished (as in
the ”second-best” scenario presented in Table 3). The expenditure side incentive
to devote government expenditures towards productive activities is again obvious,
as shown in row 3 (Table 7).
Table 7: Consumption tax harmonization. A detailed description of different scenarios presented in this
table is offered in the main text. For comparison purposes, the benchmark and optimal policy scenarios are
again presented in the first two rows. All fiscal parameter values are presented, together with corresponding
simulations of equilibrium values of leisure hours, (net) rate of return on capital, equilibrium growth rate and
welfare changes, with respect to the benchmark case. Labour income and consumption taxes are allowed to
vary within bounds (−τL, τC ≤ 90%). The reported changes in welfare are again relative to the benchmark
economy. The large welfare effects in the presented policy simulations are justified namely by the form of the
welfare function. Larger changes in the equilibrium growth rate, ψj , imply important (persistent) deviations in
the equilibrium. The deviations from the benchmark or optimal policy set are sizeable and the large changes in
government consumption expenditure implied by all alternative policy scenarios again imply very large welfare
deviations. In the more extreme case, with a reported welfare change of above 100%, this is explained by the
extreme size of the distortions under such equilibrium, featuring a very large shift from government consumption
towards production expenditure, without a sizeable ”growth dividend”. This is reported with the aim to improve
intuition rather than represent a realistic policy scenario. Note that, despite a similar decrease in government
consumption expenditure, the magnitude of the welfare drop is much less significant once capital subsidies are
allowed. The order of magnitude can nonetheless be compared to that of other policy simulations, both the
baseline cases and other alternative policy simulations, for instance with capital income or labour income tax
harmonization. Further details presented in Table 8.
τK τL τC hj gj lj ψj ∆W
Benchmark 0.31 0.38 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.78 1.48%
Optimal policy 0.00 -0.55 0.55 0.17 0.08 0.66 2.91% 17.94%
τC = 40%
0.00 0.00 - 0.01 0.21 0.74 3.23% -68.28%
0.00 -0.75 - 0.01 0.17 0.64 3.27% -58.00%
-0.18 0.00 - 0.01 0.08 0.76 3.61% -52.82%
-0.17 -0.10 - 0.01 0.08 0.75 3.61% -52.26%
-0.19 0.10 - 0.01 0.08 0.78 3.62% -54.12%
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Yet there is now an incentive set income taxes optimally, given consumption
taxes. In equilibrium, this implies that capital income taxes remain at their lowest
level, while labour income taxes are set ”optimally” to maximise the (after-tax)
rate of return on capital. Without capital subsidies, this will imply a subsidy to
labour, closer to the optimal policy scenario, and setting government production
expenditures at a higher-than-optimal level, yet with a much smaller scope to over-
invest in this item. Hence the fiscal competition-induced government investment
distortion is somehow ”minimized”, given the harmonized level of (or maximum
threshold on) consumption taxes.
Allowing for capital subsidies (lines 5-7), the intuition is similar. Given con-
sumption taxes, capital subsidies, labour income taxes and government production
expenditure are ”optimized” to deliver the highest (after-tax) growth rate. As in
previous cases, allowing for capital subsidies implies that government production
expenditure is driven to its optimum level (gˆj = 0.08), while in this case we will
observe a positive labour income tax at τL = 20%, used to marginally increase
the subsidy to capital. For this reason, with capital subsidies, working hours will
be the lowest, similar to the benchmark value (lj = 0.78). The growth rate will
also be higher than without capital subsidies (ψj = 3.62%), as government pro-
duction expenditure is now also set at the first-best level. In turn, without capital
subsidies, leisure hours (lj = 0.64) are closer to the first-best scenario, as well
as the growth rate of the economy (ψj = 3.27%). In both cases, the magnitude
of welfare losses is significant, although significantly smaller than in either of the
scenarios of capital and labour income tax harmonization. The losses can mostly
be attributed to the expenditure side distortion, introduced by capital mobility
and fiscal competition.
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3.5.4 Tax harmonization: a summary
Having analyzed the three main tax policy harmonization options, as well as the
equilibria implied by those for the average EU-28 economy, we can now succinctly
compare these scenarios and elaborate a bit further on the potential merits of
each of these. Furthermore, we can consider policy scenarios where more than
one tax is harmonized. This analysis should also put us in a position to high-
light the main limitations of our approach, before moving on to another form of
fiscal harmonization: the centralization of spending powers or, in the EU case, a
significant enlargement in the size (and scope) of the EU budget.
Table 8 summarizes the three ”benchmark” cases (rows 1-3) and the three equi-
libria reached with different tax harmonization scenarios, with no capital subsidies
(rows 4-6). In addition, for labour income and consumption tax harmonization,
the two equilibria with capital subsidies are also shown (rows 7 and 8). Capital
income tax harmonization immediately stands out as the policy option that poten-
tially carries the largest welfare losses. This is because it does not tackle two of the
key (revenue-side) distortions introduced by fiscal competition, with full capital
mobility: the over-subsidization of the labour-leisure choice and the shift towards
indirect taxation. It also exacerbates the another distortion brought about by
fiscal competition, the government investment distortion. The large welfare losses
- even relative to the extreme tax competition equilibrium - can be explained by
the very low leisure time and lower growth rate. Interestingly, the total share of
government spending is unchanged when compared to the benchmark scenario,
but the composition of government spending is dramatically shifted.
Looking through the different equilibria presented in Table 8, a significant share
of the welfare losses can generally be attributed to the shift in the composition in
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Table 8: Tax harmonization: summary. All the policy simulations with equilibria consistent with interjuris-
dictional fiscal competition (i.e. the ”constrained” growth-maximizing cases analyzed earlier) are shown in this
Table. The two policy scenarios which include direct capital subsidies are shown separately. The large welfare
effects in the presented policy simulations - namely the tax competition scenario, as well as the harmonization of
capital and labour income taxes - are explained by the underlying large changes in the equilibrium growth rate,
ψj , and the level of government consumption expenditure, implied by all alternative policy scenarios. The two
more extreme cases, with reported welfare changes of above 100%, feature very large shifts in the composition of
government expenditures, without a sizeable ”growth dividend”. The magnitude of the welfare drops - even with
the equivalently large decreases in government consumption expenditure - is much less significant once capital
subsidies are allowed. Finally, note that the harmonization of consumption tax rates is the only option which
limits the main distortion, related to the ”race to the top” in government production expenditure, created by
fiscal competition and further reinforced under the other tax harmonization scenarios.
τK τL τC hj gj lj ψj ∆W
Benchmark 0.31 0.38 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.78 1.48%
Optimal policy 0.00 -0.55 0.55 0.17 0.08 0.66 2.91% 17.94%
Tax competition 0.00 -0.90 0.90 0.01 0.32 0.61 3.63% -89.44%
τK ≥ 0%
τK = 10% - -0.90 0.90 0.01 0.39 0.59 3.16% -129.18%
τL = 20% 0.00 - 0.90 0.01 0.37 0.77 3.44% -116.73%
τC = 40% 0.00 -0.75 - 0.01 0.17 0.64 3.27% -58.00%
Capital subsidies
τL = 20% -0.46 - 0.90 0.01 0.08 0.82 4.85% -59.02%
τC = 40% -0.19 0.10 - 0.01 0.08 0.78 3.62% -54.12%
government spending, which leaves government consumption expenditure at inef-
ficiently low levels. Yet, the five different equilibria presented here uncover further
interesting features. Compared to capital income tax harmonization, labour in-
come tax harmonization acts directly in one key distortion: the ”race to the
top” in the subsidy to labour-leisure choice, which supposes a shift towards lower
progressivity in labour income tax schedules, is circumvented. The considerable
increase in leisure time, relative to both capital income tax harmonization and
optimal policy, reflects this fact. Nonetheless, the shift from direct towards indi-
rect taxation is not prevented. This leads to a sizable subsidy to capital, either
via government production expenditure (row 5) or direct subsidies (row 7), the
latter generally being assumed away in the context of EU competition regulations.
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Yet, together with competitive pressures brought by capital mobility and inter-
national economic integration, this also intensifies the shift towards government
production expenditure, causing larger distortions in the economy.
Finally, the case of consumption tax harmonization is considered. To be fully
consistent with the model, this can be thought of as a general harmonization of
(or, equivalently, imposition of maximum thresholds on) consumption taxes. This
includes VAT, as well as, for instance, excise duties. This case is particularly inter-
esting as it is the only tax harmonization scenario which proves adequate to limit
a general shift from direct towards indirect taxation. Furthermore, by effectively
limiting the ability of governments to raise revenues through less distortive (and
mobile) tax bases, it also hinders a ”race to the top” in (direct or indirect) capital
subsidization. Comparing the two equilibria with capital subsidies, this is partic-
ularly clear. The bottom line is that the fiscal competition-induced government
investment distortion is thereby diminished and the inter-temporal distortion that
leads households to over-invest (relative to the first-best equilibrium) is, by im-
plication, also restricted.
One message is thus clear from the comparison of different tax harmonization
scenarios. If policymakers aim to curb the distortions induced by fiscal com-
petition, the ”order of preference” in tax harmonization agreements should be
directed towards the harmonization of the least distortive taxes, on less mobile
tax bases. Consumption tax rates, and particularly VAT rates, thus appear as
the first candidate in such task. On the contrary, the harmonization of more dis-
tortive taxes, with more mobile tax bases, such as capital income taxes, rather
than deterring fiscal competition, potentially leads to a shift in fiscal competition
towards non-distortive taxation and government production expenditure. Rather
115
than correcting existing distortions, this brings further sources of distortion into
the economy and is thus likely to do more harm than good, with no obvious gains
in terms of the scope for redistributive policies at the national level.
Finally, considering joint tax harmonization scenarios reinforces the main mes-
sage of this paper. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the harmonization of capital in-
come taxes (or of income taxes, in general), by exacerbating the distortions origi-
nally triggered by fiscal competition, are likely to imply the largest welfare losses.
Table 9 shows different joint tax harmonization scenarios, first with the tax rates
analyzed so far, then over different rates. The joint harmonization of income taxes
(row 1) implies a ”race to the top” in indirect taxation and that the government
investment distortion is magnified, resulting in the largest share of government
production expenditure. It becomes again apparent that only consumption tax
harmonization (eventually coupled with the harmonization of income taxes) is the
only policy option capable of minimizing this distortion (rows 2-5).
Other tax harmonization scenarios highlighted in rows 6-10 shed light on how
different levels of consumption tax rate harmonization may affect welfare. As-
suming away labour income taxation, the optimum level of consumption tax har-
monization is at a relatively low level, in the interval of 10 − 20%. This implies
that, on the one hand, the level of consumption taxation is low enough to de-
ter the fiscal competition-induced government investment distortion and, on the
other hand, high enough to avoid inefficiently high capital income taxation. Cap-
ital income taxation cannot also be completely ruled out. Comparing rows 6 and
10, for instance, we observe that sustaining low levels of consumption taxation
might be preferable than having the economy in an equilibrium with higher-than-
optimal consumption taxes, even if that implies positive capital income taxes in
116
equilibrium. This also suggests that, in the presence of fiscal competition, optimal
consumption taxation may be lower than in a closed economy environment.
Table 9: Joint tax harmonization: summary. All the policy scenarios consistent with interjurisdictional fiscal
competition are shown in this Table. All fiscal parameter values are presented, together with corresponding
simulations of equilibrium values of leisure hours, (net) rate of return on capital, equilibrium growth rate and
welfare changes, with respect to the benchmark case. Non-harmonized taxes are allowed to vary within bounds
(τK ,−τL, τC ≤ 90%). The reported changes in welfare are again relative to the benchmark economy. The first
four rows combine the previous harmonized tax rates into pairs of joint tax harmonization scenarios. The fifth
row works as a benchmark, combining all the three tax harmonization cases. Rows 6-9 set labour income taxes
to zero and vary the (harmonized) tax rate on consumption. These simulations show that, in an environment
of full capital mobility, the optimal harmonized level of consumption tax rates can be lower than in the optimal
policy scenario, implicitly assuming a closed economy. All the scenarios presented in this table are equilibrium
outcomes, where only one tax rate is allowed to vary at the time, again so to maximize the after-tax rate of
return on capital, φj (i.e. consistent with interjurisdictional fiscal competition, like the ”constrained” growth-
maximizing cases analyzed earlier). A more detailed explanation of the different joint tax harmonization options
is offered in the main text. The levels of tax rate harmonization, unless stated otherwise, are at the same levels
as before, i.e. for the combination of any of the following two: τK = 10%, τL = 20%, τC = 40%. These values
were all chosen to stand between the benchmark and the optimal policy points. The four last rows feature a
mix between labour income and consumption tax harmonization, with τL = 0% (equivalent to a ”flat tax rate”
system) and varying levels of consumption tax rates.
τK τL τC hj gj lj ψj ∆W
τK + τL - - 0.90 0.01 0.43 0.76 2.97% -128.45%
τK + τC - -0.90 - 0.01 0.23 0.60 2.91% -69.30%
τL + τC 0.00 - - 0.01 0.22 0.78 3.17% -65.20%
τL + τC -0.19 - - 0.01 0.08 0.80 3.61% -55.32%
τK + τL + τC - - - 0.01 0.29 0.76 2.79% -82.64%
τL = 0%
τC = 0% 0.14 - - 0.01 0.08 0.74 2.10% -60.02%
τC = 10% 0.04 - - 0.01 0.08 0.74 2.55% -58.48%
τC = 20% 0.00 - - 0.01 0.11 0.75 2.90% -54.23%
τC = 40% 0.00 - - 0.01 0.21 0.74 3.22% -64.10%
3.5.5 Federal budget: towards a new EU Cohesion Policy?
None of the above tax harmonization scenarios tackles another fundamental source
of potential welfare losses, both relative to the benchmark economy and to the
first-best allocation, under optimal fiscal policy. Fiscal competition between ju-
risdictions implies important shifts in government expenditure composition. A
by-product of the so-called fiscal competition-induced government investment dis-
tortion is a persistent under-spending in government activities directly benefiting
117
households’ welfare, or, in short, government consumption expenditure53.
How to design a fiscal harmonization scheme that is able, at the same time,
to address the main distortions introduced both on the taxation and on the ex-
penditure side? Assuming away the possibility (or desirability) of having large
shares of earmarked government expenditure - particularly taking into account
the hybrid nature of a vast majority of public goods, both with a ”productive”
and a ”welfaristic” role - we consider the centralization (rather than harmoniza-
tion) of spending powers. Starting from a broad principle of public finance, the
principle of subsidiarity54, the following proposals take as given that, on the one
hand, certain government expenditures can be ”centralized” while being tailored
to different local needs (e.g. healthcare) and, on the other hand, that it is po-
litically feasible to consider a scenario under which a ’federal budget’ is broad
enough to cover some comon fundamental areas of government intervention (e.g.
unemployment insurance). Recent proposals that go in this direction, although
generally more focused on the response of EU economies to the business cycle, in-
clude for example the creation of a common European unemployment mechanism
(Beblavy´ and Maselli 2014, Abraham et al. 2018a, Dolls et al. 2018).
Tables 10 and 11 consider different policy scenarios, under which a significant
share of government expenditures is set at the central or federal level. We first
start from a share of the budget which corresponds to 20% of aggregate output, ap-
proximately equivalent to the US federal budget. Another underlying assumption
is that the areas of intervention of a common EU budget ought to be predomi-
53This type of expenditure can be interpreted in a broad sense. Even acknowledging the productive character
of some of the following areas of intervention, we can broadly identify government consumption expenditure as
spending on merit goods or as welfare spending. This can range from healthcare and education spending towards
government benefits or welfare-improving public infrastructure.
54This principle is also frequently acknowledged as one of the leading principles underlying the design of EU
treaties and institutions, and, in general, in the design of federal institutions. (REFERENCES HERE)
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nantly of a welfaristic nature, including for instance unemployment insurance and
targeted family benefits, or a share of healthcare and education spending.
It is assumed throughout the exercise that sub-central jurisdictions, EU coun-
tries, still keep full discretion over the size and composition of national govern-
ment expenditure. Furthermore, it is also initially assumed that the EU budget is
funded by EU countries, broadly in a negotiation process that implies pluri-annual
financial agreements, similar to the current EU financing framework. This implies
however an unrealistic large share of government expenditure centralization while
jurisdictions have full discretion on setting tax rates. Rows 3-4 in Table 10 rep-
resent the two equilibria reached under this scenario, with and without capital
subsidies, respectively. These are meant to work as a ’benchmark’ case and allow
further comparison with the remaining policy scenarios, under which the same
share of government expenditure is also centralized, coupled with some degree of
tax harmonization across EU countries. Rows 5-7 present different scenarios of
joint tax harmonization. One trend emerges from the equilibria reached under
the three different policy scenarios: only consumption tax harmonization averts a
”race to the top” in government production expenditure at the sub-central level.
Interestingly, for a high level of consumption tax rates, there is an incentive for
governments to set government production expenditures below optimum (row 7).
This is because, given government consumption expenditures above (first-best)
optimum, policymakers attempt to correct this distortion by ensuring that aggre-
gate government spending remains close to optimum and by giving an incentive
for households to invest more55.
Taking this into account, rows 8-10 show the results for different levels of the
55Tables D.1 and D.2 in Appendix show further results and how different fiscal harmonization scenarios reach
different equilibria highlighted here.
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consumption tax rate. Only consumption taxes are harmonized (together with
the centralization of a share of government spending), whereas both capital and
labour income taxes are allowed to move freely, bearing again in mind the incentive
of sub-central jurisdictions to maximize the after-tax or private rate of return on
capital. A similar picture emerges: given the size and composition of the federal
budget, and given consumption tax rates, policymakers will have the incentive to
set income taxes and government productive expenditures ”optimally”.
Policymakers at the federal level can thus be thought to face three key issues,
setting the size and composition of the federal budget, as well as the harmonized
level of consumption taxes, that maximizes economic welfare and is consistent with
interjurisdictional fiscal competition. The three scenarios highlighted in Table 10
suggest one important trade-off when setting the ”optimal” rate of consumption
taxes. A higher-than-optimal consumption tax rate implies an incentive for sub-
central jurisdictions to subsidize capital. A lower-than-optimal consumption tax
rate implies that sub-central jurisdictions will tax labour income too heavily, in
order to fund government productive expenditure. One immediate implication is
that higher consumption tax rates across the EU imply a higher growth rate of
the economy, although this does not necessarily imply higher welfare.
Table 11 shows the results for a more limited fiscal reform56. The scenarios
included here assume a smaller EU budget, approximately equal to 3% of GDP.
One can think of this as a scenario under which the composition of the EU budget
is broadly kept at the current level, while, for instance, a common European
unemployment insurance system is set in place. Hence, the scope of the EU
budget remains limited, while the increase in size can be explained by this ”fixed”
expenditure across EU countries. Row 3 summarizes the equilibrium reached
56Please refer to Table D.3 in Appendix for the complete set of policy simulation results.
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Table 10: EU federal budget. All the policy scenarios consistent with interjurisdictional fiscal competition are
shown. For comparison purposes, the benchmark and optimal policy scenarios are presented in the first two
rows. All fiscal parameter values are presented, together with corresponding simulations of equilibrium values
of leisure hours, (net) rate of return on capital, equilibrium growth rate and welfare changes, with respect to
the benchmark case. Non-harmonized taxes are allowed to vary within bounds (τK ,−τL, τC ≤ 90%). The
reported changes in welfare are again relative to the benchmark economy. It is assumed throughout the different
scenarios that the share government consumption expenditure is set equal to the benchmark level (hj = 20%).
This supposes a relatively high level of centralization of spending powers. A more detailed discussion of the
different policy scenarios is offered in the main text. The levels of tax rate harmonization are presented in the
table. These values were all chosen to stand between the benchmark and the optimal policy points. The three
last rows feature only consumption tax harmonization, showing a potentially optimal level of consumption tax
rate harmonization below the optimal policy level.
τK τL τC hj gj lj ψj ∆W
Benchmark 0.31 0.38 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.78 1.48%
Optimal policy 0.00 -0.55 0.55 0.17 0.08 0.66 2.91% 17.94%
hj = 20%
0.00 -0.90 0.90 - 0.14 0.61 3.24% 4.02%
-0.15 -0.20 0.90 - 0.08 0.72 3.57% 6.86%
τK = 10% + τL = 20% - - 0.90 - 0.25 0.76 2.73% -10.64%
τK = 10% + τC = 40% - -0.45 - - 0.08 0.66 2.40% 7.91%
τL = 20% + τC = 50% -0.02 - - - 0.07 0.78 2.74% 9.77%
τC = 50% -0.02 0.19 - - 0.07 0.78 2.74% 9.23%
τC = 45% 0.00 0.16 - - 0.06 0.77 2.62% 9.88%
τC = 40% 0.00 0.32 - - 0.05 0.81 2.47% 8.21%
when this is coupled with consumption tax harmonization, at a relatively low
level, close to the benchmark economy (τC = 19%). This level is also chosen
so that a ”race to the top” in government production expenditure is prevented.
Although the potential welfare losses are clear, they can be attributed to below-
optimal government consumption expenditures.
Yet, these policy simulations clearly suggest that even a limited expenditure-
side reform at the EU level, coupled with some degree of tax harmonization,
can go a long way in ensuring that the (potentially large) welfare losses from
interjurisdictional EU fiscal competition are thwarted57.
57Rows 9-11 in Table D.3 show the results for a similar policy reform coupled instead with capital income tax
harmonization. Clearly, given the incentive for governments to over-invest - by resorting to indirect taxation
- the potential welfare losses are still not prevented and can be traced back to the fiscal competition-induced
government investment distortion.
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Table 11: Limited EU budget. All the policy scenarios consistent with interjurisdictional fiscal competition
are shown. For comparison purposes, the benchmark and optimal policy scenarios are presented in the first two
rows. All fiscal parameter values are presented, together with corresponding simulations of equilibrium values
of leisure hours, (net) rate of return on capital, equilibrium growth rate and welfare changes, with respect to
the benchmark case. Non-harmonized taxes were allowed to vary within pre-defined bounds. It is assumed
throughout the exercise that the EU budget is increased to a ratio of 3% of GDP. Under this scenario, the
policy simulations show consumption taxes are harmonized at a level of τC = 19%, just below the current EU-28
average in the benchmark scenario, deliver the best result, in terms of the computed welfare measure.
τK τL τC hj gj lj ψj ∆W
Benchmark 0.31 0.38 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.78 1.48%
Optimal policy 0.00 -0.55 0.55 0.17 0.08 0.66 2.91% 17.94%
hj = 3%
τC = 19%
-0.01 0.10 - - 0.08 0.77 2.80% -16.24%
3.6 Concluding remarks
Fiscal competition between EU countries is likely to bring large welfare losses
and, sooner rather than later, imply very large shifts in tax and spending struc-
tures of EU governments. Some form of fiscal coordination is thus commonly
advocated in order to prevent such type of non-cooperative Nash equilibrium.
An obvious question immediately follows: how should policymakers design a fu-
ture EU fiscal harmonization agreement? In this context, several fiscal reform
proposals have been put forward. Tax harmonization proposals, in particular,
have taken many different forms over the past decades, but have almost solely fo-
cused on capital income tax harmonization. This paper proposes a fundamentally
different approach to fiscal harmonization.
Two main messages emerge. Firstly, capital income tax harmonization is no
panacea. If EU countries aim to curb interjurisdictional fiscal competition and
prevent large welfare losses that can potentially emerge from it, indirect taxes,
rather than income taxes, should become priority targets of any fiscal reform pro-
posals. Perhaps counter-intuitively, this is due to the fact that the incidence of
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indirect taxes, such as value-added taxes, generally falls over least distortive tax
bases and thus provide the most efficient way for governments to raise revenues.
In the context of intense fiscal competition among EU countries, governments
have the incentive to direct tax revenues towards capital subsidization. This can
come in two distinct forms: direct subsidies, typically ruled out in the context of
EU and WTO regulations, and indirect subsidies, through higher government pro-
ductive expenditures. We refer to this as a fiscal competition-induced government
investment distortion. A race to the top thus emerges in indirect taxation and
government production expenditure in a non-cooperative or unconstrained fiscal
competition scenario. Indeed, if only direct taxes - such as corporate or personal
income taxes - are harmonized, this is likely to reinforce this shift and produce
even larger distortions in fiscal policies across EU member states.
Secondly, revenue side reforms - such as the introduction of harmonized VAT
taxation across the EU - must be accompanied by expenditure side reforms. This
is because the government investment distortion implies potentially large shifts on
the composition of government expenditure. In particular, indirect capital sub-
sidization through higher government productive expenditures comes at a price:
a race to the bottom in government expenditures of a predominantly welfaristic
nature. We have thus analyzed different scenarios which suppose a larger EU bud-
get. In a nutshell, even limited reforms - such as the introduction of a common
European unemployment insurance mechanism or larger EU budget contributions
in targeted areas of government welfare expenditure - can go a long way in pre-
venting the potentially large welfare losses from fiscal competition between EU
countries, if coupled with an harmonized VAT taxation framework. The results
of our simulations also suggest a strikingly different approach for EU Cohesion
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Policy, with implications on both the size and areas of intervention of the EU
budget. In particular, while a significant share of the current EU budget is de-
voted to agricultural and structural policies, in order to promote the catching-up
of economically disadvantaged regions, the results from our policy simulations
suggest that a progressive shift of EU Cohesion policies towards welfaristic spend-
ing is paramount to achieve a common European fiscal agreement consistent with
deepening capital mobility and economically integrated EU economies.
The size and scope of a federal EU budget will nonetheless necessarily depend,
on the one hand, on how different fiscal reforms can be implemented while ensuring
that enough fiscal discretion is kept at the national level. On the other hand, on
the political feasibility of such reforms, constrained namely by different policy
preferences across countries, which can bring important constraints at least on
the levels of (harmonized) taxation and size of the EU budget. Regarding a
common European unemployment insurance system, Abraham et al. (2018a) have
shown that significant welfare gains can be achieved from implementing common
policies in all countries involved, while at the same time leaving room for national
adjustments on the generosity of unemployment benefits. A consistent EU fiscal
harmonization agreement is thus most likely to succeed if it goes in the direction
of setting common minimum (and maximum) thresholds, rather than aiming at
harmonizing tax and spending decisions at the national level.
One main limitation emerges from this analysis: the model is silent about the
dynamics of income inequality and redistribution in different environments of fis-
cal competition or partial fiscal harmonization. Yet, at least one question emerges:
if countries are unable to set positive capital income taxes (or even progressive
labour income tax schedules), how to solve the problem of income redistribution in
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a world of capital mobility and deepening economic integration? This paper sug-
gests the issues of income redistribution and tax harmonization should be treated
separately, at first. Tax harmonization must first and foremost ensure that the
distorting incentives of tax competition can effectively be constrained and wel-
fare losses minimized. Concerns with income inequality and redistribution should
then be addressed, again with the need to ensure that national tax schemes are
consistent with fiscal competition incentives. Guerreiro et al. (2018), for instance,
suggest that, in the absence of lump-sum or discriminatory personal income tax
regimes, a tax on automation (which can go up to almost 40%) coupled with a uni-
versal transfer can be the best way to redistribute. In the EU, the introduction of
such taxes must necessarily be coordinated and the universal transfer system can
be set in place in connection with a common unemployment insurance mechanism.
Finally, one classical conclusion from the literature on optimal capital taxation is
that policymakers ought to tax wealth rather than capital income, because the
latter distorts the intertemporal investment-savings decisions of households, while
the former can be seen as a lump-sum tax. One problem with such option ensuring
credible commitment (Diamond and Saez, 2011). This has also been suggested
as a motivation for a switch from capital income to consumption taxation. A
common system of progressive consumption taxation can thus potentially reap
two virtues of wealth and consumption taxation, as a way to redistribute and
limit the distortive incentives of income taxation. This paper thus reinforces the
view that a shift towards consumption taxation can be desirable, particularly a
context of intense fiscal competition, and indeed more feasible and less distortive
than attempting to sustaun high capital income taxes across the EU.
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Abstract
Governments can be understood to have two main fiscal policy targets over the short-
term: macroeconomic and debt stabilization. Yet, there can often be a trade-off between
both. Fiscal policy across OECD countries has become pro-cyclical over recent decades,
particularly within the EMU. We assess the role of fiscal decentralization and endogenous
debt limits on the fiscal stance of OECD countries and assess whether this may have played
a role in the fiscal responses before and after the recent European sovereign debt crisis.
Both the average level of structural fiscal balances and their responsiveness to indebtedness
conditions are found persistently weaker beyond the 70 percent debt-to-GDP threshold,
pointing towards a fiscal fatigue phenomenon. The effect of fiscal decentralization appears
to be more complex, not least because of the large heterogeneity in both the size and
scope of fiscal decentralization across OECD countries. Large intergovernmental transfer
systems do appear however negatively associated with the fiscal stance, particularly when
sub-national governments have a wide policy scope.
4.1 Introduction
The message from the large literature on real business cycles, macroeconomic
stabilization and public finance is clear: fiscal policy should be counter-cyclical.
In this context, discretionary fiscal policy, as measured by structural or cyclically-
adjusted balances, should at best be acyclical, while automatic stabilizers are let
to work in order to smooth the business cycle. In particular, in environments like
the European Monetary Union (EMU), where member countries share a common
currency and have no control over monetary policy, fiscal policy becomes the sole
instrument to respond to asymmetric macroeconomic shocks and is thus expected
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to respond adequately in order to smooth the business cycle (Gal´ı et al., 2003)58.
As the EMU sovereign debt crisis has shown, accumulating ’rainy day funds’ is
thus paramount for countries to ensure fiscal discretion over the business cycle.
Yet, the empirical literature on fiscal policy cyclicality finds broadly mixed
results and fiscal policy is frequently found acyclical in developed economies, or
even pro-cyclical. Recent studies shed more light on this phenomenon. For in-
stance, Vegh and Vuletin (2015) find that tax policies tend to be acyclical in
developed economies but pro-cyclical in developing countries. Kaminsky et al.
(2005), Ilzetzki and Ve´gh (2008) and Cuadra et al. (2010) find similar results
in the context of developing economies. Recent evidence also suggests that fis-
cal fatigue may influence the fiscal stance, as the ability of governments to in-
crease primary balances may be undermined by rising stocks of debt (Ghosh et al.
2013, Checherita-Westphal and Zˇdˇa´rek 2017 and Pappada` and Zylberberg 2018).
Many other factors have been identified as determinants of fiscal policy cyclical-
ity. Frankel et al. (2013) find a causal relationship between strong institutions and
countercyclical fiscal policies59. Many contributions have also highlighted how fis-
cal policy responses can be influenced by different political economy factors, such
as the existence of formal fiscal rules and electoral cycles (Lindbeck 1976, Barro
1979, Alesina and Sachs 1988, Rogoff and Sibert 1988, Alesina and Roubini 1992,
Jones et al. 2000, Persson and Tabellini 2001, Hallerberg et al. 2007).
In light of the above, we study the fiscal behaviour of twenty-five OECD coun-
tries, from 1995 to 2016, thirteen of which are within the EMU (nineteen are
58Moreover, as public debt is issued in a currency over which governments have no control, the rationale for
counter-cyclical policies is reinforced, as countries become prone to speculative attacks and can eventually face
the need to switch off automatic stabilizers.
59Tornell and Lane (1999) suggest that, in a context of weak institutions, a lower concentration of power leads
to a less pro-cyclical fiscal policy. This is related to a ”voracity effect”, which makes fiscal policy too expansionary
in upswings, due to the influence of different interest groups.
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current EU member countries). Discretionary fiscal policy is found markedly pro-
cyclical, which suggests a divergence in practice between policy and theory. We
thus re-assess the main determinants of fiscal responses in developed economies
and how these might have been affected by different factors. The literature on
fiscal reactions functions is generally concerned with two issues: fiscal policy cycli-
cality and sustainability (Bohn 1998, Gal´ı et al. 2003 Lane 2003). In this paper,
we focus in particular on the issue of fiscal policy cyclicality. Consistently with the
literature, we include other determinants of policy cyclicality commonly identified.
We aim in particular to assess the role of fiscal decentralization and endogenous
debt limits on the fiscal stance of OECD and EU economies and assess whether
this may have played a role in the fiscal responses before and after the recent Euro-
pean sovereign debt crisis. However, it is well-known that fiscal decentralization,
as a complex phenomenon, is hard to measure clearly. Different effects of fiscal
decentralization on the fiscal stance can also be considered. On the one hand,
local and regional governments with wide spending powers may have a negative
impact on fiscal coordination, thereby influencing the fiscal stance and making it
less responsive to the business cycle at the national level. On the other hand, such
coordination problems might not actually be present, either because sub-national
governments do not have strong revenue-raising powers and rely on intergovern-
mental grants or because the level of spending autonomy is limited. The latter
case implies that sub-national governments can be seen as regional and local ad-
ministrative divisions or agencies of the central government. In this context, we
explore the effects of fiscal decentralization by using different measures of fiscal de-
centralization. We profit in particular from the detailed measures of expenditure
and revenue decentralization made available by the OECD. In addition, we use a
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novel dataset which measures the fiscal discretion of regional governments. The
Local Authority Index (LAI) presents comparable data for 39 European countries,
analyzing and reporting changes in the extent of fiscal and political decentraliza-
tion. In particular, the measures of decentralization presented in this dataset
capture in detail the extent to which local authorities have fiscal discretion over
their budgets, and was put together as part of the project “Self-rule Index for
Local Authorities” (European Commission, 2015).
Other studies have also focused on the link between fiscal decentralization
and the fiscal stance (Afonso and Hauptmeier 2009, Schaltegger and Feld 2009,
Baskaran 2010, Eyraud et al. 2011, Eyraud et al. 2012, Foremny and von Hagen
2012). The decentralization of spending powers is associated with lower public
debt (Baskaran, 2010) and improving fiscal balances of the general government,
particularly if coupled with decentralization of revenue-raising powers (Eyraud
et al., 2012). On the other hand, it is also suggested that ensuring sustainable
fiscal policy at the central level is key for the effective performance of sub-national
governments facing adverse macroeconomic conditions (Foremny and von Hagen,
2012). In a related study, Asatryan et al. (2015) find that greater revenue auton-
omy tends to foster fiscal discipline at the sub-national level. The potential effect
of fiscal decentralization on long-term fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic sta-
bilization thus vary widely. Sub-national governments can act as mere agencies
of the central government and have little room for fiscal maneuver, or instead
as act as autonomous institutions with extensive fiscal powers, independently of
the central government. The extent to which both revenues and expenditures are
decentralized may nonetheless also vary in any of these cases.
The main aim of this study is to assess how the degree of de facto sub-national
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fiscal decentralization affects fiscal performance. De jure fiscal decentralization
does not necessarily affect long-term fiscal sustainability or have direct implica-
tions for macroeconomic stabilization. De facto fiscal decentralization, on the
other hand, with extensive fiscal autonomy at the sub-national level, may affect
macroeconomic stabilization, as ultimately the aggregate fiscal response will de-
pend on the sum of different fiscal behaviours at the national and sub-national
levels. Long-term fiscal sustainability may also be affected, if fiscal decentraliza-
tion is coupled with pervasive fiscal incentives at the sub-national level. The po-
tential concerns raised by the existence of high levels of vertical fiscal imbalances,
created when large intergovernmental transfer systems are in place to finance ex-
tensive expenditure responsibilities at the sub-national level, are again ambiguous.
The literature on fiscal federalism suggests vertical fiscal imbalances can gener-
ate common pool incentives and eventually cause long-term fiscal sustainability
problems. Yet, this can also be seen as the result of an optimal organization of
tax and spending responsibilities in federal systems.
We find five main policy patterns. Firstly, discretionary fiscal policy, as mea-
sured by structural primary balances, is found predominantly pro-cyclical over
the period. Secondly, consistent with long-term fiscal sustainability concerns, the
fiscal stance is found to respond positively to rising debt-to-GDP ratios. Thirdly,
a persistent negative effect of election periods on the fiscal stance is also clear,
suggesting the relevance of electoral budget cycles. These findings are robust
across different specifications and sample characteristics. Yet, the existence of
dissimilar fiscal responses across different debt-to-GDP levels suggests the impor-
tance of endogenous debt limits. Fourthly, in this context, we find that both the
average level of structural fiscal balances and their responsiveness to rising debt
131
levels is persistently weaker beyond the 70 percent debt-to-GDP threshold. This
points towards the relevance of fiscal fatigue in debt overhang environments. Fi-
nally, the effect of fiscal decentralization appears to be more complex. Revenue
decentralization appears to exhibit a negative relationship with the average level
of structural balances. Yet, once considering the level of sub-national autonomy,
this effect disappears and, instead, the degree of vertical fiscal imbalances appears
with a strong negative relationship with the fiscal stance. This result is reinforced
by two additional findings. On the one hand, while a higher level of expenditure
decentralization exhibits a negative relationship with average corporate taxation,
revenue decentralization appears associated with higher average personal income
tax rates. On the other hand, exploring other indicators of sub-national fiscal
autonomy, we can observe that vertical fiscal imbalances appear once again nega-
tively related to the fiscal stance, particularly when sub-national governments are
involved in the provision of a wide range of public services. The responsiveness
to the business cycle does not appear directly affected, suggesting that coordi-
nation problems do not play a major role in explaining the cyclical behaviour of
discretionary fiscal policy.
In the next section we review the main literature on fiscal reaction functions.
We also shed light on possible links between fiscal decentralization and the cycli-
cality of fiscal policy, based on the classic literature on public finance and fiscal
federalism. We present our data and methodology in the third section. In the
fourth section, we explore the main results and present robustness checks. Finally,
in the last section we offer some concluding remarks, discuss the main limitations
of our paper and highlight some possible avenues for future research.
132
4.2 Literature review and motivation
Fiscal policy is one of the most important tools for policymakers in developed
economies and is widely used both for redistributive and stabilization purposes.
In the context of the EMU, it is in fact the only stabilization tool at the disposal
of national governments to counter asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. In this
context, the fiscal background also imposes important constraints on the fiscal
stance (Gal´ı et al., 2003), in light of the rules set out by the Maastrich Treaty
and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), or more recently the Fiscal Compact
(TSCG)60, Accordingly, the great emphasis recently put on national fiscal respon-
sibility and long-term debt sustainability led to a renewed set of contributions in
the literature. In this section, we aim to briefly review the literature on fiscal re-
action functions, focusing in particular on the recent contributions. We then focus
on the empirical assessments of the fiscal behaviour of EU and OECD countries,
in order to obtain a first grasp of the main policy patterns observed in recent
decades across developed economies. Finally, we review shortly the literature on
fiscal federalism, aiming to identify the main mechanisms that may link fiscal
decentralization and the fiscal stance, before moving on to explore the data and
methodology used in this paper,
4.2.1 Fiscal reaction functions: theoretical frameowork
The motivation for the large literature that has developed on fiscal reaction func-
tions since the contribution of Bohn (1998) can be traced further back to the early
work of Barro (1979), exploring long-term fiscal policy sustainability. Namely, this
60The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), in
its formal denomination, came into force after the European sovereign debt crisis, building upon the SGP and
aiming to introduce better surveillance mechanisms (the so-called preventive arm) and to reinforce budgetary
controls (the so-called corrective arm).
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literature stemmed from an early positive theory of ”optimal” fiscal policy, iden-
tifying factors that can influence the choice between taxes and the issue of debt.
While these early models generally accepts that Ricardian equivalence can be seen
as a valid long-run relationship, they introduce other ”second-order” or short-run
considerations, which include for instance the overall tax burden, to obtain an
optimal level of debt creation. This analysis thus concentrates on variables that
could in principle be dominated in the long-run by ”first-order” effects. The early
model of Barro (1979) is thus used as the underlying theoretical framework to
test whether there is an effect of government spending, temporary variations in
income, or of expected inflation on new debt issuance61. In Bohn (1998), a similar
focus can be found on the behaviour of the US fiscal balances in the post-war
period. The aim was to assess whether the US government satisfied its inter-
temporal budget constraint, by setting fiscal policy appropriately in response to
changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio. To this end, a fiscal reaction function is estab-
lished, in order to evaluate the response of the fiscal stance, extracting the effect
of non-discretionary elements of fiscal policy (viz. automatic stabilizers and debt
service). Other determinants of government fiscal behaviour are included as con-
trol variables. A positive link is found between the debt-to-GDP ratio and fiscal
balances, interpreted as evidence of long-term US fiscal policy sustainability62.
The literature on fiscal reaction functions can be divided into two main cat-
egories. Using a common analytical framework and empirical tools, the focus
is frequently placed on two main issues: long-term debt sustainability and fiscal
61The theoretical hypotheses set out by this model are tested with post-war US data. By and large, the
empirical results confirm the underlying theory. The magnitude of countercyclical debt responses, however,
appears somewhat larger than implied by the theory, which is interpreted as an indicator of US government
concerns with stabilization policy in the post-war period.
62Ghosh et al. (2013) point out, however, that this may not be enough to preclude rising debt-to-GDP ratios.
Hence, a positive relation between debt-to-GDP and fiscal balances should instead more cautiously be interpreted
as a weak sustainability criterion.
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policy cyclicality. The literature can thus be understood as a predominantly ”nor-
mative” empirical literature assessing the overall quality of fiscal policy, through
the short-run response of fiscal balances to different factors. Recent contributions
have focused on both issues63. In the former case, the main concern is in assessing
the fiscal response to rising debt ratios, whereas in the latter case the response to
a measure of short-term macroeconomic performance, generally the output gap,
is explored. All these approaches however follow the initial spirit of Bohn (1998),
focusing on the quality of fiscal policy, as both (counter-)cyclicality and long-term
sustainability can be seen as two desirable properties of fiscal policy. Hence, pol-
icymakers can be thought to have, not just one, but two needles on their fiscal
policy compass: cyclicality and sustainability. As pointed out by Fata´s and Mihov
(2010), while sustainability relates to a long-term quality of fiscal policy, it is also
connected in many ways to short-term macroeconomic stabilization.
Looking now at the left-hand side of fiscal reaction functions, both strands of
the literature focus on similar measures of fiscal balances, with the aim to capture
the response of fiscal policy to different variables. Hence, the focus on primary
rather than overall fiscal balances - thereby extracting the debt service, which
depends on the ”stock” of past fiscal decisions -, or, more commonly, the use of
cyclically-adjusted measures of the fiscal stance, aiming to extract the cyclical
components of fiscal policy, namely the effect of automatic stabilizers. The use
of the cyclically-adjusted primary balance (CAPB) is thus consistent with the
primary focus of the literature, insofar as it is able to isolate the discretionary
component of fiscal policy, i.e. the fiscal reaction, from aggregate measures of
63On fiscal sustainability: Bohn (2005), Afonso (2008), De Mello (2008), Mendoza and Ostry (2008), Afonso
and Hauptmeier (2009), Afonso et al. (2010), Daniel and Shiamptanis (2013), Ghosh et al. (2013), Weichenrieder
and Zimmer (2014). On fiscal policy cyclicality: Turrini et al. (2008), Golinelli and Momigliano (2009), Fata´s
and Mihov (2010), Battilossi et al. (2013), E´gert (2014).
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the fiscal balance, which are necessarily influenced by other characteristics of the
fiscal stance64. In addition, the inclusion of automatic stabilizers on the left-hand
side of a fiscal reaction function can be particularly problematic, as the size and
magnitude of this component becomes reliant on specific country characteristics,
which show high persistence over time65.
4.2.2 Fiscal reaction functions: empirical specification
The estimation of models that relate the fiscal stance to the output gap, the ratio
of public debt and other fiscal variables brings several challenges that must be
addressed, before any econometric inference can validly be drawn. The variables
in the equation form a fundamental identity, which prevails in any circumstance.
We can thus start by writing the fundamental government budget constraint:
Bt = Gt − Tt + (1 + rt)Bt−1
where Bt is the stock of government debt in period t, expressed as the sum of
primary spending, Gt, and the interest rate, rt, paid on the existing stock of debt,
Bt−1, net of government revenues, Tt, in any period t. The above can also be
written as a difference equation, defining the overall fiscal balance:
∆Bt = Bt −Bt−1 = Gt − Tt + rtBt−1
we thus can write the budget deficit in each period as the sum of primary gov-
ernment balances, (Gt − Tt), and debt service, rtBt−1. Hence, if the amount of
taxes collected in a given period is just enough to cover primary spending, a gov-
64Another indicator used to measure the fiscal reaction of governments is real primary spending (Battilossi
et al., 2013).
65These characteristics include for instance the size of governments (Fata´s and Mihov, 2010), as well as the
composition of government spending and the degree of overall tax progressivity (Gal´ı et al., 2003).
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ernment will exhibit a zero primary balance, whereas the overall fiscal balance is
likely to be negative, resulting in an increase in the stock of debt, ∆Bt > 0. In
other words, if the primary surplus (Tt−Gt) cannot cover the debt service in each
period rtBt−1, the stock of government debt will rise.
The econometric estimation of a fiscal reaction function generally departs from
the fundamental budget identity and includes a lagged dependent variable, im-
plying that primary balances exhibit a high persistence. This is often interpreted
as governments being unable to set out sufficient fiscal reforms to dramatically
change a country’s fiscal position in a single year (Afonso, 2008) or, alternatively,
that past fiscal behaviour also explains the current fiscal stance (Turrini et al.,
2008). The basic specification of a fiscal reaction function is thus expressed as:
si,t = βsi,t−1 + γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 + εi,t (33)
where bi,t−1 is lagged government debt, yˆi,t−1 is the output gap, εi,t is the er-
ror term and si,t is the primary fiscal balance, generally adjusted for its cyclical
component. The subscript i, i = 1, . . . , N refers to the cross-sectional dimension
of the estimation, denoting different countries or regions, whereas the index t,
t = 1, . . . , T refers to the time-series dimension, indicating different time periods.
The use of primary measures in the estimation of fiscal justifications is again jus-
tified with the focus on fiscal reactions to the business cycle or a rising stock of
debt. The use of cyclically-adjusted primary balances reinforces this idea. By iso-
lating the effect of discretionary measures from that of automatic stabilizers, the
estimation will present a more accurate picture of governments’ fiscal behaviour.
Along with the two main theoretical determinants of the fiscal stance, the
econometric estimation of fiscal reaction functions also involves the inclusion of
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several other determinants of the fiscal stance:
si,t = αi + βsi,t−1 + γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 + Λ(n)X
(n)
(i,t) + εi,t (33’)
The general specification for the econometric estimation of a fiscal reaction func-
tion thus includes the intercept parameter αi, capturing country fixed effects. The
parameter β, in turn, captures the persistence of the fiscal stance. The key pa-
rameters are γ and δ, capturing debt sustainability (through the response of fiscal
balances to the stock of debt) and fiscal policy cyclicality (or the response of the
fiscal stance to the economic cycle), respectively. Finally, Λ(n×1) is a (n×1) vector
of parameters capturing the effect of a set of n control variables, X
(n)
(i,t), such as
political economy variables, fiscal rules, or time-fixed effects. In this case, we in-
clude decentralization measures in our estimation, as part of this set of variables,
as well as dummies for election years and debt thresholds.
Looking more in depth at two key parameters in this equation, γ and δ, the
sustainability parameter, γ, is expected to exhibit a positive and significant sign,
indicating a positive fiscal response, i.e. larger fiscal surpluses, to rising debt
levels, in line with fiscal sustainability concerns of policymakers. Thus, γ > 0 is
an indicator of fiscal policy sustainability or, in other words, that a government
follows a Ricardian fiscal regime (Afonso, 2008). An increase in the primary bal-
ance (cyclically-adjusted or unadjusted) in response to an increase in government
debt, thus suggests that current primary surpluses can ensure a sustainable path of
government debt, which can be financed via current and future tax revenues. For
γ = 0, no evidence of a systematic fiscal response to debt levels is found, whereas
γ < 0 could suggest a scenario of long-term fiscal unsustainability or, in other
words, of a non-Ricardian fiscal regime. Increases in debt would thus be followed
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by looser fiscal policy and the debt path would ultimately tend to become unsus-
tainable. The cyclicality parameter, δ, is also expected to also exhibit a positive
and significant sign, indicating a countercyclical fiscal policy. In an economic up-
swing, fiscal balances would thus be rising, while contractionary measures are put
in place by the government. During an economic downturn, a higher fiscal deficit
would be the result of expansionary fiscal policies that can (partially) smooth the
business cycle. If however we have δ = 0, no significant systematic response is
found to the output gap, in which case we can infer in favour of a predominantly
acyclical fiscal policy. Finally, a cyclicality parameter significantly smaller than
zero, δ < 0, shows evidence of pro-cyclical fiscal policies across the sample period
and countries considered. This implies that fiscal policy, rather than playing an
active role in smoothing the economic cycle, actually amplifies it and potentially
makes upswings and downturns persist for longer periods66. The discussion of the
remaining parameters in the fiscal reaction function is left to a latter part, where
we fully discuss the econometric specification of the fiscal reaction functions used
in this paper.
4.2.3 Fiscal reaction functions: main results
Having set out our basic framework, highlighting the main strands in the litera-
ture and the fundamental estimation framework, we are now in position to explore
more in depth the main results found in the literature. The strand of the litera-
ture that is more concerned with fiscal policy cyclicality focuses in particular on
the response of fiscal balances to the output gap. The concern is in particular
whether patterns of pro-cyclicality or counter-cyclicality can be found and what
66Note also that both variables, bi,t−1 and yˆi,t−1, indicate a lagged, rather than real-time, response of fiscal
balances, as policymakers typically face information lags and cannot respond to rising debt levels or economic
downturns contemporaneously.
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may help to explain these. Despite the large consensus around the desirability
of counter-cyclical fiscal policy behaviour, from the macroeconomic stabilization
perspective, it is nonetheless found in the literature that fiscal policy in the EU
follows a rather pro-cyclical behaviour (Turrini et al., 2008). This rather sur-
prising pattern can be found in a wide array of contributions on fiscal reaction
functions. E´gert (2014), for instance, looks at fiscal policy cyclicality for OECD
countries over the 1970-2008 period and finds evidence of counter-cyclicality, par-
ticularly stronger economic downturns. Yet, this appears to be largely a result
of automatic stabilizers. Looking at the contribution of discretionary fiscal mea-
sures, the results suggest instead a pattern of acyclicality with large differences
between countries included in the sample. Countries with ”healthier” public fi-
nances, i.e. with lower debt levels and higher average primary surpluses, were also
found in a better position to react during economic downturns, by implementing
expansionary fiscal policies. In addition, disaggregating between different expen-
diture components, investment spending is found to be more pro-cyclical, whereas
government subsidies were found mostly counter-cyclical.
These findings are in line with those found in Lane (2003), stressing the im-
portance of looking at disaggregated measures of government spending, as aggre-
gates can lead to ambiguous conclusions and hide different patterns in different
spending items. Similarly, Fata´s and Mihov (2010), in a comparison between fis-
cal behaviour in the EMU and other OECD countries between 1970 and 2007,
find that discretionary fiscal policy tended to be pro-cyclical in the EMU, once
the effect of automatic stabilizers is isolated. In contrast, evidence is found of
counter-cyclical fiscal policy in the United States. Gal´ı et al. (2003) find a general
trend towards more counter-cyclical fiscal behaviour in EMU countries, following
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a trend observed in most developed economies. Golinelli and Momigliano (2009),
focusing on the fiscal responses of EMU countries, from 1994 to 2008, find that
results are sensitive to model specification, often yielding contradicting results. In
particular, the results are found strongly reliant on the choice of the dependent
variable, as cyclically-adjusted measures yield different results from considering
government primary balances. Similarly, in terms of data used, real time and
ex-post data generate different results. With respect to ex-post data, fiscal policy
is found acyclical in this sample67. Also looking at EMU countries, between 1980
and 2005, Turrini et al. (2008) finds a pro-cyclical bias during economic upswings,
mostly driven by government expenditures. Taking a more long-run view, Bat-
tilossi et al. (2013) find a gradual shift from pro-cyclical towards counter-cyclical
fiscal policy in Spain, following the transition from dictatorship to democracy
in the 1970s. This supports the ”learning process” view also suggested in other
papers (Gal´ı et al., 2003).
Overall, the results in the literature on fiscal policy cyclicality suggest a pre-
dominantly acyclical discretionary fiscal response to the business cycle in OECD
countries. Once the effect of automatic stabilizers is taken into account, the re-
sponse tends to appear counter-cyclical, as otherwise expected (Gal´ı et al., 2003).
Another issue that stands out is the variability and the strong differences seen be-
tween econometric samples, countries, data sources and different measures (Go-
linelli and Momigliano, 2009). Together with the results in Lane (2003), high-
lighting that different expenditure items exhibit different cyclicality patterns, the
above seems to call for a careful approach to econometric inference and for more
67This approach is seen to tackle the issue of ”actual” fiscal policy, as opposed to ”policy intentions”. Using
real-time data only, Golinelli and Momigliano (2009) find asymmetric reactions to the economic cycle, with pro-
cyclical responses in downturns and counter-cyclical during economic upswings. These results are interpreted
by the authors as evidence against the view that points pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy as one of the main causes
behind the fiscal stress experienced in later periods by EMU countries (Persson and Tabellini, 2001).
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detailed analysis of all the information dimensions offered by different samples68.
The literature on fiscal reaction functions focusing on debt sustainability also
had an extensive development after the seminal contribution of (Bohn, 1998). For
instance, looking at the Brazilian fiscal performance from 1995 to 2004, De Mello
(2008) finds that all levels of government positively contributed towards a sus-
tainable fiscal path, increasing primary balances in response to higher debt levels.
Even with a warning regarding the quality of the fiscal adjustment, given the bias
towards public investment rather than current expenditure cuts, it is pointed out
that (formal) debt limits at the regional level contributed towards a fiscal per-
formance in line with long-term sustainability concerns in Brazil. Afonso (2008),
for instance, looking at the EU-15 countries experience from 1970 to 2003, tests
the hypothesis of the existence of Ricardian fiscal regimes, finding that EU-15
member countries did react with higher primary surpluses to rising debt-to-GDP
ratios, particularly at higher debt levels. However this effect appears weaker
during election periods, the results are interpreted as pointing towards an over-
all fiscal performance in line with sustainability concerns. Similarly, Afonso and
Hauptmeier (2009), looking at the fiscal reactions of EU countries over the pe-
riod of 1990 to 2005, find overall a positive response of the fiscal stance to rising
government debt levels, with a significant influence of fiscal rules, in the context
of the SGP framework. A negative effect of spending decentralization is found
however, contributing negatively to the response of primary fiscal balances to debt
levels. The rationale behind this effect can be explained namely by coordination
problems in more decentralised governments (Ter-Minassian and Fedelino).
68In addition, as suggested by Cimadomo (2016), the results of studies making use of cyclically-adjusted
measures need to be taken with a pinch of salt. The difficulties involved in the measurement of the output
gap, as well as the cyclical conditions that influence the fiscal stance, suggest that further robustness checks are
particularly welcome.
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On the other hand, Ghosh et al. (2013) estimate fiscal reaction functions for
a group of 23 OECD economies from 1970 and 2007 and find a non-linear re-
sponse of fiscal balances to debt levels, interpreting this as a sign of ‘fiscal fatigue’
in countries facing high debt ratios. In contrast with Afonso (2008), a weaker
responsiveness of primary balances is found at higher debt levels, namely when
debt-to-GDP ratios reach the 90-100% interval, and even turns negative after the
150% boundary. This also contrasts with the early findings of Bohn (1998). Men-
doza and Ostry (2008), on the other hand, find a weaker response of primary
balances to changes in debt for countries with higher debt-to-GDP ratios. We-
ichenrieder and Zimmer (2014) also find contrasting evidence for a sample of EU
countries, indicating that fiscal responsiveness to the debt stock varied substan-
tially, between periods and countries. In particular, more indebted countries are
found to become progressively less responsive to the debt-to-GDP ratio, after the
accession period to the EMU.
Large differences can again be found in the fiscal responses of governments to
rising debt levels. In particular, the responses at high debt thresholds seem to
be particularly heterogeneous, which brings into question the issue of fiscal sus-
tainability itself. On the one hand, governments concerned about sustainability,
would try to increase primary balances in order to ensure that outstanding liabil-
ities are covered. On the other hand, the capacity to do so may be undermined
after certain debt thresholds are reached. In addition, a positive response of fiscal
balances to higher debt-to-GDP ratios may not prove in itself sufficient to offset a
strong upward trend in debt levels (Ghosh et al., 2013). Recent literature suggests
that fiscal fatigue may become an important player in environments characterised
by an excessive debt burden, or debt overhang, as the ability of governments to
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increase primary balances becomes constrained (Checherita-Westphal and Zˇdˇa´rek
2017 and Pappada` and Zylberberg 2018). Several other factors can also influence
the fiscal stance, such as electoral cycles or other political economy variables.
Furthermore, these may influence fiscal reactions in a non-linear fashion. We now
briefly explore the literature on fiscal federalism in order to disentangle possible
channels through which fiscal decentralization can influence the fiscal stance.
4.2.4 Fiscal federalism
In its well-known argument, Tiebout (1956) suggested that citizens “voting with
their feet” act as monitors of sub-national governments. Accordingly, fiscal fed-
eralism would support better policies, as local and regional governments tend to
have more detailed information about needs and preferences of local populations
(Oates 1993, 1999, 2005, 2008), and this leads to a more efficient structure of gov-
ernance. The conditions under which this may happen, would however depend
ultimately “on the proper structure of fiscal institutions” (Oates 1993, p. 242)69.
A large body of empirical literature on fiscal federalism has since developed.
Namely, several empirical studies can be found on the relationship between fis-
cal decentralization and fiscal performance (Schaltegger and Feld 2009, Baskaran
2010, Eyraud et al. 2011, Eyraud et al. 2012, Foremny and von Hagen 2012)70.
Eyraud et al. (2011), for instance, find that the vertical fiscal imbalances, resulting
from the unequal devolution of expenditure and revenue-raising responsibilities,
69In a related strand of the literature, Weingast (1995) early proposed the notion of market-preserving fed-
eralism. According to this theory, fiscal federalism would protect markets against Leviathan governments by
creating self-enforcing restrictions on political institutions and foster economic development by promoting inter-
jurisdictional fiscal competition. Weingast underlines the importance of federal systems, in order to align the
incentives of policymakers with citizen welfare.
70A large strand of the empirical literature explores the link between fiscal decentralization and economic
growth (Davoodi and Zou 1998, Iimi 2005, Thornton, Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ezcurra, among others), with broadly
mixed results. In one particular account, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003), highlight that this relationship
is likely to be affected by a wide array of different mechanisms and, hence, the sign and magnitude of such
relationship is most likely to vary widely. Kyriacou et al. (2015) suggests a mediating role between government
quality in the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional convergence.
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are damaging for overall fiscal performance, especially when regional disparities
are high. This issue has been extensively studied and recognised both as a cause
of perversely structured decentralized systems and as a consequence of the desired
properties of tax systems. In particular, the presence of large vertical fiscal imbal-
ances together with non-credible commitment of central or federal governments
not to provide further fiscal transfers is thought to be at the heart of a soft bud-
get constraint problem, which may foster lax fiscal behaviour at the sub-national
level and endanger the fiscal sustainability71. Jones et al. (2000) show evidence of
how the fiscal behaviour of sub-central government influenced fiscal outcomes in
Argentina, where sub-central governments remained mainly financed from federal
revenues. This ”divorce” between spending and tax decisions, resulting in heavy
reliance on intergovernmental grants, then paved the way for a large “expansion-
ary bias” at the sub-national level and reinforced bailout incentives for the central
government. The implications of common pool problems, partially stemming from
the limited capacity of sub-national governments to raise own revenues is also an-
alyzed in De Mello (2000). The over-spending bias at the sub-national level can
be worsened in the case of coordination failures and poor local governance. The
incentives of sub-national governments facing high vertical fiscal imbalances can
be thought as a derivation from those present under soft budget constraints72.
71This issue was identified in the early literature. Oates (1993) suggests that a strong dependence on intergov-
ernmental transfers may undermine the fundamental incentives of local governments to ensure the sustainability
of local public finances. Similarly, Weingast points out that a fundamental condition for federal governance struc-
tures to produce the right incentives and support interjurisdictional competition is that sub-central governments
“bear the full financial consequences of their decisions”. The absence of such condition would instead promote
wasteful spending decisions, rent-seeking and corruption at the local level. A large body of literature has also
devoted particular attention to the issue of soft budget constraints (Bucovetsky 1997, De Mello 2000, Goodspeed
2002, Rodden et al. 2003, Oates 2005, Besfamille and Lockwood 2008, 2008, Weingast, Pettersson-Lidbom 2010
Asatryan et al. 2015).
72In the fiscal federalism literature, the view that “money sticks where it hits” (Oates 1999, p. 1129) hints
that an excessive reliance on intergovernmental grants can foster overspending, a phenomenon known as ‘flypaper
effect’ (Hines Jr and Thaler 1995, Becker 1996, Inman 2008).
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4.2.5 Motivation
The potential effect of fiscal decentralization on long-term fiscal sustainability
and macroeconomic stabilization may vary widely. On one extreme, the central
government can be responsible for collecting all government revenues and have full
discretion on the distribution of intergovernmental grants. On the other extreme,
sub-national governments can have extensive fiscal powers and collect a significant
share of own revenues locally, enough to fully cover main expenditure areas. In
the former case, sub-national governments can be seen as agents of the central
government and have very limited effective fiscal discretion. In the latter case,
sub-national governments may act independently of the central government, with
extensive fiscal discretion. The extent to which revenues and expenditures are
decentralized may also vary widely in both cases.
A distinctive feature is thus the degree of sub-national fiscal autonomy. De jure
fiscal decentralization does not necessarily affect long-term fiscal sustainability or
have direct implications for macroeconomic stabilization. Central governments
may in practice manage to keep full discretion over aggregate spending and use
their fiscal powers, namely the size of intergovernmental fiscal transfers, as part
of their response to the business cycle or rising debt levels. De facto fiscal decen-
tralization, on the other hand, with extensive fiscal autonomy at the sub-national
level, may affect macroeconomic stabilization, as central governments are left with
reduced fiscal powers to respond to the business cycle or to rising debt levels. Ul-
timately, aggregate fiscal sustainability will depend on the sum of different fiscal
behaviours at the central and sub-national levels.
In addition, as sub-national governments may or may not have extensive spend-
ing and revenue-raising powers, the potential concerns related to vertical fiscal
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imbalances are also ambiguous. On average, around 30% of public expenditures
are decentralized across OECD countries, whereas sub-national governments are
only responsible for raising around 20% of own revenues. This fiscal imbalance,
generally created in federal systems, may have an effect on how fiscal policy in con-
ducted at the sub-national level (Bouton et al., 2008). While intergovernmental
fiscal designs take several different forms, it is generally recognized that a heavy
reliance of sub-national governments on intergovernmental grants may foster lax
fiscal behaviour and eventually endanger long-term fiscal sustainability. However,
the existence of large intergovernmental grant systems can also potentially leave a
high degree of fiscal discretion at the central level. Namely, depending on the de-
sign of such systems (intergovernmental grants can be earmarked, formula-based,
subject to annual or pluri-annual political negotiation or, in practice, can be a
mix of these), different ”effective” levels of fiscal autonomy and bargaining power
are left at the central, regional and local levels of government.
The literature on fiscal federalism suggests that the existence of large vertical
fiscal imbalances can generate common pool incentives and eventually cause sus-
tainability problems. Yet, this can also be the result of an optimal organization
of tax and spending responsibilities in a federal system. It is thus an open ques-
tion how fiscal decentralization affects aggregate fiscal performance and whether
vertical fiscal imbalances arise as the result of an optimal organization of tax
and spending responsibilities, or instead are the origin of common pool problems
harming long-term fiscal sustainability. In the next section, we aim to explore
the dataset used to explore this phenomenon empirically, through the estimation
of fiscal reactions functions for twenty-five OECD countries, between 1995 and
and 2016. We also present the methodology and explore the main econometric
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specifications used in this paper.
4.3 Data and methodology
4.3.1 Data
In order to get a first snapshot of the fiscal behaviour across the OECD, it is
important to look at the time dimension of the main variables and how these
evolved across different countries. By plotting the evolution of fiscal balances
from 1995 to 2016, one can perceive a gradual worsening of fiscal balances in the
wake of the EMU sovereign debt crisis, particularly visible in Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain (Figure 17). For most countries in the sample a recovery
of both cyclically-adjusted (CAPB) and underlying primary balances (UPB) is
perceived from about 2009 onwards, again particularly evident in those countries
under greater fiscal pressure during the EMU sovereign debt crisis. By comparing
the paths of CAPB and UPB, our choice for the latter measure for our baseline
estimates is justified with the more stable behaviour of this measure. In effect
both track each other very closely, but it is clear that the CAPB measure is
affected by one-off measures, related for instance to bank bailout episodes during
the financial crisis, which are beyond the scope of this paper73.
Another noteworthy snapshot of the budgetary environment across the OECD
over the last two decades can be obtained with the comparison of diverging
country-paths for the (potential) debt service and the debt-to-GDP ratio. Looking
at Figure 18, two distinct trends become apparent. Firstly, the markedly distinct
records concerning the the evolution of debt-to-GDP ratios. Yet, a common up-
73We also run separate regressions using the CAPB as dependent variable for our baseline specifications. The
results are shown in Appendix (Table F.1).
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Figure 17: Cyclically-adjusted primary balances (CAPB) and underlying primary balances (UPB) of 25 OECD
countries (1995-2016). Fiscal balances can be separated into a cyclical and a non-cyclical component. Cyclical
influences are associated with variations of the actual output around its potential level (the output gap). Non-
cyclical changes can be seen as a ”cause”, rather than an effect, of output fluctuations and may be interpreted
as indicative of discretionary policy adjustments. The CAPB refers to general government cyclically-adjusted
balances and exclude net interest payments. UPB eliminate the impact of so called one-off transactions from
the CAPB. One-offs transactions include deviations from trend in net capital transfers and special one-offs not
related to capital transfers.
ward trend emerges around 2007 across most countries in the sample. This is
particularly evident for EMU countries. Conversely, looking at the country paths
of the potential debt service (Figure 18), a markedly different picture emerges. A
considerable number of countries even experienced gradual decreases in their debt
services, even while debt-to-GDP ratios were soaring. As a result of decreasing
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long-term interest rates, some EMU countries such as Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, but also Canada and the United States, kept potential debt service
levels at historically low levels. Instead countries in the EMU periphery, namely
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, experienced large increases in potential debt
services, worsened by abrupt rises in prevailing long-term market interest rates74.
Yet, a high average debt-to-GDP ratio brings all countries more sensitive to fu-
ture increases in long-term interest rates. This brings the question of whether one
can interpret the dissimilar fiscal responses of OECD and EMU countries, such as
Ireland or Luxembourg, to similar debt-to-GDP ratio paths as a result of different
credit conditions in sovereign debt markets.
Figure 19 uncovers very different co-movements of fiscal balances and output
gaps. In several EMU countries, diverging paths of fiscal balances and the output
gap suggest a predominantly pro-cyclical fiscal policy in the past decade. This
is not only the case for EMU countries under emergency lending programmes
in the aftermath of the financial crisis, such as Greece or Portugal, but also in
Austria, Finland, or Luxembourg. Over the entire period however, no consistent
co-movements can be identified, and (discretionary) fiscal policy across the OECD
can be understood as mainly a-cyclical. Figures E.1 and E.2, in Appendix, show
the paths of value-added (VAT), personal income (PIT) and corporate income
(CIT) tax rates over the same period.
Turning our attention to Figure 20, we can observe that both the level of expen-
diture and revenue decentralization are relatively stable over the period for most
countries. For some countries a stable upward trend on the level of expenditure
decentralization can be seen, namely in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, or
74This can also be seen in Hungary or Slovenia. This phenomenon of financial segregation within the EMU
was pointed out by several studies as one of the main consequences of the recent financial crisis and an important
cause of concern for EU policymakers.
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Figure 18: Debt-to-GDP ratios and (potential) debt service of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016). Debt-to-GDP
ratios are calculated as total general government debt as a percentage of national GDP. The potential debt service
is calculated as the product of the debt-to-GDP ratio with the average 10-year interest yield on government debt.
The figure intends to serve as a comparison between the (relative) stocks of debt and the actual pressure these
may exert on national government budgets, which depends necessarily on market conditions and the average
interest rate charged on the stock of debt. Note: both measures are expresses as percentage of GDP, but shown
in a different scale for presentation purposes. The relevant scale for the former measure is shown on the left
hand-side, whereas the scale for the latter is shown on the right hand-side of each row of individual country plots.
Sweden, while the large changes in Ireland, Italy, and Spain suggest important
fiscal decentralization reforms. All the countries in the sample also present a level
of expenditure decentralization consistently higher than that of revenue decen-
tralization. The result is a significant overall degree of vertical fiscal imbalances
(VFIs) across most countries, with large underlying intergovernmental transfer
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systems. It is also interesting to look at the marked differences across countries.
For instance, some unitary countries present high degrees of fiscal decentralization,
such as Denmark and Sweden, whereas in federal countries such as Belgium, or in
Spain, an apparently low degree of fiscal decentralization emerges, particularly on
the revenue side. Some countries also stand out with very low levels of fiscal decen-
tralization, such as Greece, or with very high degrees of vertical fiscal imbalances,
such as Belgium and the United Kingdom. On the contrary, Germany, Iceland,
or Sweden, appear as prominently different cases of fiscal decentralization, with
more balanced equilibria of revenue and spending powers.
Yet, behind these figures may lie substantially different institutional back-
grounds, resulting in different levels of de facto fiscal decentralization. For in-
stance, where sub-national governments have little or no discretion over the com-
position and size of their budgets, a high degree of expenditure decentralization
may not entail correspondingly high levels of sub-national fiscal autonomy, giving
little room for fiscal discretion at local or regional government levels. Bearing
this in mind, we explore the Local Authority Index (LAI) and, in particular,
disaggregate some of its key measures in order to have a brief look at the het-
erogeneous institutional frameworks underlying sub-national governments and in-
tergovernmental relations across of OECD countries. This index builds upon a
series of questionnaires with local experts assessing a wide array variables related
to local autonomy. These variables are then aggregated into different dimen-
sions of local autonomy (European Commission, 2015)75. Figure E.3 presents
the evolution of three dimensions: policy scope, effective political discretion and
financial autonomy. The policy scope dimension considers the range of activi-
75The seven identified dimensions of local autonomy are the following: legal autonomy, organizational au-
tonomy, policy scope, effective political discretion, financial autonomy, central or regional control, and vertical
influence.
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Figure 19: Underlying primary balances (UPB) and output gap of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016). The UPB
is a measure of the (general) government cyclically-adjusted budgetary balance, excluding net interest payments
and the impact of one-off transactions. A predominantly counter-cyclical (discretionary) fiscal policy is suggested
if both fiscal balances and the output gap move consistently in the same direction. On the other hand, if these
two tend to move in opposite directions, pro-cyclicality is suggested. If no consistent co-movements are found,
(discretionary) fiscal policy can be understood as mainly a-cyclical. Looking at the behaviour of UPB trends
across countries, discretionary fiscal policy appears predominantly a-cyclical. The cases of Greece and Hungary
are perhaps worth noting as cases of predominantly pro-cyclical discretionary fiscal policies since the early 2000s.
ties in which sub-national governments are effectively involved. This dimension
does not distinguish, however, the extent to which sub-national governments are
involved in the delivery of those public services. Effective policy discretion mea-
sures the range of activities over which sub-national government effectively have
discretion and whether they enjoy full responsibilities over the provision of given
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public services76. Finally, the financial autonomy dimension aims at measuring
whether sub-national governments have fiscal and political discretion over their
own budgets, by combining variables related to fiscal autonomy, the system of
intergovernmental transfers and borrowing autonomy.
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Figure 20: Share of sub-national expenditures and own revenues, as percentage of total general government
expenditure and revenue of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016). Sub-national expenditure and revenue measures
are considered as the sum of local and, whenever appropriate, regional or state governments. The figure shows a
broadly mixed picture of fiscal decentralization across OECD countries over two decades. Countries with shares
of sub-national expenditure consistently at or above 40% include Canada, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United States. Countries where sub-national expenditures represent 20% or less of total
government expenditure include France, Greece, Israel, Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovenia. Countries with
persistent large (above 20 p.p.) differences between the level of expenditure and revenue decentralization include
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
76These include namely education, social assistance, healthcare, public transports or housing, among others.
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The first picture that emerges from Figure E.3 is perhaps the very large hetero-
geneity both between unitary and federal countries. Countries where sub-national
governments have a large policy scope include Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Hungary, and Poland. Yet, countries where sub-national governments have
relatively high effective political discretion over the range of public services on
which they are involved include Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Iceland, and
Sweden. Finally, countries where sub-national governments enjoy a high level of
financial autonomy include Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. In terms of the overall LAI score, Finland, Ice-
land, and Switzerland are the highest ranked countries, followed by Denmark,
Germany, Norway, Poland, and Sweden. Countries with the lowest overall LAI
scores are Greece, Ireland and the United Kingdom, followed by France and Slove-
nia. Two illustrative cases emerge from this analysis. On the one hand, the three
highest ranked countries also enjoy the highest levels of financial autonomy. On
the other hand, France emerges as a country where sub-national governments have
a large policy scope and enjoy a significant level of financial autonomy, but is one
of the lowest ranked countries in terms of overall local autonomy.
4.3.2 Methodology
One underlying assumption of the literature on fiscal reaction functions is that
governments ought to be concerned with debt sustainability and macroeconomic
stabilization. The concern with long-term debt sustainability can be traced back
to the origins of the literature, namely the early contributions of Barro (1979) and
Bohn (1998). The main concern is to check whether the short-run behaviour of
fiscal balances is in line with the concept of a ”Ricardian” fiscal regime, ensuring
a sustainable debt path. In this context, a positive response of the fiscal stance
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to rising debt-to-GDP ratios should be observed. Regarding the response to the
business cycle, this is another ”desirable” property of fiscal policy generally identi-
fied in the literature on macroeconomic stabilization (Gal´ı et al., 2003). We follow
the literature on fiscal reaction functions, estimating a fiscal policy function where
the fiscal stance reacts to, or is determined by, the debt-to-GDP ratio and the
position of the economy relative to its economic potential, among other determi-
nants. Having emphasized the fundamental identities underlying the estimation
of fiscal reaction functions, it is pertinent to set out our econometric strategy.
The use of panel estimation methods is a particularly suitable empirical method-
ology to obtain careful estimates of fiscal reactions, due to the ability of a panel
design to increase the accuracy of econometric estimates, enabling the use of two
key components of evidence, embedded in the time-series and cross-section di-
mensions. This is generally reinforced by specific sample characteristics, which
often have a small time dimension and make time-series estimates less reliable.
The estimation of individual country regressions thus often becomes unfeasible
(Afonso, 2008). The dataset used in this paper is one such example, with yearly
data for 25 OECD countries from 1995 until 2016. Another advantage of adopt-
ing a panel data approach is the decrease of multi-collinearity problems between
regressors. In particular, we develop our analysis in the framework of fixed ef-
fect (FE) models, which are generally more suitable than random effect (RE) in
the context of multi-country fiscal reactions functions (Afonso, 2008). Under the
standard FE framework, a linear regression model is estimated with intercepts al-
lowed to change over the cross-section dimension, while the remaining parameters
are assumed homogeneous across the sample. Different econometric specifications
are then generally assessed against their potential to produce reliable estimates
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of the relevant parameters.
We thus start by recalling the basic econometric specification derived earlier
to estimate fiscal reaction functions, based on a simple linear dynamic model:
si,t = αi + βsi,t−1 + γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 + Λ(n)X
(n)
(i,t) + εi,t (33’)
The subscript i in the intercept parameter αi highlights that country fixed effects
are included, whereas the parameters, β, γ and δ, capture respectively the degrees
of persistence, long-term sustainability and cyclicality of the fiscal stance. The
vector of parameters, Λ(n×1), includes other variables that may influence the fiscal
stance. These can also include interaction terms with the main regressors.
Dynamic panel data specifications bring important additional empirical chal-
lenges. Namely, in the context of autoregressive panel data estimations, the prob-
lem of inconsistency must be properly tackled. The inclusion of the lagged de-
pendent variable as a regressor leads, by construction, to a correlation between
the error term, the unobserved panel effects, and the dependent variable (Harris
and Ma´tya´s, 2004). A common solution is the use of an instrumental variables
(IV) strategy. In general, other variables, strongly correlated with the original
regressor and not correlated with the disturbance term, have to found. One ex-
ample, in the context of the estimation of fiscal reaction functions, is the use of
first-differenced variables as instruments (Afonso, 2008).
Harris and Ma´tya´s (2004) denote that Within estimators tend to underestimate
the real value of coefficients, while OLS and Between estimators overestimate the
true value. This “Nickell-Bias” in the estimation of dynamic panel models using
OLS methods represents a large asymptotic bias and causes inconsistent estimates
(Nickell, 1981). Least squares estimators do not exhibit adequate statistical prop-
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erties and, hence, standard econometric approaches become unreliable. In the
context of an IV variable approach, the use of Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) techniques is the most common (Harris and Ma´tya´s, 2004).
Even if Within estimators become biased under dynamic panel designs, Monte
Carlo evidence shows that these estimators still perform relatively well even in
small samples, remaining within a narrow interval and showing small variance
values, especially bearing in mind the volatile performance of IV or GMM esti-
mators (Kiviet et al. 1995, Bun and Kiviet 2003, Harris and Ma´tya´s 2004, Harris
et al. 2008). Against this background, an improved version of the Within or
Least-Squares Dummy Variables (LSDV) estimator is proposed (Kiviet et al.,
1995). This is achieved by deriving analytically the Nickell-bias and subtracting
an approximation of it from the standard LSDV estimator. This modification
to the standard LSDV estimator produces a nearly unbiased estimator with a
strong econometric performance (Judson and Owen 1999, Bun and Kiviet 2003).
Besides showing better econometric performances in finite sample circumstances,
LSDV-type estimators are also generally easier to compute (Kiviet et al., 1995).
Comparing to performance of GMM estimators, it is generally found that GMM
estimation reliability tends to be harmed in small sample conditions, resulting
in persistent small-sample biases, in particular when performed in panels with a
comparatively small time dimension and a large number of moment conditions
is determined (Harris et al., 2008). Bearing this in mind, a framework for im-
plemented a bias-corrected LSDV (LSDVC) estimator (Bun and Kiviet, 2003) is
proposed by Bruno (2005), delivering better small sample properties than com-
mon GMM estimators (Harris et al., 2008), namely the popular Arellano and Bond
(1991) estimator. We thus follow the procedure offered by Bruno (2005) which,
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building on the findings of Bun and Kiviet (2003), provides a simple econometric
routine to implement LSDVC estimations in unbalanced panels. This allows for a
wider use of LSDVC estimators, by bridging the gap formerly identified in Judson
and Owen (1999). In the context of the estimation of fiscal reaction functions,
this approach has also been used in Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009).
According to the literature on fiscal reaction functions, we now develop the
econometric specifications starting from the autoregressive specification outlined
in (33’). In the spirit of recent contributions, we include other potential deter-
minants of the fiscal stance, with the aim of exploring the relationship between
these variables and the response of the fiscal stance to rising debt levels and to the
business cycle. We aim in particular to assess the role of fiscal decentralization
and endogenous debt limits on the fiscal stance of OECD and EU economies and
assess whether this may have played a role in the fiscal responses before and after
the recent European sovereign debt crisis.
We start by considering another variable, with a long tradition in the politi-
cal economy literature, aiming to capture the effect of elections on fiscal policy
(Alesina and Sachs 1988, Rogoff and Sibert 1988, Alesina and Roubini 1992, Pers-
son and Tabellini 2001). Nordhaus et al. (1975) early coined this issue as one of
“political business cycles”, identifying a “predictable pattern of policy” (p. 187),
whereby incumbent parties holding office would attempt to set out more expan-
sionary fiscal policies before elections77. There is also evidence that electoral
cycles can influence the fiscal stance in EU countries (Afonso, 2008). We use a
dummy variable capturing years of parliamentary (or presidential) elections in
77This can happen both as a result of postponing more generous expansionary fiscal measures in government
programmes towards the end of political mandates or by introducing unannounced expansionary fiscal policies
close to election periods.
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each country, depending on the political regime78.
Accordingly, we add the variable DEBCit to the basic model specification, where
DEBCit takes the value of 1 for country i when there are parliamentary (or presi-
dential) elections in period t, and 0 otherwise.
si,t = αi + βsi,t−1 + γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 + λ1Debcit + εi,t (34)
A negative and statistically significant sign of coefficient λ1 indicates that the fiscal
stance is negatively affected in election years and points towards the relevance of
electoral budget cycles.
In this vein, we devote particular attention to the effects of fiscal decentraliza-
tion on the fiscal stance. In the context of the literature on fiscal reaction functions
and fiscal federalism, decentralization is often measured through relative shares of
relative expenditure and revenue decentralization. Afonso and Hauptmeier (2009),
for instance, find that higher spending decentralization, relative to total general
government expenditure, has a negative effect on (cyclically-adjusted) primary
balances. Interestingly, greater spending decentralization is also associated with
a lower sensitivity of primary balances to the level of debt. Fiscal decentralization
can, however, be assessed along several different dimensions and the implications
for aggregate fiscal behaviour may vary widely (Boadway and Shah, 2009). Fol-
lowing the literature on fiscal federalism, we aim to consider a broader line of
inquiry, in order to capture different features of fiscal decentralization. Benefiting
from the availability of detailed data for OECD countries, we start by considering
the effect of fiscal decentralization, using measures of sub-national expenditure,
78This data was collected from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA),
which holds detailed country-level data on election years and participation rates, among other variables on the
quality of democracy and democratic participation.
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f expit , and revenue decentralization, f
rev
it , as percentage of total general government
spending. In addition, we consider the size of vertical fiscal imbalances, f vfiit , in
light of the pervasive effects these may exert on long-term fiscal policy sustainabil-
ity. These are computed as the proportion of revenues of sub-central governments
obtained from intergovernmental transfers79. We also aim to assess whether fiscal
decentalization may have an effect on the responsiveness of the fiscal stance to
the debt-to-GDP ratio. We thus specify the following equations:
si,t = αi + βsi,t−1 + γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 + λ1Debcit + λ
exp
2 f
exp
it + εi,t (3a)
si,t = αi + βsi,t−1 + γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 + λ1Debcit + λ
rev
2 f
rev
it + εi,t (3b)
si,t = αi + βsi,t−1 + γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 + λ1Debcit + λ
vfi
2 f
vfi
it + εi,t (3c)
si,t = αi + βsi,t−1 + γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 + λ1Debcit + λ
b∗vfi
2
(
bi,t−1 × f vfiit
)
+ εi,t (3d)
si,t = αi + βsi,t−1 + γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 + λ1Debcit + λ
yˆ∗rev
2
(
yˆi,t−1 × f revit
)
+ εi,t (3e)
As mentioned before, as a complex phenomenon, fiscal decentralization must be
analyzed along several dimensions. Different institutional arrangements, resulting
in different ”true” levels of fiscal decentralization may have profoundly different
implications for aggregate fiscal behaviour, namely in terms of the response to
the business cycle and rising debt-to-GDP levels. One distinctive feature is the
degree of sub-national fiscal autonomy. In other words, the extent to which sub-
national governments have real fiscal powers, or rather act as agents of the central
government, is not always clear only by considering the relative share of the general
government budget assigned to sub-national governments. Profiting from the LAI
79In countries with two levels of sub-central governments, typically the case of countries with a classical federal
structure, with both state/regional and local governments, we use the sum of these two measures.
161
dataset (European Commission, 2015) - which includes detailed questionnaire-
based measures of fiscal and political discretion at the sub-national levels, with
comparable data for 39 European countries over the 1990-2014 period - we look
further into the link between fiscal decentralization and the fiscal stance. Several
measures of decentralization presented in this dataset are used to capture different
dimensions of sub-national fiscal autonomy. In our baseline estimates, we use the
aggregate LAI score, f laiit , as a regressor. One drawback of this approach is the
reduction in our sample size, both at the time series and the cross-section level.
We thus restrict the analysis to 22 European countries in the sample over the
1995-2014 period80. We use thus refine the empirical specifications (3a)-(3e):
si,t = αi + βsi,t−1 + γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 + λ1Debcit + λ
′
2
exp
(
f expit × f laiit
)
+ εi,t (3a’)
si,t = αi + βsi,t−1 + γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 + λ1Debcit + λ
′
2
rev
(
f revit × f laiit
)
+ εi,t (3b’)
si,t = αi + βsi,t−1 + γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 + λ1Debcit + λ
′
2
vfi
(
f vfiit × f laiit
)
+ εi,t (3c’)
si,t = αi+βsi,t−1 +γbi,t−1 +δyˆi,t−1 +λ1Debcit +λ
′
2
b∗vfi(bi,t−1×f vfiit ×f laiit )+εi,t (3d’)
si,t = αi+βsi,t−1 +γbi,t−1 +δyˆi,t−1 +λ1Debcit +λ
′
2
yˆ∗rev(yˆi,t−1×f revit ×f laiit )+εi,t (3e’)
We thus also aim to compare whether varying degrees of fiscal decentralization,
here interacted with the measure of local autonomy, may have a relationship with
macroeconomic stabilization. In other words, we aim to disentangle the (joint)
effect of fiscal decentralization and sub-national autonomy on the responsiveness of
the fiscal stance. Finally, following the recent literature on fiscal reaction functions
in EMU countries, we also add dummies for formal fiscal rules and debt thresholds.
80We thus exclude Canada, Israel, and the United States from the sample, as well as the data for 2015 and
2016. This makes our sample substantially smaller and extra care has to be taken, in order to ensure that the
number of moments estimated do not endanger the reliability of this analysis. Different specifications are used
and the stability of parameter estimates in analyzed.
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Accounting for the relevant interactive relationships, we can also assess whether
different fiscal rules and debt limits influenced the responsiveness of the fiscal
stance to other variables in the model. If this is the case, this would highlight
the importance of formal fiscal rules in promoting fiscal sustainability -although
it may ”hamper” the fiscal discretion of governments and fiscal responsiveness
along the business cycle - and suggest a non-linear response of fiscal balances to
debt-to-GDP ratios, in line with the ’fiscal fatigue’ hypothesis (Ghosh et al. 2013,
Checherita-Westphal and Zˇdˇa´rek 2017). Let us define the following specifications:
si,t = αi + βsi,t−1 + γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 + λ1Debcit + λ3D
b
it + εi,t (4a)
si,t = αi+βsi,t−1 +γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 +λ1Debcit +λ3D
b
it+λ
b∗b
3
(
Dbit× bi,t−1
)
+εi,t (4b)
si,t = αi+βsi,t−1 +γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 +λ1Debcit +λ3D
b
it+λ
yˆ∗b
3
(
Dbit× yˆi,t−1
)
+εi,t (4c)
where we include different debt thresholds, b, at 80, 90, and 100 percent of GDP
levels, and combine these with the (lagged) debt-to-GDP ratio and the (lagged)
output gap in (4b) and (4c), respectively81. We also analyse the effect of fiscal
rules on the fiscal stance. The rationale for this follows, on the one hand, from
the interest in re-assessing the effectiveness of the fiscal framework in the EMU,
namely given the inconclusive evidence found in the literature (Hallerberg et al.,
2007). The empirical analysis is analogous to the case of debt thresholds. For
instance, one can expect a positive impact of debt rules on the primary balance and
on the response to rising debt-to-GDP levels. Similarly, a balanced budget rule
81In two seminal papers, Reinhart et al. (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) bring forward the hypothesis
of a ”debt intolerance” level, beyond which growth is negatively affected by the stock of debt. Following these
contributions, a large literature has blossomed on the effects of high debt levels in developed economies observed
in the post-financial crisis period. E´gert (2015) finds that the value of this threshold - initially identified at the
90 percent debt-to-GDP point for developed economies (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010) - is very sensitive to several
sample characteristics, namely country coverage and data frequency. This suggests more research is needed to
identify the possibly non-linear effects of debt on the economy. In a series of robustness checks, the existence of
debt thresholds at the 50-70% debt-to-GDP levels is also tested.
163
may have a positive impact on the fiscal stance but may undermine governments’
ability to pursue counter-cyclical fiscal policies (Gal´ı et al., 2003). The following
additional fiscal reaction function specifications are also estimated:
si,t = αi + βsi,t−1 + γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 + λ1Debcit + λ4D
r
it + εi,t (5a)
si,t = αi+βsi,t−1 +γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 +λ1Debcit +λ4D
r
it+λ
b∗r
4
(
Drit× bi,t−1
)
+εi,t (5b)
si,t = αi+βsi,t−1 +γbi,t−1 + δyˆi,t−1 +λ1Debcit +λ4D
r
it+λ
yˆ∗r
4
(
Drit× yˆi,t−1
)
+εi,t (5c)
Different fiscal rules, r, such as debt rules or balanced budget rules, are again
combined with the (lagged) debt-to-GDP ratio and (lagged) output gap in (5b)
and (5c), respectively. Once again, one drawback arises using the fiscal rules
indicators. The dummies for country fiscal rules (sub-divided into expenditure,
revenue, balanced budget and debt rules) were extracted from the Fiscal Rules
Dataset, prepared by the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department. The original dataset
however only includes fiscal rules until 2015. This reduces the time series dimen-
sion of our panel. Alternatively, we use a dummy for EMU participation, in order
to look for possible fixed effects (which include the common fiscal framework).
4.4 Results
A preliminary illustration of the fiscal behaviour of OECD countries can be ob-
tained with the use basic charts, plotting together the dependent variable together
with some of the key factors of interest. In this case, one can start for instance by
looking at a measure of the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balances plotted against vari-
ables that capture the level of indebtedness or the output gap. Thus, when looking
at Figure 21, we can foresee the first sign of a fiscal behaviour across OECD coun-
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tries consistent with long-term debt sustainability: no evident relationship can be
immediately found between (cyclically-adjusted) primary balances and the level
of indebtedness. The individual points in the plot represent the fiscal stance of
different countries in each year, relative to the (lagged) debt-to-GDP ratio. The
five marked outlier observations on the top-right side of the graph are different
observations for Greece and point towards the importance of properly taking into
account the outliers in the estimation of the dynamic panel regression. Further-
more, by looking at Figure 22, we can observe that, by and large, a negative
relationship between underlying primary balances and the (lagged) output gap
stands out. This points towards a pro-cyclical behaviour of fiscal policies across
OECD countries over the period. The problem of outliers seems less relevant in
this case and, importantly, not attributable to one single country. Most negative
output gap observations do however arise in the wake of the financial crisis period
(as can also be confirmed from Figure 19). Time dummies, as well as debt-to-
GDP controls included in some of the estimation procedures presented in this
section can capture partially this ”outlier effect”, linked frequently to countries
under stronger fiscal stress.
The dynamic ”fixed effects” (or LSDVC) estimator used in the baseline esti-
mation (featuring country-level dummies) is able to partially capture the outlier
problem, whenever this attributable to one country, at a given moment in time.
Yet, in our robustness checks, a set of estimations is also ran for a sub-set of EMU
countries, namely excluding Greece from the sample. The results are shown to be
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Figure 21: Fiscal policy sustainability across OECD countries (1995-2016). Scatterplot of the (lagged) debt-to-
GDP ratio and underlying primary balances (UPB) in OECD countries. The UPB is a measure of the (general)
government cyclically-adjusted budgetary balance, excluding net interest payments and the impact of one-off
transactions. The figure suggests a mildly positive response of the fiscal stance to rising debt-to-GDP levels,
in line with long-term fiscal sustainability concerns. The five marked outlier observations on the top-right side
of the graph correspond to yearly observations in Greece after the 2009-10 EMU sovereign crisis episode. This
feature points towards the importance of properly dealing with the outlier observations in the estimation stage of
the dynamic panel regression. Further robustness checks are performed by removing Greece from the estimation
sample.
robust to this exclusion82.
4.4.1 Dynamic panel regression estimates: baseline results
We now proceed to a detailed analysis of the baseline results from the estimation
of a set of fiscal reaction functions for a sample of OECD countries, from 1995
to 2016. In so doing, our objectives are threefold. Firstly, we aim to provide a
detailed characterization of the behaviour of the fiscal stance across the OECD
over the past two decades. In addition, in a second stage, we focus not only on
82The baseline estimations are also re-run for the whole OECD sample with the exception of Greece (Tables
F.3 and F.4), and uncover further interesting features. Firstly, a consistent and significant positive response of
fiscal balances to the debt-to-GDP ratio is found. Secondly, however, the evidence for a pro-cyclical behaviour
of discretionary fiscal policies is now weaker, but still significant at the 10% level. Finally, fiscal balances appear
again negatively affected in election years.
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Figure 22: Fiscal policy cyclicality across OECD countries (1995-2016). Scatterplot of the (lagged) output gap
and underlying primary balances (UPB) in OECD countries. The UPB is a measure of the (general) government
cyclically-adjusted budgetary balance, excluding net interest payments and the impact of one-off transactions.
A negative relationship between underlying primary balances and the (lagged) output gap is suggested, pointing
towards a pro-cyclical fiscal behaviour across the OECD over the sample period. Some outliers that can be
observed in this figure are not attributable to one single country. Most negative output gap observations (on the
top-left side of the graph) arise in the wake of the financial crisis period. Output gap observations implying more
significant deviations from trend appear again concentrated in the 2004-2007 period. Time dummies, as well
as debt-to-GDP thresholds are included in some of the estimation procedures, as part of the (negative) ”outlier
effect” appears mostly linked to countries with high surges in debt-to-GDP levels.
the fiscal balances, but also on the contribution of revenue-side fiscal reforms,
through changes in personal income tax (PIT) rates and corporate income tax
(CIT) rates83. Secondly, we aim to gain a deeper understanding of the effect and
associated magnitudes that several political and institutional factors may have ex-
erted on the observed fiscal behaviour of OECD countries, some of them already
previously emphasized in the literature. In this context, we aim to explore in
greater detail the role of fiscal decentralization. Thirdly, we aim at exploring fur-
ther possible non-linearities in fiscal responses, as suggested by recent literature.
Namely, we aim to shed more light on the fiscal fatigue hypothesis (Ghosh et al.,
83The choice over this two taxes is that they represent two of the main revenue sources for developed economies.
Having provided an illustration of how consumption taxes, in particular value added tax (VAT) rates, evolve
over time, we observe that these have been relatively more stable than PIT or CIT rates and, hence, less prone
to cyclical variations.
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2013). This is associated with the idea of an underlying nonlinear relationship
between public debt and a country’s fiscal and macroeconomic performance, fre-
quently associated with the seminal studies of Reinhart et al. (2003) and Reinhart
and Rogoff (2010).
In accordance with the discussion developed in the previous section, the results
presented in this section are based on a dynamic panel data estimation method,
using the bias-corrected LSDV (LSDVC) estimator (Kiviet et al. 1995, Bun and
Kiviet 2003 and Bruno 2005). The bias correction is initialized in this context
using a consistent estimator, which is chosen to be the standard Arellano and
Bond (1991) GMM estimator. The standard errors reported in each table are
thus not standard analytical values, but rather based on numerical simulation
techniques. Alongside the tables presented in the context of this section, sup-
plementary regression results are provided in the Appendix and discussed here
whenever plausible, for comparison and robustness purposes.
Table 12 presents the results for the LSDVC panel estimates of different fiscal
reaction function specifications, using underlying primary balances as the depen-
dent variable. The explanatory variables used in the first specification (column
(1)) are meant to provide a benchmark estimate of a simple fiscal reaction func-
tion, using the three most commonly used variables, besides the lagged dependent
variable: the (lagged) debt-to-GDP ratio, the (lagged) output gap, and a dummy
variable capturing election years. Under this framework, the coefficient on the
lagged dependent variable captures the persistence of underlying primary bal-
ances, which unsurprisingly remains very high across all specifications. In turn,
the coefficient on the (lagged) debt-to-GDP ratio provides an estimate of the
fiscal responsiveness to indebtedness conditions or, in other words, of the debt
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stabilization motive of governments. A positive and significant sign, which re-
mains again broadly stable across the different specifications shown in Table 12,
indicates that governments tend to respond with strengthened fiscal discipline to
increasing debt levels and points towards a Ricardian fiscal behaviour or, in other
words, a sustainable debt path. Note however the relatively low (although per-
sistently significant) coefficient, in the 0.02− 0.03 interval. The coefficient on the
output gap, in turn, aims at measuring the cyclicality of fiscal policy84. Finally,
the dummy identifying election years aims to capture the existence of electoral
budget cycles. A negative and significant sign across all different specifications
strongly indicates that governments tend to systematically loosen fiscal policy,
running higher (cyclically-adjusted) primary deficits or lower surpluses, in elec-
tion years, confirming the findings in the literature on political economy and fiscal
policy.
The remaining cases look into the relationship between fiscal decentralization
and the fiscal stance. The second specification (column (2)) adds the level of
expenditure decentralization, measured as the as the percentage of sub-national
over total government expenditure, to the set of explanatory variables. For in-
stance, a negative coefficient would suggest that highly decentralized governments
tend to be associated with lower fiscal balances. Instead, the third specification
shown in Table 12 (column (3)) adds level of revenue decentralization, also as
percentage of total government revenue. A positive coefficient would in this case
signal a positive effect on fiscal balances of decentralizing taxation powers towards
sub-national governments. The results suggest that the level of expenditure de-
84The lag is justified also, but no only, in order to tackle the well-know endogeneity problems of this variable
in the estimation of fiscal reaction functions, namely as an alternative to an instrumental variable (IV) approach
(Turrini et al., 2008). Another important issue is to deal with the information lags underlying fiscal policy
decisions. Assuming policymakers typically cannot respond contemporaneously to short-term macroeconomic
fluctuations, a lag on the levels of debt and output gap thus also captures this phenomenon.
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centralization has no persistent effect on the fiscal stance, whereas the decentral-
ization of government revenue seems to exert a significantly negative effect on the
fiscal stance. This suggests that the level of expenditure decentralization per se
may not be detrimental for the fiscal stance. In other words, there seem to be
clear reasons for more decentralized countries to necessarily run higher or lower
(cyclically-adjusted) primary deficits. The main question may thus lie on specific
institutional designs, which define the ”rules of the game” and how fiscal respon-
sibilities are devolved. The reasons behind a negative sign on the level of revenue
decentralization can be twofold. On the one hand, as suggested by the literature
on fiscal federalism, fiscal decentralization often originates common pool incen-
tives at the sub-national level, due to the fact that it frequently encompasses a
larger level of expenditure rather than revenue decentralization. The results here
may thus suggest that, even when sub-national governments have significant fis-
cal powers to raise own revenues, the fundamental incentive still remains due to
the extensive intergovernmental transfer systems that are generally set in place
in decentralized systems of government, creating a large vertical fiscal imbalance
(VFI). A second argument may suggest that this negative coefficient can be ex-
plained by the fact that sub-national governments have weaker revenue-raising
powers, in practice, because tax bases are more mobile at this level of government
and sub-national tax administration systems may be less developed than federal
or central ones. Both arguments can also be seen as complementary explanations
of the same phenomenon. The fourth econometric specification (column (4)) aims
to further explore the effect of VFIs on the fiscal stance. Although with the
expected sign, the coefficient on the VFI, calculated as the percentage of sub-
national government revenues obtained from intergovernmental transfers, is not
significant. Bearing this in mind, the aim in the remaining baseline econometric
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specifications is to explore further the role of fiscal decentralization on the fiscal
behaviour of OECD countries. In particular, we aim to explore how different
degrees of sub-national autonomy may play a role in this relationship.
The first specification in this subset (column (5)) only includes the aggregate
score of the local autonomy index (LAI) as a regressor. No significant relationship
between this factor and the level of underlying primary balances is found, although
the negative sign is consistent with previous estimates. The three following re-
gression specifications (columns (6)-(9)) interact the aggregate LAI score with
the measures of fiscal decentralization used previously. Both the relative levels of
expenditure and revenue decentralization now exhibit negative but not significant
signs. More interesting is the sign on the level of VFI. The sign now appears
much larger than before, in absolute terms, and highly significant. This sug-
gests that the existence of extensive intergovernmental transfer systems coupled
with a high degree of sub-national fiscal autonomy can be particularly damaging
for a country’s aggregate fiscal stance. The two final specifications aim explore
whether the degree of sub-national autonomy may have a relationship with the
responsiveness - rather than the average level - of the fiscal stance, in terms of
both cyclicality and long-term sustainability properties. Both coefficients appear
with statistically insignificant negative signs, suggesting no (direct) relationship
between fiscal decentralization and the short-term responsiveness of fiscal policy
to the business cycle and rising debt levels.
4.4.1.1 Non-linear fiscal responses
In Table 13, the existence of non-linear fiscal responses to indebtedness conditions
is explored. In the aim of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) and E´gert (2015), among
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Table 12: Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): baseline results. De-
pendent variable (si,t): underlying primary balances (UPB). The UPB is a measure of the
(general) government cyclically-adjusted budgetary balance, excluding net interest payments
and the impact of one-off transactions. Estimates are based on a bias-corrected least squares
dummy variable (LSDVC) estimator developed for autoregressive (unbalanced) panel data mod-
els, using bias approximations developed in Bruno (2005), based on the standard Arellano and
Bond (1991) panel estimator. Bootstrap standard errors are provided in brackets. The regres-
sors in the baseline estimation include: (lagged) debt-to-GDP ratio (bi,t−1), (lagged) output
gap (yˆi,t−1), and a dummy capturing election years (Debcit ). Further regression specification for
which results are presented in this table also include different measures of fiscal decentralization
(fFDit ), as well as interaction terms between those, with measures of expenditure (f
exp
it ) and
revenue decentralization (frevit ), vertical fiscal imbalances (f
vfi
it ) and local autonomy (f
lai
it ).
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others, we explore whether the fiscal stance may exhibit different responses to
rising debt levels, depending on the relative size of the debt stock. This is related
to the idea of a debt intolerance threshold, beyond which the stock of government
debt can become an important burden for a country’s fiscal and macroeconomic
performance. Ghosh et al. (2013) proposes the concept of endogenous debt limits
and ”fiscal fatigue”. Consistent with the previous literature, we first look for the
existence of threshold effects around the 90% debt-to-GDP ratio. Against what is
found in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) or Ghosh et al. (2013), we find no evidence
of a debt threshold at the 90-100% debt-to-GDP ratio levels. Instead, consistent
with E´gert (2015), we do find evidence that possible debt thresholds may exist at
lower debt-to-GDP ratio levels, around or below 70% debt-to-GDP levels (column
(1)). Although this cannot be observed as a direct effect on the responsiveness
on fiscal balances to both the debt-to-GDP ratio and the output gap (columns
(4)-(9)), these results suggest that the marginal responses of (cyclically-adjusted)
primary balances remain positive at moderate debt levels, but start to decline
beyond this point. This is consistent with the idea of fiscal fatigue suggested
namely in Ghosh et al. (2013). Note also that the persistence, sustainability
and cyclicality coefficients remain remarkably stable across different specifications,
suggesting again a pro-cyclical fiscal stance set in accordance with long-term debt
sustainability concerns. A negative significant sign is again found on the election
dummy, pointing towards the relevance of electoral budget cycles.
In order to explore the ”fiscal fatigue” or ”debt intolerance” phenomenon a
bit further, the existence of debt thresholds at lower levels is also tested, between
50 and 70% debt-to-GDP ratios. Again, consistent with the findings of E´gert
(2015), we find that signs of fiscal fatigue or fiscal intolerance appear to kick in
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already at moderate debt levels. The results in Table 17, in the following sec-
tion, also point towards the existence of relevant debt thresholds, but at lower
levels than previously thought, with a negative and significant effect not only on
the level of fiscal balances, but crucially on the degree of fiscal responsiveness to
indebtedness condition. Although of a relative small magnitude, these estimates
point towards a degree of fiscal responsiveness to rising debt-to-GDP ratios that
can become severely weakened in cumulative terms. In effect, together with the
coefficient on the lagged debt-to-GDP ratio and the estimates obtained in Table
13, these results suggest that the fiscal responsiveness to indebtedness conditions,
interpreted frequently as a sustainability criterion, can vary widely across the
spectrum of relative debt stocks, which is consistent with the existence of endoge-
nous debt limits (Ghosh et al., 2013). Taken together, the results in Tables 13 and
17 are particularly worrying for the long-term sustainability of fiscal policies in
EMU countries and other developed economies, particularly where debt overhang
problems appear to be more severe85. It is also worth noting that the coefficients
on the interactive terms between different debt thresholds and the lagged output
gap do not show any significant ”fiscal fatigue” effects of high debt-to-GDP levels
on the cyclicality of fiscal policies across the OECD.
4.4.1.2 Fiscal rules
The estimates in Table 14 briefly look at the effect of formal fiscal rules on the
fiscal stance. As is well-known, much emphasis has recently been given to the
existence of sound fiscal frameworks in developed economies, as means of ensuring
85These results are also consistent with the large literature that developed recently on debt overhang and
sovereign default (Arellano 2008, Cuadra et al. 2010, D’Erasmo and Mendoza 2016, D’Erasmo et al. 2016,
Arellano and Bai 2017).
174
Table 13: Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): debt thresholds. De-
pendent variable: underlying primary balances (UPB). The UPB is a measure of the (general)
government cyclically-adjusted budgetary balance, excluding net interest payments and the
impact of one-off transactions. Estimates are based on a LSDVC estimator developed for au-
toregressive (unbalanced) panel data models (Bruno 2005), based on the standard Arellano and
Bond (1991) estimator. Bootstrap standard errors are provided in brackets. Besides the re-
gressors also included in the baseline estimation, the regression specifications for which results
are presented in this table also include different levels of debt-to-GDP thresholds (Dbit), where
b = 80, 90, 100%, as well as interaction terms between these and the (lagged) debt-to-GDP ra-
tio and the output gap. These aim to capture possible non-linearities in the response of fiscal
balances across different debt levels.
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long-term fiscal sustainability. This has been subject of particular attention in
the context of the EMU (Gal´ı et al., 2003), first with the rules established by
the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP, and more recently replaced by the Fiscal
Compact or TSCG. As with the case of the analysis of debt thresholds, our aim is
twofold. First, we aim to assess whether different fiscal rules may have an impact
on the average value of fiscal balances. Secondly, going one step further, the aim
is to assess whether the level or magnitude of fiscal responsiveness also varies. For
instance, a balanced budget rule may restrict a country’s capability to respond to
business cycle fluctuations. On the other hand, the existence of debt rules may
provide an incentive for countries to respond more aggressively to rising debt-to-
GDP ratios. Taking advantage of an extensive dataset, the Fiscal Rules Dataset,
we can explore the effects of expenditure and revenue rules, as well as of balanced
budget and debt rules. We focus in particular on the latter two, as these are also
the more discussed options in the context of the EMU fiscal framework.
The first specification presented in Table 14 looks at the effects of fiscal rules
on the average value of the underlying primary balances (column (1)). Only debt
rules appear with the expected positive sign, found significant at the 10% level.
The remaining four econometric specifications (columns (2)-(5)) aim to explore
whether, rather than having an impact on the average level of fiscal balances, fiscal
rules may affect the responsiveness of the fiscal stance. On the one hand, neither
balanced budget rules nor debt rules appear to affect significantly the responsive-
ness of fiscal balances to indebtedness conditions (columns (2) and (3)). In the
framework of the fiscal reaction functions literature, one can thus interpret this
as evidence against the view that the existence of formal fiscal rules has beneficial
effects on long-term fiscal sustainability. It is also worth noting that, although
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not significant, the coefficient on the interaction term between debt rules and the
lagged debt-to-GDP ratio appears with the expected positive sign. Finally, the
two last econometric specifications (columns (4) and (5)) aim to explore whether
the existence of such rules may somehow restrict the ability of governments to
respond to the business cycle (Gal´ı et al., 2003). Although both coefficients do
not appear statistically significant, a positive sign suggests such rules may gear
fiscal policy interventions towards a more counter-cyclical pattern. In addition,
the coefficients on the (lagged) output gap now also appear not significant in the
regression, suggesting that the discretionary element of fiscal policy is mainly a-
cyclical. These results thus appear to mildly support the view that fiscal rules
can promote more ”prudent” fiscal behaviour, in line with Gal´ı et al. (2003).
4.4.1.3 Tax reaction functions
So far, we have focused on the reactions of cyclically-adjusted (or underlying) pri-
mary balances to diverse factors, such as the debt-to-GDP ratio and the output
gap, or the level of fiscal decentralization and formal fiscal rules. By and large,
we can conclude that fiscal balances appear mildly pro-cyclical over the period
and responsive to indebtedness conditions, in line with long-term fiscal sustain-
ability concerns. We have also found a consistent negative effect of election years,
as suggested in the literature, and of intergovernmental transfers, particularly
when coupled with high degrees of sub-national fiscal autonomy. The existence
of threshold effects also seems to suggest that there might exist underlying non-
linear effects of the debt stock on fiscal performance, a phenomenon coined in the
literature as ”debt intolerance” or ”fiscal fatigue”. The estimates now presented
in Tables 15 and 16 aim to provide more insights on the behaviour of fiscal vari-
177
Table 14: Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): fiscal rules. Dependent
variable: underlying primary balances (UPB). The UPB is a measure of the (general) govern-
ment cyclically-adjusted budgetary balance, excluding net interest payments and the impact of
one-off transactions. Estimates are based on a LSDVC estimator developed for autoregressive
(unbalanced) panel data models (Bruno 2005), based on the standard Arellano and Bond (1991)
estimator. Bootstrap standard errors are provided in brackets. Besides the regressors also in-
cluded in the baseline estimation, the regression specifications for which results are presented in
this table also include dummies capturing different fiscal rules (Drit), where r = er, rr, bbr, dr, as
well as interaction terms between these and the (lagged) debt-to-GDP ratio and the output gap.
These aim to capture the effect of formal fiscal rules on the fiscal stance, such as expenditure
(r = er), revenue (r = rr), balanced budget (r = bbr) and debt rules (r = dr).
si,t (UPB) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
si,t−1 0.830*** 0.833*** 0.831*** 0.832*** 0.832***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
bi,t−1 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
yˆi,t−1 -0.066*** -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.065 -0.069
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.048) (0.049)
Debcit -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dr=erit -0.001
(0.002)
Dr=rrit -0.001
(0.004)
Dr=bbrit -0.003
(0.004)
Dr=drit 0.008*
(0.005)
bi,t−1 ×Dbbrit -0.001
(0.004)
bi,t−1 ×Ddrit 0.002
(0.004)
yˆi,t−1 ×Dbbrit 0.002
(0.050)
yˆi,t−1 ×Ddrit 0.007
(0.052)
*10% significance level, **5% significance level, ***1% significance level
ables. How do tax rates, rather than tax revenues or aggregate fiscal measures,
respond to these factors? Do governments tend to vary tax rates over the business
cycle or in accordance with long-term debt sustainability concerns? Are tax rates
also affected by electoral budget cycles? And, finally, are tax rates affected by
the relative levels of fiscal decentralization in different countries? We focus in
particular on the behaviour of top statutory CIT (Table 15) and PIT rates (Table
16).
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Table 15 replicates the econometric specifications presented in Table 12, but
now considering exclusively the behaviour of CIT rates. Again, as expected, CIT
rates appear highly persistent, with the autoregressive parameter appearing con-
sistently in the 0.9-0.95 range. Besides the high persistence, three main patterns
emerge, at a first glance. Firstly, it is interesting to find that CIT rates do not
appear to respond to long-term fiscal sustainability concerns, as the parameters
on the (lagged) debt-to-GDP ratio appear consistently not significant and, al-
though very close to zero, with varying signs. Secondly, CIT rates appear to
move acyclically or in a mildly counter-cyclical fashion. Although the coefficients
on the (lagged) output gap appear consistently with a negative value, these are
not always significant, and frequently only significant at the 10% level. Thirdly,
CIT rates do not appear to respond to political cycles, showing no significantly
positive or negative bias in election years. Taken together these three patterns
suggest that CIT rates in OECD countries have been relatively persistent over
the past decades and do not seem to exhibit strong cyclical patterns. The mild
counter-cyclical behaviour, together with the observed downward trend in the
data (Table E.2), rather than pointing towards a ”response” of CIT rates to the
business cycle (as in the case of aggregate fiscal balances), may instead suggest
that CIT rate cuts may happen mostly during economic upswings, perhaps con-
sistently with the fact that higher aggregate tax revenues leave more fiscal space
for tax cuts. On the other hand, the fact that CIT rates do not appear to respond
to the debt-to-GDP ratio may also not be surprising. Being generally a minor
source of tax revenues in developed economies (as compared, for instance, to PIT
or VAT revenues) and implying a more distortionary tax, CIT rate increases are
frequently forestalled. In addition, in an environment of fierce international fis-
cal competition, any expectation of CIT rate increases can deter investments and
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have a detrimental effect on a country’s fiscal and macroeconomic performance.
In order to further delve into this fiscal competition argument, we also aim to
explore whether fiscal decentralization may have a relationship with CIT rates.
Interestingly, negative relationship is observed between the average CIT rate and
the level of expenditure decentralization (column (2)), as well as with the magni-
tude of VFIs (column (4)). The level of revenue decentralization, although with
a negative sign, does not show a significant relationship with the average CIT
rate. A similar pattern emerges when these factors are interacted with the level
of sub-national autonomy. On the one hand, more decentralized expenditure pow-
ers may imply stronger fiscal competition between sub-national jurisdictions, with
a negative spillover on average CIT rates. This explanation can also be consis-
tent with the idea that fiscal decentralization can foster yardstick competition,
as policymakers of neighbouring jurisdictions would indirectly compete with each
other for reelection. These ”peer effects” generated at the sub-national level can
thus generate lower overall level of corporate taxation. Yet, the negative relation-
ship between the level of VFIs and average level of CIT rates can also suggest a
different explanation. As sub-national governments tend to rely predominantly
on intergovernmental transfers as a source of revenue, this may endanger fiscal
sustainability in the long-term and have a general negative effect on tax rates,
not only on CIT rates. This explanation is more consistent with the common
pool problems and soft budget constraints that can be generated by decentralized
systems of government with large intergovernmental transfer systems. We can
explore this argument further by looking at the behaviour of PIT rates.
Table 16 provides a similar analysis of the behaviour of PIT rates. In this tax
reaction function, PIT rates are regressed against the same set of determinants
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used to analyse the behaviour of fiscal balances and CIT rates (Tables 12 and
15). Once again, PIT rates exhibit a high degree of persistence, along the same
range of CIT rates. Yet, the behaviour of these along the business cycle appears
to be dramatically different from that of CIT rates. PIT rates appear to respond
mildly to the debt-to-GDP ratio. Hence, it appears that personal income taxation
is used as a revenue source to ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. The positive
and significant coefficients on the (lagged) debt-to-GDP ratio suggest that gov-
ernments tend to respond to rising debt levels with higher (top statutory) PIT
rates. Assuming that these tend to be on the ”right” side of the Laffer curve, PIT
revenues can then be used to rapidly increase government revenues and strengthen
aggregate fiscal balances. On the other hand, PIT rates do not seem to behave in
a cyclical way. Another interesting issue emerges however: PIT rates do seem to
respond to electoral cycles. A positive and significant coefficient in election years
indicates that governments tend to increase PIT rates in election years (even while
running lower fiscal balances, as suggested from Table 12). These results can be
interpreted as evidence of reelection concerns of incumbent governments. In re-
sponse to median voter preferences, governments tend to increase average PIT
rates, while increasing public expenditures.
Turning our attention to the effect of fiscal decentralization on PIT rates,
the results in Table 16 point again towards a different picture from those seen
before for CIT rates (columns (2)-(4)). Although no relationship is found between
expenditure decentralization or the relative size of VFIs and the average level
of PIT rates, revenue decentralization does seem to have a positive significant
relationship with the level of PIT rates. When interacted with the degree of
sub-national autonomy, similar conclusions arise, with a larger coefficient on the
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level of revenue decentralization (column (7)) and no significant effects on the
explanatory power of the other two factors (columns (6) and (8)). Once again,
this apparent relationship can be explained by different underlying mechanisms.
On the one hand, a higher level of fiscal decentralization coupled with the de-
volution of taxation powers may cause aggregate PIT rates to rise on average,
because these may be used by sub-national governments to raise tax revenues,
if decentralized. Generally, VAT rates are decided at the central level - both
the standard and reduced rates -, with little or no room for discretion at the
sub-national level. Similarly, corporate income taxation is generally not deemed
appropriate to be set at the sub-national level, namely because of race to the
bottom concerns and fears of negative externalities. Hence, PIT rates seem, be-
sides other sources of local revenue, such as property taxes and user fees, the
most likely candidates to allow for some degree of sub-national tax discretion.
The questions then emerges of why should PIT rates be higher, and not lower, in
more decentralized countries. One explanation is that sub-national governments
may tend on average to raise higher PIT taxes in order to provide a higher level
of local public goods. On the other hand, fiscal decentralization may imply that
the central government may now also compete with sub-national governments to
raise tax revenues. Fiscal decentralization may generate, in this context, not only
”horizontal” tax competition, between sub-national governments, but also ”verti-
cal” tax competition, between the central and sub-national governments. Hence,
the central government may choose to raise the aggregate PIT rates strategically,
as a ”first mover” or an incumbent, ahead of fiscal decentralization reforms.
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Table 15: Fiscal reaction functions of 21 OECD countries (1995-2016): tax rates. Dependent
variable: top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rate. Estimates are based on a LSDVC
estimator developed for autoregressive (unbalanced) panel data models (Bruno 2005), based
on the standard Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. Bootstrap standard errors in brackets.
The same regressors also included in the baseline estimation table are used. Further details
can be found in Table 12. The aim using a different dependent variable is to capture further
determinants of changes in tax rates and, in so doing, better characterize the evolution of the
fiscal stance in the OECD across the sample period.
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Table 16: Fiscal reaction functions of 21 OECD countries (1995-2016): tax rates. Dependent
variable: top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rate. Estimates are based on a LSDVC
estimator developed for autoregressive (unbalanced) panel data models (Bruno 2005), based
on the standard Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. Bootstrap standard errors in brackets.
The same regressors also included in the baseline estimation table are used. Further details
can be found in Table 12. The aim using a different dependent variable is to capture further
determinants of changes in tax rates and, in so doing, better characterize the evolution of the
fiscal stance in the OECD across the sample period.
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4.4.2 Robustness checks
From our previous analysis, various policy patterns have emerged. Firstly, we
have seen that fiscal balances tend to respond to debt-to-GDP ratio in a way
consistent with long-term fiscal sustainability concerns. Yet, it appears that fiscal
policy has tend to become pro-cyclical across OECD economies. Also CIT rates
appear to move in a counter-cyclical fashion, suggesting that governments may
use a larger ”fiscal space” generally available during economic upswings to reduce
corporate taxation. Secondly, electoral budget cycles seem to play a role in the
way fiscal policy is conducted across the OECD. Not only election years tend to be
associated with weaker fiscal balances, but also with higher PIT rates, suggesting
a ”strategic” behaviour of incumbent governments with reelection prospects.
The evidence on the existence of debt thresholds and on the effect of fiscal rules
is mixed. Debt thresholds seem to exist, according to recent literature, but start
to appear at relatively low levels, which imply that ”fiscal fatigue” (Ghosh et al.,
2013) may indeed be an important feature of fiscal policy responses across the
business cycle. Debt rules are associated with higher fiscal balances, on average,
and thus seem to play a mild role in promoting long-term fiscal sustainability.
Finally, the evidence on the effect of fiscal decentralization is more complex. Fiscal
decentralization tends to be associated with weaker fiscal balances and lower CIT
rates. In particular, the effect of the relative magnitude of intergovernmental
transfers also appears to play a role in this relationship. At the same time, revenue
decentralization appears associated with higher PIT rates.
In this section, we aim to further explore the relationships highlighted above.
To this end, we design a series of robustness checks, in order to assess whether the
results found so far hold across a wider range of econometric specifications. First,
185
we re-assess the idea of a non-linear response of fiscal balances using different
debt thresholds. Secondly, we use the US output gap as a measure of the business
cycle. Finally, we re-run the previous for a sample of EMU countries only and, in
a second stage, remove Greece from the sample.
4.4.2.1 Debt thresholds
The results obtained so far have suggested that the fiscal responsiveness to in-
debtedness conditions can vary widely across different debt levels. This is consis-
tent with the recent literature, suggesting the existence of endogenous debt limits
(Ghosh et al., 2013). Table 17 confirms and reinforces the idea of a varying respon-
siveness of (cyclically-adjusted) primary balances across different debt-to-GDP
levels. Having tested several different debt thresholds, it appears that a negative
effect of debt on the fiscal stance is perceivable already after the 50% debt-to-GDP
ratio. Furthermore, this affects not only the average level of fiscal balances past
this level, but also the degree of responsiveness to rising debt-to-GDP levels. The
existence of endogenous debt limits (Ghosh et al., 2013) suggests that long-term
fiscal sustainability can be endangered in environments of high public debt. Not
only the ”fiscal space” for future fiscal adjustments becomes shorter, as higher
debt-to-GDP ratios are associated with lower structural fiscal balances, but also
the varying responsiveness across the distribution of relative debt stocks suggests
that ”fiscal fatigue” can be an important feature of fiscal policy in the current
debt overhang environment across most developed economies.
Acknowledging the dissimilar paths of debt-to-GDP ratios and debt services at
the country level, we also aim to identify whether different fiscal responses can also
be observed across the distribution of debt service thresholds. Table F.2 shows the
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results using different potential debt service thresholds, as measured by the debt-
to-GDP ratio multiplied by the yearly average of long-term interest rates for each
country. The average (potential) debt service across OECD countries over the
period was around 3%. Hence, different debt service thresholds are calculated at
the 2-5% levels. Two interesting patterns emerge: while the responsiveness of the
fiscal stance to rising debt-to-GDP ratio increases across different (potential) debt
service thresholds, the responsiveness to the business cycle also become more pro-
cyclical. These results are also robust to the removal of Greece from the sample.
4.4.2.2 US output gap
In Table 18 we provide alternative estimates for our baseline fiscal reaction func-
tion specifications (Table 12), using the US output gap as an alternative for the
EU output gap. In so doing, we aim to re-assess in particular the cyclical proper-
ties of fiscal reactions across the OECD. In addition, we also look at the stability of
the remaining parameters, both across the different specifications shown in Table
18 and comparing with previous estimates. Both the sign and magnitude of the
coefficients on the (lagged) debt-to-GDP ratio, the output gap measure and the
election dummy are broadly constant over the different specifications, and similar
to those found previously. In addition, not surprisingly, the estimated persistence
of fiscal balance lies within the same range. However, looking at the cyclicality
parameter it is interesting to note that, although persistently negative, as in Table
12, most of the coefficients are not significant using the US output gap as a proxy
of the business cycle. This points towards a predominantly a-cyclical discretionary
fiscal policy response, although again with a slight pro-cyclical tendency.
Regarding the fiscal decentralization coefficients, these appear again with the
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Table 17: Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): alternative debt thresh-
olds. Dependent variable: underlying primary balances (UPB). The UPB is a measure of the
(general) government cyclically-adjusted budgetary balance, excluding net interest payments
and the impact of one-off transactions. Estimates are based on a LSDVC estimator developed
for autoregressive (unbalanced) panel data models (Bruno 2005), based on the standard Arellano
and Bond (1991) estimator. Bootstrap standard errors in brackets. This table reports estimates
as a robustness check to the results presented in Table 13. Besides the regressors also included
in the baseline estimation, the regression specifications for which results are presented in this
table include different levels of debt-to-GDP thresholds (Dbit), where b = 50, 60, 70%, as well as
interaction terms between these and the (lagged) debt-to-GDP ratio and the output gap. These
aim to capture possible non-linearities in the response of fiscal balances across different debt
levels.
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same signs, magnitudes and significance. It is again worth noting that revenue
decentralization does seem to be associated with lower fiscal balances, while large
intergovernmental transfers are also detrimental to the fiscal stance, particularly
when coupled with a large degree of sub-national fiscal autonomy.
4.4.2.3 EMU countries
Restricting the initial analysis to EMU countries significantly restricts our sam-
ple size86 and reinforces the preference for the use of LSDVC rather than GMM
estimation methods. Tables 19 and 20 show the results for the sample of 13 EMU
countries. In addition, Tables F.3 and F.4 (in Appendix) consider the results for
the complete sample of OECD countries, excluding Greece.
The results for our EMU sample show broadly similar results. Fiscal balances
respond positively to the debt-to-GDP ratio and show a markedly pro-cyclical be-
haviour. Electoral budget cycles also appear to be an important feature, as fiscal
balances are consistently lower in election years. These trends are also very stable
across different econometric specifications and the estimated relationships hold
consistently at the 5% significance level, and at the 1% level (Tables 19 and 20).
The relationship between fiscal decentralization and the aggregate fiscal stance
seems again more complex. Only revenue decentralization appears with a signifi-
cantly negative coefficient. The role of sub-national autonomy in this relationship
is not apparent from the results obtained for the sample of EMU countries (Table
19). On the contrary, we find evidence of the existence of debt thresholds (Table
20), again at relatively lower debt levels than previous studies have suggested
86The new sample consists only of the following 13 countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain. We also include a dummy for
EMU participation.
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Table 18: Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): US output gap. De-
pendent variable: underlying primary balances (UPB). The UPB is a measure of the (general)
government cyclically-adjusted budgetary balance, excluding net interest payments and the
impact of one-off transactions. Estimates are based on a LSDVC estimator developed for au-
toregressive (unbalanced) panel data models (Bruno 2005), based on the standard Arellano and
Bond (1991) estimator. Bootstrap standard errors in brackets. This table reports estimates as
a robustness check to the results presented in previous Tables 12-17, using the (lagged) output
gap as a regressor. Besides the remaining regressors included in the baseline estimation, the
regression specifications for which results are presented in this table include use the (lagged) US
output gap as a measure of the business cycle. This aim to assess whether the responsiveness
or the measured cyclicality of fiscal balances is robust to different measures of the output gap.
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(E´gert, 2015). Evidence is found of non-linearities of fiscal responses around the
70-80% thresholds. Furthermore, this does not only affect the level of fiscal bal-
ances, but the responsiveness of the fiscal stance to rising debt ratios (column
(10)). The results found for the sub-sample of EMU countries is thus consistent
with the existence of endogenous debt limits and of fiscal fatigue at high debt-
to-GDP ratios (Ghosh et al., 2013), which can endanger fiscal adjustments in the
EMU.
Finally, looking at our OECD sample, excluding Greece, uncovers further in-
teresting features. On the one hand, a consistent significant positive response
of fiscal balances to the debt-to-GDP ratio is found. In addition, fiscal balances
appear again to be negatively affected in election years. Both relationships hold
at the 1% level. On the other hand, the evidence for a pro-cyclical behaviour
of discretionary fiscal policies is now much weaker. Although a negative sign is
persistently found, this relationship is now only found significant at the 10% level,
or even not significant at all in several cases (Tables F.3 and F.4). This suggests
that pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies was triggered in EMU countries under fiscal
stress and only recently became a feature of fiscal policy within the EMU. Yet, this
also underlines one important ”shortcoming” of the EMU fiscal design: countries
under fiscal stress were forced to persistently run pro-cyclical (contractionary)
fiscal policies, in order to respond to sustainability concerns, or even to guarantee
membership of the EMU in extreme cases. Although this may have been partly
driven by lax fiscal behaviour at the national level in the build-up to the EMU
sovereign debt crisis, it is now widely recognised that the EMU needs to move
forward to achieve a common fiscal framework, namely able to ”insure” member
countries against asymmetric macroeconomic shocks.
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Table F.3 uncovers further interesting features. By removing only one ”out-
lier” of the sample, both in terms of aggregate fiscal behaviour over recent years
and of the relative level of fiscal decentralization, we are able to re-assess the re-
lationship between fiscal decentralization and the aggregate fiscal stance. Similar
patterns arise here from those found in Table 12, for the full sample of OECD
countries. The relationships found are now slightly stronger. Interestingly, the
coefficient on the interaction term between the level of revenue decentralization
and the level of sub-national autonomy becomes significant. The relationship be-
tween the interaction term between the level of VFIs and the level of sub-national
autonomy also becomes stronger and significant at the 5% level. This points again
towards the directions identified earlier. Firstly, fiscal decentralization may lead
to common pool incentives, as it frequently implies larger levels of expenditure
than revenue decentralization. In addition, even extensive own revenues decen-
tralized to sub-national government levels, the latter may have weaker revenue-
raising powers, either because tax bases are more mobile or because local tax
administration systems may be less developed than federal or central ones. Both
explanations lead to a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and
aggregate fiscal balances. Secondly, the existence of extensive intergovernmental
transfer systems coupled with a high degree of sub-national fiscal autonomy can
be particularly damaging for the general government fiscal stance and long-term
fiscal sustainability. Not only it may create the type of common pool problems
just highlighted, but it can also make them permanent. By bringing both more
fiscal powers and more bargaining power to sub-national governments levels, the
scope for renegotiation of intergovernmental transfers becomes greater and this
can ”institutionalize” soft budget constraint incentives in federal systems.
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In turn, the results in Table F.4 confirm and reinforce the results previously
found on debt thresholds. If these exist, suggesting that the fiscal stance response
can exhibit a non-linear pattern across different indebtedness conditions, they ap-
pear at lower levels than previously found. Evidence is found here of endogenous
debt limits around or below the 80% debt threshold, with an effect on the re-
sponsiveness of fiscal balances to the debt-to-GDP ratio found already at the 50%
debt-to-GDP ratio. Similarly to E´gert (2015), the volatility of debt thresholds
across different samples also suggests that these may vary according to country
characteristics or macroeconomic and institutional environments.
4.4.2.4 Sub-national autonomy
In order to further explore the sub-national autonomy measures contained in the
LAI dataset, we identify three key dimensions which can have a direct effect on
the effective degree of fiscal autonomy and run further regressions on the whole
OECD sample. Table F.5 shows the results for this exercise.
The dimensions of sub-national autonomy included is this set of regressions are
the following: financial autonomy, f
lai(fa)
it , effective political discretion, f
lai(epd)
it ,
and policy scope, f
lai(ps)
it , the three factors identified and analyzed earlier (Table
E.3). The first interesting result that immediately emerges is that the three factors
now appear with different signs (columns (1)-(3)). While the estimated coefficients
on policy scope and effective political discretion suggest a positive relationship
between these factors and the fiscal stance, financial autonomy appears to exert
a negative effect on the fiscal stance. Only financial autonomy, however, appears
with a significant (negative) effect.
We thus interact this measure with the levels of expenditure and revenue de-
193
Table 19: Fiscal reaction functions of 13 EMU countries (1995-2016): baseline results. De-
pendent variable: underlying primary balances (UPB). The UPB is a measure of the (general)
government cyclically-adjusted budgetary balance, excluding net interest payments and the
impact of one-off transactions. Estimates are based on a LSDVC estimator developed for au-
toregressive (unbalanced) panel data models (Bruno 2005), based on the standard Arellano and
Bond (1991) estimator. Bootstrap standard errors in brackets. This table reports estimates
for similar specifications to those presented in Table 12, using a sub-sample of OECD countries
inside the EMU.
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Table 20: Fiscal reaction functions of 13 EMU countries (1995-2016): debt thresholds. De-
pendent variable: underlying primary balances (UPB). The UPB is a measure of the (general)
government cyclically-adjusted budgetary balance, excluding net interest payments and the
impact of one-off transactions. Estimates are based on a LSDVC estimator developed for au-
toregressive (unbalanced) panel data models (Bruno 2005), based on the standard Arellano and
Bond (1991) estimator. Bootstrap standard errors in brackets. This table reports estimates
for similar specifications to those presented in Table 13, using a sub-sample of OECD countries
inside the EMU.
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centralization, as well as with the relative size of VFIs, as before. Yet this time
no significant relationship emerges from the analysis. Using the same interaction
terms for the other two measures of sub-national fiscal autonomy does however un-
cover another interesting issue. A negative significant relationship emerges when
the policy scope factor is interacted with the relative size of VFIs. This suggests
that, although a large policy scope at the sub-national level may not in itself be
harmful for the aggregate fiscal stance (although not significant, this factor even
appears with a positive sign in our regression results), it may become harmful
if coupled with large VFIs. In other words, extensive intergovernmental transfer
systems can become particularly damaging for aggregate fiscal performance, if and
when sub-national governments are involved in the provision of a wide array of
public services. This reinforces the idea that measuring fiscal decentralization is
a particularly difficult task as, especially in this case, the devil lies in the details.
4.5 Concluding remarks
Governments can be understood to have two main fiscal policy objectives
over the short-term: macroeconomic and debt stabilization. However counter-
cyclicality and fiscal sustainability can be thought as two desirable properties of
fiscal policy, there can often be a trade-off between both. In this context, fiscal
policy across OECD countries has become pro-cyclical over recent decades. While
this phenomenon is not new (viz. Turrini et al. 2008, Fata´s and Mihov 2010), this
paper suggests that it appears to have become even stronger in EMU countries
and aims to shed more light on some of its causes. Namely, we aim to emphasize
the role of two institutional features that may undermine the capacity of gov-
ernments to respond both to macroeconomic and to debt stabilization concerns:
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endogenous debt limits and fiscal decentralization.
The existence of dissimilar fiscal responses across different debt-to-GDP levels
suggests the relevance of endogenous debt limits (Ghosh et al., 2013). Indeed, the
results presented in this paper highlight two related issues: both the average level
the responsiveness of structural fiscal balances to rising debt levels is persistently
weaker beyond the 70 percent debt-to-GDP limit. Consistent with recent litera-
ture (E´gert, 2015), the level of this threshold varies, however, between the 50 and
80 percent debt-to-GDP ratio, suggesting once again the importance of different
country characteristics in determining endogenous debt limits. Irrespective of the
exact threshold values, this points towards the relevance of fiscal fatigue in debt
overhang environments. Hence, the capacity of governments to sustain a fiscal
stance in line with both macroeconomic and debt stabilization properties can be
undermined when debt-to-GDP ratios are at historically high levels.
The results in this paper point towards a fact that may have become particu-
larly relevant to describe the post-2008 financial crisis fiscal policy environment
in developed economies: in order to sustain a fiscal stance in line with long-term
fiscal sustainability concerns, OECD countries, particularly EMU countries, have
often had to ”switch-off” automatic stabilizers, by running pro-cyclical policies
in economic downturns. Similarly, if and when this would imply unsustainable
pro-cyclical policies, the responsiveness to debt may have become weaker. Fis-
cal fatigue can thus be understood to arise when the ”fiscal space” for countries
to simultaneously respond to macroeconomic and debt stabilization concerns is
limited. This is even reinforced by considering the results obtained with different
potential debt service levels. Having become an important feature of fiscal policy
in the current fiscal policy environment, as countries face historically high debt
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burdens, fiscal fatigue is thus one symptom of fiscal policy in countries facing
debt overhang problems. The existence of formal fiscal rules seems, in this con-
text, to have done little to avoid this phenomenon and promote long-term fiscal
sustainability, with only mild evidence for the effectiveness of debt rules.
In turn, another aim in this paper was to shed more light into the relation-
ship between fiscal decentralization and aggregate fiscal performance. The first
conclusion that emerges from this paper is that sub-national autonomy is a key
”hidden” link to understand this relationship. Revenue decentralization appears,
at first sight, persistently linked with a weaker fiscal stance. Yet, sub-national
governments across OECD countries have, on average, 30% of total general gov-
ernment expenditure responsibilities, while only 20% of own-revenues are collected
at the sub-national level. These figures also hide important differences in fiscal
decentralization across OECD countries and, in particular, about the level of ef-
fective sub-national fiscal autonomy. Having explored various different dimensions
of sub-national autonomy, offered by the extensive LAI dataset (European Com-
mission, 2015), vertical fiscal imbalances appear to play an important role in the
relationship between fiscal decentralization and the fiscal stance. Both when the
aggregate index of sub-national autonomy and the index of sub-national policy
scope are considered, vertical fiscal imbalances are shown to affect negatively the
average level of fiscal balances, as well as the responsiveness to rising debt-to-GDP
ratios. At the same time, a higher level of expenditure decentralization is associ-
ated with lower average corporate income tax rates, while revenue decentralization
is associated with higher average personal income tax rates. Financial autonomy
appears associated with weaker fiscal balances, but the results do not hold when
interacting this variable with measures of fiscal decentralization. Fiscal decentral-
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ization does not appear to affect aggregate fiscal performance, neither through
its effect on the average level of structural fiscal balances nor through its effect
on macroeconomic or debt stabilization. It does however generally imply large
intergovernmental transfer systems, often arising as a result of an optimal organi-
zation of tax and spending responsibilities. One issue thus arises from our analysis:
as ambitious fiscal decentralization reforms often involve large intergovernmental
transfer systems, namely as a result of the limited scope for decentralization of
taxation powers, these ought to be accompanied by administrative reforms aiming
at reinforcing accountability at the sub-national level.
Fiscal policy has become pro-cyclical across the OECD and the results in this
paper suggest that pro-cyclicality can be here to stay. An environment of debt
overhang, together with the likely rise of interest rates over the medium term,
can bring further pressures to the conduct of fiscal policy, particularly in EMU
countries with limited fiscal space. Its main syndrome, fiscal fatigue, is likely
to make the short-term trade-off between macroeconomic and debt stabilization
ever more visible. In turn, the different experiences of fiscal decentralization across
OECD countries and the important institutional heterogeneities suggest that large
intergovernmental transfer systems tend to be a consequence of an optimal fiscal
design, where sub-national have extensive spending powers but limited revenue-
raising capacity. If not adequately designed, these can however have consequences
for long-term fiscal sustainability and eventually bring further fiscal pressure in
countries facing high debt burdens.
What are the policy implications? Fiscal policy should respond both to macroe-
conomic and debt stabilization. Policymakers should thus aim to create the nec-
essary conditions to ensure this is indeed the case. In the EMU, the current
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policy proposals on a common European unemployment insurance system are an
example of a step in this direction. The scope for counter-cyclical structural bal-
ances should also be reinforced. Yet, in an environment where countries are facing
historically high debt-to-GDP ratios, this can prove a particularly difficult task.
Moves into the direction of common debt issuance, backed by a common fiscal
framework, can be an important factor ensuring governments, through the man-
agement of national fiscal policies, have enough discretion - and fiscal space - to
respond adequately to both the business cycle and long-term fiscal sustainability.
The discussion on a European Stability Fund has already taken off, and its design
should, first and foremost, ensure enough fiscal discretion is kept at the national
level, while improving fiscal sustainability across the EU. At the same time as a
common fiscal framework is being implemented at the European level, there is
also frequently a large scope for fiscal discretion at the sub-national level. Two
issues stand out from our analysis: a very large heterogeneity in the levels of fiscal
decentralization as well as in the effective levels of sub-national autonomy, and the
general negative effect of large intergovernmental transfer systems on fiscal sus-
tainability. This suggests a large room for improvement in national institutionsm
governing intergovernmental fiscal relations. At the European level, this process
can be promoted through national cooperation aiming at sharing best practices
and promoting the role of regional and local governments, without compromising
fiscal sustainability in the long-term. In short, ensuring a multi-layered inte-
greated European fiscal framework is paramount to promote the overall quality
of fiscal policies.
200
V
Conclusion
201
V Conclusion
The European sovereign debt crisis has sparked a large debate on the fiscal archi-
tecture of the European Monetary Union. A new wave of academic contributions
has rapidly blossomed, after the Presidents’ Reports (Van Rompuy et al. 2012
and Juncker et al. 2015). Policymakers have also taken on board some of the rec-
ommendations highlighted as essential pillars of a reformed European Monetary
Union. Hence, the change in paradigm on the scope of intervention of the Euro-
pean Central Bank, the rapid creation of the European Stability Mechanism, the
approval of a new European fiscal framework - known as the Fiscal Compact -,
and the move towards a Banking Union, with the Single Supervisory Mechanism
and a potential common deposit insurance.
Yet, much remains to be done. The European Union still lacks a common fiscal
capacity, namely in order to equip member countries with better mechanisms to
respond to asymmetric macroeconomic shocks and a large burden of debt. The
literature has provided numerous solutions, such as the creation of a European
unemployment insurance scheme (Abraham et al. 2018a) or the development of
a European Stability Fund (Abraham et al. 2018b). While these reforms can
go a long way in forming a common fiscal capacity to complete the European
Monetary Union, making it more resilient to financial crises and large macroe-
conomic fluctuations, they are also likely to fall short in terms of endowing the
European Union with a comprehensive fiscal framework capable of responding to
the long-term challenges of developed economies in the twenty-first century, such
as widening wealth inequality and the automation of a large share of traditionally
labour-intensive tasks in the productive chain. In this context, one clear trend
over the past decades has been the changing structure of taxation across developed
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economies, with a secular decrease in corporate income taxation and a progressive
shift towards indirect taxes and less progressive labour income taxes.
Departing from the classical literature on fiscal federalism, this thesis aims to
provide a new perspective on the development of a European fiscal framework.
In a nutshell, the main question that it aims to answer is: how to design a fiscal
framework for the European Union consistent both with the forces of globaliza-
tion and the protection of the European Welfare State? Focusing in particular
on the pressures brought by increasing capital mobility and interjurisdictional fis-
cal competition, this thesis brings some answers to this problem and offers new
questions for future research.
5.1 Lessons from Essays on Fiscal Federalism
This thesis contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, it provides a
detailed picture of the evolution of taxation over the past decades across EU and
OECD countries, which also constitutes one important motivation behind the first
two chapters. In this context, the downward trend in corporate income tax rates
stands out as a marked characteristic of tax reforms in recent decades across the
EU. The results obtained in Chapter Four also suggest another interesting char-
acteristic of corporate tax rates trends over recent decades: governments appear
to have persistently used a larger fiscal space available in periods of economic
expansion to introduce tax cuts, thus making fiscal policy more pro-cyclical. The
recent corporate tax cuts across developed economies, most notably in the United
States, seem to confirm this pattern of policy and clearly suggest that the secular
decrease in corporate tax cuts has not yet come to a halt. Other common trends
in taxation across developed economies are a steady decrease in labour income tax
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progressivity and a higher reliance of governments on indirect forms of taxation,
namely on VAT revenues.
Secondly, it re-assesses the relationship between fiscal federalism and economic
growth. In an environment of tax competition between jurisdictions, either at
the national or at the regional and local level, fiscal federalism brings growth-
maximizing policies. In a race to attract mobile factors of production, govern-
ments attempt to maximise the after-tax rate of return by providing higher levels
of public goods and services with a productive character. This also involves a
potential large shift in tax bases, from more mobile and distortive towards less
mobile and least distortive tax bases. In an environment of fixed labour supply
and perfectly mobile capital, this implies a race to bottom in capital taxes and
a race to the top in taxes that fall on the immobile fixed factor. This is a fully
efficient outcome and implies the highest growth dividend.
Thirdly, acknowledging the additional constraints brought by an environment
of international tax competition to the trade-off between growth and redistribu-
tion, or efficiency and equity, it analyzes the room for and the consequences of
different tax harmonization scenarios. Chapter Two provides a framework where
simple tax harmonization scenarios can be designed and understood, by and large,
as the main options at the disposal of policymakers. The consequences of har-
monization of tax rates on mobile and immobile factors are explored. The first
clear result that emerges from this theoretical exercise is that the harmonization
of taxes on mobile factors, frequently advocated in an attempt to deter a race to
the bottom in capital income taxation, may in fact lead to a race to the top in
taxes on immobile factors. This happens as governments face the perfect mobility
of productive factors and thus engage in a Bertrand competition to attract these
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to their jurisdiction. When the taxation of mobile factors is fixed - or (binding)
minimum thresholds are imposed -, the competition occurs solely over the (gross)
rate of return on these factors, which implies that governments raise taxes on
immobile factors to finance higher levels of productive public good provision. In
an environment with perfectly mobile capital and a fixed supply of labour, this
implies that all labour income accruing to households is taxed away to maximise
the rate of return on capital. Only the harmonization of labour income taxes can
avoid this outcome, while leaving room for competition over tax rates on mobile
factors and non-zero capital income taxes, in equilibrium.
Fourthly, building on this intuition and on the theoretical results obtained in
Chapter Two, Chapter Three develops an endogenous growth model with flexible
labour supply calibrated to an average EU economy. Detailed policy simulations
are performed and different fiscal harmonization scenarios are considered. Capital
income tax harmonization proves once again to be no panacea. A race to the top
is again observed on the least mobile and distortive tax base. This also leads to
an over-investment on the productive public good, relative to the optimum. In
this context, indirect taxes, such as VAT, should become priority targets of fiscal
reforms proposals in the European Monetary Union. Expenditure side reforms are
also needed. Even limited increases in the EU budget, such as the introduction
of a common European unemployment insurance system can go a long way in
preventing significant welfare losses from interjurisdictional fiscal competition.
Finally, Chapter Four provides a novel characterization of the evolution of fis-
cal policy across OECD countries. In particular, the cyclical behaviour of discre-
tionary fiscal policy is explored, both as a response to short-term macroeconomic
stabilization and long-term fiscal sustainability concerns. Although a consistent
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response of structural balances is found to higher debt levels, in line with long-
term fiscal sustainability concerns, fiscal policy across OECD countries has be-
come pro-cyclical over recent decades, particularly within the European Monetary
Union. Furthermore, in line with recent literature, the existence of endogenous
debt limits and the channels through which these might have affected the fiscal
stance in OECD countries is explored. Both the average level of structural fis-
cal balances and their responsiveness to the level of debt are found persistently
weaker beyond the 70 percent debt-to-GDP threshold, or even below, pointing
towards the relevance of fiscal fatigue phenomena. Looking at the average level
and responsiveness of fiscal balances across different potential debt service thresh-
olds, uncovers another interesting result: beyond the 3 percent debt service limit
a higher average level of fiscal balances is found, as well as a stronger response to
indebtedness conditions. However, this is also accompanied by a more pro-cyclical
response to the business cycle. This suggests that, not only fiscal fatigue episodes
can be thought as a new feature of fiscal policy across OECD countries over recent
years, but also that countries under greater fiscal stress – as measured by potential
debt service levels – may have had to completely switch off automatic stabilizers
during economic downturns in order to respond to short-term fiscal pressures. In
the terminology of recent literature on fiscal policy, this also suggests that many
countries have long exhausted the available fiscal space, implying that future fiscal
adjustments in the context of economic recessions can become ever more painful,
particularly for countries within the European Monetary Union. The role of fiscal
decentralization is also assessed, with the aim of learning from the past experi-
ence of OECD countries and draw lessons both for future fiscal decentralization
reforms at the national level and fiscal reforms at the European level. The effect
of fiscal decentralization on the fiscal stance appears to be more complex, not least
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because of the significant heterogeneity in political and legal arrangements behind
fiscal decentralization reforms across OECD countries. Two issues however seem
to remain clear. On the one hand, fiscal decentralization is not necessarily harmful
for fiscal performance and does not appear to affect the aggregate responsiveness
to macroeconomic and debt cycles. On the other hand, large intergovernmental
transfer systems, which frequently accompany ambitious decentralization reforms,
show a persistent negative relation with fiscal performance. This phenomenon is
reinforced when sub-national governments keep wide responsibilities over the pro-
vision of local public services. Large levels of sub-national financial autonomy are
also related with weaker aggregate fiscal performance.
5.2 Policy proposals and future work
The lessons from this thesis have wide implications for the current discussion
on the fiscal architecture of the European Union and for the future design and
implementation of such reforms. Firstly, any future fiscal reforms that involve only
partial harmonization of corporate taxes, or the mere consolidation of tax bases
(like in the CCCTB project), are unlikely to produce significant results in terms of
limiting the potentially damaging effects of capital mobility and tax competition.
Instead, by constraining the discretion of governments to set corporate tax rates
and rules, it is instead likely to intensify fiscal competition over other tax bases
and the provision of productive public goods, to the detriment of equitable tax
structures and welfaristic or merit goods. In other words, any tax reforms that
are limited to corporate taxation are likely to generate more regressive income tax
structures and produce a heavier reliance on indirect forms of taxation.
Secondly, indirect taxes, such as value-added taxes, rather than income taxes,
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appear as the obvious candidates for future tax harmonization reforms. Both in
terms of scope, given the relative importance in terms of government revenue, and
of effectiveness in restraining fiscal competition incentives, the harmonization of
consumption taxes can become a prime candidate for future fiscal reform. Such
an instrument can not only provide the European Union with a common fiscal
framework able to finance a larger common budget, but also equip member coun-
tries as a whole with a partially harmonized tax system that is able to overcome
potentially future intense fiscal competition pressures.
Thirdly, tax reforms ought to be accompanied by expenditure side reforms.
Although this thesis does not directly tackle this issue and does not aim to propose
specific reforms on this side, it contributes to understand current proposals in a
wider context. Recent proposals that include a European unemployment scheme
are therefore particularly welcome in light of these results, as a means to improve
the response of national economies to short-run macroeconomic fluctuations, but
also in a context where national governments become more constrained to set out
more ambitious welfaristic programmes. This thesis also hints that such proposals
can be extended at a later stage to a wider set of government programmes and
spending areas, from the development of a common European defence budget to
a direct involvement in the financing of certain areas of healthcare and education
spending across the European Union.
Fourthly, any fiscal reforms undertook at the European level must also learn
from the past. Besides a common feasibility or participation constraint, implying
that any future fiscal reforms in the European Union ought to rule out perma-
nent transfers between member countries, these also need to be able to overcome
other potential issues. On the one hand, fiscal reforms ought to ensure that the
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quality of fiscal policy over the business cycle is improved. In particular, re-
cent years have witnessed a pro-cyclical discretionary component of fiscal policy,
arguably related to the need to respond to soaring debt levels during economic
downturns. This phenomenon has become more intense in countries under greater
fiscal stress, namely in those under greater scrutiny from financial markets. Hence,
fiscal reforms within the European Monetary Union, having already moved for-
ward towards a more credible fiscal framework, also have to ensure that a debt
overhang environment is compatible with an adequate response to business cycle
fluctuations. Proposals for a European Stability Fund, or an extended European
Stability Mechanism, go in this direction. On the other hand, the future fiscal
architecture of the European Union, can also learn from individual country fiscal
decentralization experiences. Namely, as both revenue and expenditure side re-
forms can lead to extensive fiscal transfer systems, both of cyclical and permanent
nature, these ought to be carefully designed so as to ensure an alignment of fiscal
incentives across different member countries. In so doing, extensive room for fiscal
discretion at the national level must also be kept.
This thesis also opens new lines of research. The first is a natural development
of the current work to consider the proposed policy reforms in the context of more
complete macroeconomic models. The second places emphasis on the need to
place any fiscal harmonization reforms in a wider context. In particular, studying
the effect of tax harmonization reforms in a partial equilibrium setting or in the
context of models with a limited role for governments can lead to misleading
results and endanger the validity of proposed policy reforms. The third explores
in detail the blurry link between fiscal federalism and fiscal performance. As more
data becomes available and new datasets are developed, more promising results
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can shed light on the wider effects of fiscal decentralization reform and contribute
to better inform policymakers.
5.3 Closing remark
This section has highlighted that the lessons and policy recommendations that
can be drawn from this thesis open many new questions relevant for the design of
future fiscal reforms in the European Union, but also across the globe. As recent
work in this field has shown, there is plenty of room for significant improvements
in the design of the European Monetary Union and an exciting prospect is the
progressive development of ambitious policy proposals with a subsequent detailed
analysis with the help of modern macroeconomic models. Namely, recent work
in macroeconomics has helped to include labour market frictions and different
types of heterogeneities into traditional models, thereby contributing to move the
field into an unprecedented level of detail. Independently of other work, like this
thesis, it seems ever more promising for future work to profit from this body
of knowledge and from the growing availability of detailed data to understand
how current institutions are likely to respond to the challenges of the twenty-first
century. Automation and the changing structure of the global supply chain are
only two examples that are likely to radically change current economic structures
and the role of governments in the economy, and thereby an important role for
economic research is to enable a well-informed policy debate and propose policy
reforms that can help shape a global economy that is able to generate the highest
ever levels of economic prosperity and living standards for all.
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”Globalization, the information revolution, and regional and ethnic conflicts have
made it imperative for a large and growing number of countries around the globe
to reexamine the roles of various orders of government to secure peace, order,
and good government and to reposition their roles in improving social and
economic outcomes and retaining relevance in the lives of their citizens. This
reexamination has resulted in a silent revolution sweeping the globe, which is
slowly but gradually bringing about rearrangements that embody diverse features
of supranationalization, confederalization, centralization, provincialization, and
localization. The vision of a governance structure that is slowly taking hold
through this silent revolution indicates either a gradual shift from unitary
constitutional structures to federal or confederal governance for a large majority
of people or a strengthening of local governance under a unitary form of
government. This new vision of governance has also led to a resurgence of
interest in fiscal federalism principles and practices as federal systems are seen to
provide safeguards against the threat of centralized exploitation as well as
decentralized opportunistic behavior while bringing decision making closer to the
people.”
Robin Boadway and Anwar Shah (2009)
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Figure A.1: Average effective tax rates of 4 large EU countries (1982-2005).
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Figure A.2: Average effective tax rates of 8 small EU countries (1982-2005).
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Appendix B Mathematical Appendix (Chapter II)
The standard neo-classical growth model:
We can represent utility of the representative household and the production function of the economy as follows:
∫ ∞
0
e−δt log
[
cij(t)
]
dt (B.1)
yj(t) = Akj(t)
αlj(t)
1−α (B.2)
Assuming a perfectly competitive environment in the economy, profit-maximization yields the following returns to the
productive factors:
rj(t) ≡ ∂yj(t)
∂kj(t)
= Aαkj(t)
α−1lj(t)1−α (B.3)
wj(t) ≡ ∂yj(t)
∂lj(t)
= A(1− α)kj(t)αlj(t)−α (B.4)
Agents face the following budget constraint:
k˙ij(t) = rdij(t)(t)k
i
j(t) + wj(t)l
i
j − cij(t) (B.5)
We can write the following Hamiltonian:
Hˆ(cij(t), k
i
j(t), µ(t)) ≡ e−δt
{
log
[
cij(t)
]
+ µ(t)
[
rdij(t)(t)k
i
j(t) + wj(t)l
i
j − cij(t)
]}
and, after combining the first-order optimization conditions, obtain the following Euler equation:
cij(t) = c
i
j(0)e
(rj(t)−δ)t (B.6)
After re-arranging the terms, consumption can be expressed as:
cij(t) =
(
δkij(0) + wj(0)l
i
j
)
e(rj(t)−δ)t.
Substituting back into the budget constraint we can show:
k˙ij(t) = (rj(t)− δ)kij(t)
given that wj(t) = wj(0)e
(rj(t)−δ)t.
We can finally write the following utility function, as function of parameters %, κi and ωj :
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V (%, ωj ;κ
i) = %δ2 +
1
δ log
(
δκi + ωj
)
+ 1δ log(k(0))
where % = rj(t)−δ is rate of growth of the economy, κi = k
i
j(0)
kj(0)
is the relative capital intensity of agent i and ωj =
wj(0)
kj(0)
is the wage-capital ratio in the economy. Thus, there is no role for policy in the standard neo-classical growth model.
Neo-classical growth model with capital taxes and a merit good:
We can represent utility of the representative household and the production function of the economy as follows:
∫ ∞
0
e−δt log
[
η
1
σ
c c
i
j(t)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h hj(t)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
dt (B.7)
Given that the production function and the competitive conditions of the economy are similar, profit-maximization will
result in the same equilibrium wage rate wj(t) and rate of return on capital rj(t).
Agents face the following budget constraint:
k˙ij(t) = (rdij(t)(t)− θj)k
i
j(t) + wj(t)l
i
j − cij(t) (B.8)
Given that now, in order to fund the merit good, the government charges the tax rate θj on capital:
hj(t) = θjkj(t). (B.9)
We can thus write the following Hamiltonian:
Hˆ(cij(t), k
i
j(t), µ(t)) ≡ e−δt
{
log
([
η
1
σ
c cij(t)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h hj(t)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
)
+ µ(t)
[(
rdij(t)(t)− θj
)
kij(t) + wj(t)l
i
j − cij(t)
]}
and obtain the following Euler equation:
cij(t) = c
i
j(0)e
(rj(t)−θj−δ)t (B.10)
Consumption can be expressed as:
cij(t) =
(
δkij(0) + wj(0)l
i
j
)
e(rj(t)−θj−δ)t.
Finally, substituting back into the budget constraint, we show:
k˙ij(t) = (rj(t)− θj − δ)kij(t)
given that wj(t) = wj(0)e
(rj(t)−θj−δ)t.
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In this model with capital taxes and a merit good, we have a role for government as provider of the public good. To
fund this publicly delivered good, the government raises capital taxes. It is clear from the utility of the representative
household that agents will prefer a non-negative amount of this good delivered in equilibrium. We can find this by writing
the utility function as a function of parameters:
V (Φ, ωj , θj ;κ
i) =
Φ(θj)
δ2
+
1
δ
σ
σ − 1 log
[
η
1
σ
c (δκ
i + ωj)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h θ
σ−1
σ
j
]
+
1
δ
log(k(0)) (B.11)
where Φ = rj(t)−θj−δ is rate of growth of the economy, κi is the again relative capital intensity of agent i and ωj = wj(0)kj(0)
is now the after-tax wage-capital ratio in the economy.
The policy most favoured by the median voter is the policy θmed chosen in equilibrium by the benevolent central
government. This policy can be defined by maximizing V (Φ, ω, θj ;κi) with respect to the policy parameter θj :
( ηc
ηh
) 1
σ
[δκi + ωj ]
σ−1
σ θ
1
σ + θj = δ (B.12)
Thus, the optimal policy for the capital tax to fund the merit good is similar to the one presented in the more
comprehensive model we present in our paper. We leave further interpretations to the section on optimal policy, but
not without mentioning that the equilibrium under decentralization will entail a race to bottom in θj and the policy will
diverge from the optimal policy.
Neo-classical growth model with capital taxes and a productive public good:
We can represent utility of the representative household similarly to (B.1) but the production function of the economy
is now as follows:
yj(t) = Agj(t)
1−αkj(t)αlj(t)1−α (B.13)
Assuming a perfectly competitive environment in the economy, profit-maximization yields the following private rate of
return on capital and wage rate:
rj(t) ≡ ∂yj(t)
∂kj(t)
= Aαgj(t)
1−αkj(t)α−1lj(t)1−α (B.14)
wj(t) ≡ ∂yj(t)
∂lj(t)
= A(1− α)gj(t)1−αkj(t)αlj(t)−α (B.15)
Agents face the following budget constraint:
k˙ij(t) = (rdij(t)(t)− τj)k
i
j(t) + wj(t)l
i
j − cij(t) (B.16)
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Given that now, in order to fund the merit good, the government charges the tax rate τj on capital:
gj(t) = τjkj(t). (B.17)
We can thus write the following Hamiltonian:
Hˆ(cij(t), k
i
j(t), µ(t)) ≡ e−δt
{
log
[
cij(t)
]
+ µ(t)
[(
rdij(t)(t)− τj
)
kij(t) + wj(t)l
i
j − cij(t)
]}
and obtain the following Euler equation:
cij(t) = c
i
j(0)e
(rj(t)−τj−δ)t (B.18)
We can again represent consumption and the equilibrium growth rate of capital in a similar fashion. In this model with
capital taxes and a productive public good, we have a somehow different role for government, which now provides a good
that is fundamental for the production of output. So it is clear that now there cannot be a ’full’ race to bottom in the
decentralized case. To fund this publicly delivered productive input, the government raises capital taxes. It is again clear
that agents in this economy will prefer a non-negative amount of this good delivered in equilibrium, as it affects the first
term of the utility function as a function of parameters:
V (γ, ωj , θj ;κ
i) =
γ(τj)
δ2
+
1
δ
log
[
δκi + ωj(τj)
]
+
1
δ
log(k(0)) (B.19)
where γ = rj(t)− τj − δ is rate of growth of the economy and κi and ωj are again the relative capital intensity of agent i
and the after-tax wage-capital ratio in the economy, respectively.
The policy most favoured by the median voter is the policy τmed chosen in equilibrium by the benevolent central
government. This policy can be defined by maximizing V (γ, ω, θj ;κi) with respect to the policy parameter τj . Now τj will
only affect the first term of the utility function. Still, we can observe that it will have an optimal level. Furthermore, given
that the chosen tax rate τj affects the return to productive factors, it also affects the equilibrium after-tax wage-capital
ratio of the economy, ωj .
Notice that a poorer agent will generally prefer a higher wage-capital ratio, given the growth rate. We can alternatively
express this as follows:
∂V (γ,ωj ,θj ;κ
i)
∂γ =
1
δ2
∂V (γ,ωj ,θj ;κ
i)
∂ωj
= 1δ
1
δκi+ωj
∂V (γ,ωj,θj ;κ
i)
∂γ
∂V (γ,ωj,θj ;κ
i)
∂ωj
=
δκi+ωj
δ
This result is similar to Hatfield (2015). It is thus clear that the rate at which an agent i is willing to substitute
between the growth rate of the economy and the after-tax wage-capital ratio is increasing in its relative capital intensity,
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κi. Hence, a poorer median voter will tend to prefer a higher after-tax wage-capital ratio, even if this means a lower
equilibrium growth rate.
Notice, on the other hand, that under decentralization the policy will again differ from the optimal, as governments
of different jurisdictions will have a different objective function. Decentralized governments will choose in equilibrium to
maximise the private rate of return on capital, ρ = rj(t)− τj . This model is the closest one to Alesina and Rodrik (1994),
where it is discussed that, without tax competition and with only a capital tax as policy instrument, there will be a level
of provision of the (productive) public good that is not growth-maximizing.
Neo-classical growth model with capital taxes and both types of public good:
We can represent utility of the representative household similarly to (B.7) and the production function of the economy
is similar to (B.13). Profit-maximization will thus result in the same rate of return on capital rj(t) and equilibrium wage
rate wj(t), as expressed in (B.14) and (B.15), respectively.
Agents face the following budget constraint:
k˙ij(t) = (rdij(t)(t)− θj − τj)k
i
j(t) + wj(t)l
i
j − cij(t) (B.20)
Given that now, in order to fund both the merit and the productive public good, the government charges two different
tax rates on capital, (B.9) and (B.17).
We can write the current-value Hamiltonian:
Hˆ(cij(t), k
i
j(t), µ(t)) ≡ e−δt
{
log
([
η
1
σ
c cij(t)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h hj(t)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
)
+ µ(t)
[(
rdij(t)(t)− θj − τj
)
kij(t) + wj(t)l
i
j − cij(t)
]}
and obtain the following Euler equation:
cij(t) = c
i
j(0)e
(rj(t)−θj−τj−δ)t (B.21)
Consumption can be expressed as:
cij(t) =
(
δkij(0) + wj(0)l
i
j
)
e(rj(t)−θj−τj−δ)t.
Finally, substituting back into the budget constraint, we can show:
k˙ij(t) = (rj(t)− θj − τj − δ)kij(t)
given that wj(t) = wj(0)e
(rj(t)−θj−τj−δ)t.
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Agents in the economy will prefer a non-negative amount of both publicly delivered goods, in equilibrium. We can
write the utility function as a function of parameters:
V (ξ, ωj , θj ;κ
i) =
ξ(θj , τj)
δ2
+
1
δ
σ
σ − 1 log
[
η
1
σ
c (δκ
i + ωj(τj))
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h θ
σ−1
σ
j
]
+
1
δ
log(k(0)) (B.22)
where ξ = rj(t)− θj − τj − δ is rate of growth of the economy and κi and ωj are, respectively, the relative capital intensity
of agent i and the after-tax wage-capital ratio in the economy.
The same reasoning follows from the analysis above, as the optimal policies will be similar to the ones already discussed.
Agents will prefer a non-negative value of the merit good in equilibrium, as this directly affects their current utility level
(second term of the utility function). However, as this is funded through a capital tax, which effectively reduces the
private rate of return on capital, this good will not be provided in decentralized equilibrium, due to tax competition
among jurisdictions. This generates a deviation from optimal policy and welfare losses. Regarding the productive public
good, poorer agents will again tend to prefer a higher after-tax wage-capital ratio, given the growth rate of the economy.
Whereas the government will aim to maximise the utility of the median voter in a centralized setting, in the presence of
tax competition the governments of different jurisdictions will have instead the objective of maximizing the private rate
of return on capital. A more detailed discussion of the implications of this model are left to the main text.
Model derivations:
Necessary conditions:
· Hˆc(cij(t), kij(t), µ(t)) ≡ u′(cij(t))− µ(t) = 0⇒
(
ηc
cij(t)
) 1
σ 1
Cij(t)
− µ(t) = 0
Cij(t) = η
1
σ
c cij(t)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h hj(t)
σ−1
σ
∂ log
[
η
1
σ
c c
i
j(t)
σ−1
σ +η
1
σ
h hj(t)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
∂cij(t)
= σσ−1
{
1
η
1
σ
c c
i
j(t)
σ−1
σ +η
1
σ
h hj(t)
σ−1
σ
σ−1
σ η
1
σ
c cij(t)
− 1σ
}
=
(
ηc
cij(t)
) 1
σ 1
η
1
σ
c c
i
j(t)
σ−1
σ +η
1
σ
h hj(t)
σ−1
σ
or...
· Hˆc(cij(t), kij(t), µ(t)) ≡ u′(cij(t))− µ(t) = 0⇒ 1
[Cij(t)]
σ
σ−1
(
ηcC
i
j(t)
σ
σ−1
cij(t)
) 1
σ − µ(t) = 0
∂ log
[
Cij(t)
] σ
σ−1
∂cij(t)
= 1
[Cij(t)]
σ
σ−1
σ
σ−1
[
Cij(t)
] σ
σ−1−1(= 1σ−1 ) σ−1
σ η
1
σ cij(t)
− 1σ , Cij(t)
1
σ−1 = [Cij(t)
σ
σ−1 ]
1
σ ,
Cij(t)
1
σ−1
Cij(t)
σ
σ−1
= 1
Cij(t)
· Hˆk(cij(t), kij(t), µ(t)) ≡ µ(t)(rdij(t)(t)− τKdij(t)) = δµ(t)− µ˙(t)
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⇒ −
˙[(
ηc
cij(t)
) 1
σ 1
Cij(t)
]
=
(
ηc
cij(t)
) 1
σ 1
Cij(t)
(rdij(t)(t)− τKdij(t) − δ)[(
ηc
cij(t)
) 1
σ 1
Cij(t)
]
dt :
Let us consider:
µ˙(t) = ddt
[(
ηc
cij(t)
) 1
σ
]
1
Cij(t)
+ ddt
[
1
Cij(t)
](
ηc
cij(t)
) 1
σ
d
dt
[
1
Cij(t)
]
=
d
[
Cij(t)
−1
]
dCij(t)
dCij(t)
dt
dCij(t)
dt =
dCij(t)
dcij(t)
c˙ij(t) +
dCij(t)
dhj(t)
h˙j(t)
⇒ −µ˙(t) = 1σ
(
ηc
cij(t)
) 1
σ c˙ij(t)
cij(t)
. 1
Cij(t)
+
[
1
Cij(t)
]2(
η
1
σ
c .
σ−1
σ c
i
j(t)
σ−1
σ
c˙ij(t)
cij(t)
+ η
1
σ
h .
σ−1
σ hj(t)
σ−1
σ
h˙j(t)
hj(t)
)
.
(
ηc
cij(t)
) 1
σ
⇒ −µ˙(t) = 1σµ(t)
c˙ij(t)
cij(t)
+ σ−1σ µ(t)
1
Cij(t)
(
η
1
σ
c .cij(t)
σ−1
σ
c˙ij(t)
cij(t)
+ η
1
σ
h .hj(t)
σ−1
σ
h˙j(t)
hj(t)
)
⇒ −µ˙(t) = 1σµ(t)
c˙ij(t)
cij(t)
+ σ−1σ µ(t)
1
Cij(t)
(
η
1
σ
c .cij(t)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h .hj(t)
σ−1
σ
)
c˙ij(t)
cij(t)
, if
c˙ij(t)
cij(t)
=
h˙j(t)
hj(t)
⇒ −µ˙(t) =
(
1
σ +
σ−1
σ
)
µ(t)
c˙ij(t)
cij(t)
= µ(t)
c˙ij(t)
cij(t)
⇒ − µ˙(t)µ(t) = (rdij(t)(t)− τKdij(t) − δ)
⇒ c˙
i
j(t)
cij(t)
= (ψ − δ) , ψ = rdij(t)(t)− τKdij(t)
⇒ cij(t) = cij(0)e(ψ−δ)t
or...
· Hˆk(cij(t), kij(t), µ(t)) ≡ µ(t)(rdij(t)(t)− τKdij(t)) = δµ(t)− µ˙(t)
⇒ −
˙[
1
[Cij(t)]
σ
σ−1
(
ηcCij(t)
σ
σ−1
cij(t)
) 1
σ
]
= 1
[Cij(t)]
σ
σ−1
(
ηcC
i
j(t)
σ
σ−1
cij(t)
) 1
σ
(rdij(t)(t)− τdij(t) − θdij(t) − δ)[
1
[Cij(t)]
σ
σ−1
(
ηcC
i
j(t)
σ
σ−1
cij(t)
) 1
σ
]
dt :
Let us consider:
µ˙(t) = ddt
[
1
[Cij(t)]
σ
σ−1
](
ηcC
i
j(t)
σ
σ−1
cij(t)
) 1
σ
if
cij(t)
Cij(t)
σ
σ−1
constant over the BGP
d
dt
[
1
Cij(t)
σ
σ−1
]
=
d
[
Cij(t)
− σ
σ−1
]
dCij(t)
dCij(t)
dt
dCij(t)
dt =
dCij(t)
dcij(t)
c˙ij(t) +
dCij(t)
dhj(t)
h˙j(t)
⇒ −µ˙(t) =
{
σ
σ−1
1
[Cij(t)]
σ
σ−1
1
Cij(t)
(
η
1
σ
c .
σ−1
σ c
i
j(t)
σ−1
σ
c˙ij(t)
cij(t)
+ η
1
σ
h .
σ−1
σ hj(t)
σ−1
σ
h˙j(t)
hj(t)
)}
.
(
ηcC
i
j(t)
σ
σ−1
cij(t)
) 1
σ
⇒ −µ˙(t) = 1
[Cij(t)]
σ
σ−1
1
Cij(t)
(
η
1
σ
c cij(t)
σ−1
σ
c˙ij(t)
cij(t)
+ η
1
σ
h hj(t)
σ−1
σ
h˙j(t)
hj(t)
)
.
(
ηcC
i
j(t)
σ
σ−1
cij(t)
) 1
σ
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⇒ −µ˙(t) = µ(t) 1
Cij(t)
(
η
1
σ
c cij(t)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h hj(t)
σ−1
σ
)
c˙ij(t)
cij(t)
, if
c˙ij(t)
cij(t)
=
h˙j(t)
hj(t)
⇒ −µ˙(t) = µ(t) c˙
i
j(t)
cij(t)
⇒ c˙
i
j(t)
cij(t)
= (ψ − δ)
⇒ cij(t) = cij(0)e(ψ−δ)t
In order to obtain the utility as a function of parameters, we plug-in our optimality conditions into the original form of
the utility function:
∫∞
0
e−δt log
(
eξt
[
η
1
σ
c (δkij(0) + (1− τLj )wj(0)lij)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h hj(0)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
)
dt
where ξ = ψ − δ and assuming that, along the balanced growth path, we must have c˙
i
j(t)
cij(t)
=
h˙j(t)
hj(t)
. Since labour supply
lij(t) is constant, we can simplify this expression to:∫∞
0
ξte−δtdt+
∫∞
0
log
([
η
1
σ
c (δkij(0) + (1− τLj )wj(0)lij)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h hj(0)
σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
)
e−δtdt
= ξδ2 +
1
δ
σ
σ−1
(
log
[
η
1
σ
c (δkij(0) + (1− τLj )wj(0)lij)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h hj(0)
σ−1
σ
])
.
Dividing and multiplying the second term by [log kj(0)]
σ−1
σ :
= ξδ2 +
1
δ
σ
σ−1
{
log
[
η
1
σ
c (δκi + ωj)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h
(
hj(0)
kj(0)
)σ−1
σ
]
+ σ−1σ log(kj(0))
}
We thus reach our final form:
V (ξ, ωj ;κ
i
j) =
ξ(τKj , τ
L
j , βj)
δ2
+
1
δ
σ
σ − 1 log
[
η
1
σ
c (δκ
i
j + ωj)
σ−1
σ + η
1
σ
h
(
(1− βj)(
τLj
1− τLj
ωj + τ
K
j )
)σ−1
σ
]
+
1
δ
log(kj(0))
Centralization equilibrium:
In a proof similar to Hatfield (2015), we use the median voter theorem to obtain the policy chosen by the central
government:
(τK
med
, τL
med
, βmed) = arg max
(τK ,τL,β)
{
V (ξ, ω, β;κmed)
}
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Consider any other policy set (τK
′
, τL
′
, β′) with the implied growth rate ξ(τK ′, τL′, β′) and after-tax wage-capital
ratio ω(τK
′
, τL
′
, β′). If the policy set (τK ′, τL′, β′) is not efficient, then there exists another policy set with the same
implied growth rate (η(τK , τL, β) = η(τK
′
, τL
′
, β′)) and a strictly higher after-tax wage-capital ratio (ω(τK , τL, β) ≥
ω(τK
′
, τL
′
, β′)). Every agent thus prefers (τK , τL, β) to (τK ′, τL′, β′). By the same token, there exists a policy set
(τK
med
, τL
med
, βmed) that is preferred by half of the agents to (τK , τL, β); if this policy set (τK
med
, τL
med
, βmed) features
a higher growth rate than (τK , τL, β), then every agent with a (weakly) higher initial capital endowment than the median
voter will prefer (τK
med
, τL
med
, βmed) to (τK , τL, β). Otherwise, if the policy set (τK
med
, τL
med
, βmed) features a lower
growth rate than (τK , τL, β), then the after-tax wage-capital ratio will be higher and every agent with a (weakly) lower
initial capital endowment than the median voter will prefer (τK
med
, τL
med
, βmed) to (τK , τL, β). Therefore, by preference
transitivity, at least half of the voters will prefer (τK
med
, τL
med
, βmed) to (τK , τL, β) and (τK
med
, τL
med
, βmed) is the
equilibrium Condorcet winner.
Proposition 1. In the centralization equilibrium, the equilibrium policy set is (τK
med
, τL
med
, βmed). This policy set
will not, in general maximize economic growth.
Decentralization equilibrium:
The policy set chosen by the government in jurisdiction j under decentralization is such that:
(τK
∗
, τL
∗
, β∗) = arg max
(τKj ,τ
L
j ,βj)
{
Aα
[
βj
(
τKj +
τLj
1− τLj
ωj
)]1−α
− τKj
}
Again, the proof follows Hatfield (2015). Yet, this is now requires a different procedure. With jurisdictions competing
for capital and no transaction or adjustment costs, a Bertrand-type competition arises. In other words, to attract any
capital, jurisdictions must offer the most attractive rate of return (alternatively, the most attractive price for capital).
Households - both capital-rich and capital-poor - within each jurisdiction want to attract capital, as otherwise the wage
rate will be 0 in the economy. In such winner-takes-all environment, competition between jurisdictions leads to a ”race
to the top” to maximize the return on capital. Each jurisdiction, in order to attract any capital, must use its policy
set (τKj , τ
L
j , βj) to maximize the (net) private rate of return. In equilibrium, all capital will be invested only in those
jurisdictions that choose the tax policy (τK
∗
, τL
∗
, β∗) that maximizes this function. Finally, note that the rate of return
on capital is independent of the amount of capital in the economy; thus each government sets the rate of return on capital
in their own jurisdiction by choosing the policy set (τKj , τ
L
j , βj). In addition, since the growth rate is an affine function
of the rate of return on capital, each government also sets the growth rate of the economy and all capital will be invested
only in jurisdictions that choose the growth-maximizing tax policy (τK
∗
, τL
∗
, β∗).
Proposition 2. Under decentralization, in every equilibrium at least one government will choose the
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growth-maximizing policy set (τK
∗
, τL
∗
, β∗) and all capital will be invested in jurisdictions with this tax policy.
This proposition does not state, however, that every government in each jurisdiction j will set their fiscal policy to
satisfy the above condition. Indeed, there may exist asymmetric equilibria, under which one or more jurisdictions set
their tax rates to (τK
∗
, τL
∗
, β∗) and these are the only jurisdictions in which capital is invested, while other governments
of different jurisdictions set another policy, receiving no capital. In this case, even if a jurisdiction with no capital were
to change its policy set to (τK
∗
, τL
∗
, β∗), no agent would necessarily move her capital there. However, by introducing
a slight home bias, where households facing equal (net) private rates of return prefer to invest their capital stock in the
home jurisdictions, the following can be obtained:
Proposition 3. Under decentralization with the presence of a non-negligible home bias, the equilibrium will imply that
all jurisdictions will implement the policy set to become the growth-maximizing policy set, (τK
∗
, τL
∗
, β∗), and all capital
will be invested by households in their own jurisdictions.
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Appendix C Figures and Mathematical Appendix (Chapter III)
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Figure C.1: Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1982-2017): Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, United
Kingdom
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Figure C.2: Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1982-2017): Austria, Finland, Sweden
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Figure C.3: Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1982-2017): Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain
246
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
0.34
0.35
0.36
0.37
0.38
0.39
0.4
0.41
0.42
 France
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
 Germany
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
 Italy
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.3
0.32
0.34
 United Kingdom
Figure C.4: Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017): four largest economies
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Figure C.5: Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017): Benelux and Austria
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Figure C.6: Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017): Nordic countries
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Figure C.7: Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017): Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
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Figure C.8: Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017): North-Eastern European countries
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Figure C.9: Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017): South-Eastern European countries
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Figure C.10: Top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017): four largest economies
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Figure C.11: Top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017): Benelux and Austria
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Figure C.12: Top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017): Nordic countries
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Figure C.13: Top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017): Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
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Figure C.14: Top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017): North-Eastern European countries
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Figure C.15: Top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in the EU-28 (1995-2017): South-Eastern European countries
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Figure C.16: Value-added tax (VAT) rates in the EU-28 (2000-2017): four largest economies
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Figure C.17: Value-added tax (VAT) rates in the EU-28 (2000-2017): Benelux and Austria
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Figure C.18: Value-added tax (VAT) rates in the EU-28 (2000-2017): Nordic countries
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Figure C.19: Value-added tax (VAT) rates in the EU-28 (2000-2017): Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain
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Figure C.20: Value-added tax (VAT) rates in the EU-28 (2000-2017): North-Eastern European countries
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Figure C.21: Value-added tax (VAT) rates in the EU-28 (2000-2017): South-Eastern European countries
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Model derivations
Each economy j is populated by N identical individuals, with perfect foresight and an infinite planning horizon. The
representative agent is endowed with one unit of time, which she can use either for leisure time, l, or to work, 1− l. The
output of a firm, y, is determined by the following production function:
yj(t) = A
′Gj(t)αkj(t)1−α(1− lj)α ≡ A′
(Gj(t)
kj(t)
)α
(1− lj)αkj(t)
where k denotes the per capita stock of capital and Gj is the flow of productive government spending. We assume that
the government uses a share gj of aggregate output, Y , for productive spending:
Gj(t) = gjYj(t)
Hence, aggregate output in each economy j is given by:
Yj(t) = (Ag
α
j )
1
1−α (1− lj) α1−αKj
The welfare of the representative agent in this economy can be represented by the utility function:
∫ ∞
0
e−δt
1
γ
[
cj l
θ
jH
η
j
]γ
dt
where again it is implicitly assumed that the government claims a fraction of output, hj for consumption spending:
Hj(t) = hjYj(t)
The equilibrium in a centrally planned economy can thus be obtained by choosing the aggregate stock of capital K,
flow of consumption C and leisure time l to maximize the utility of the representative agent in this economy, subject to
the resource constraint of the economy:
K˙j = (1− gj − hj)Yj − Cj
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The current-value Hamiltonian solving the central planner’s problem in this economy can be described as:
Hˆ(Cj , lj , Yj ,Kj) ≡ e−δt
{ 1
γ
[
(Cj/Nj)l
θ
j (hjYj)
η
]γ
dt+ λ(t)
[
(1− gj − hj)Yj − Ck − K˙j
]
+ µ(t)
[
(Agαj )
1
1−α (1− lj) α1−αKj − Yj
]}
Defining Ω(lj) ≡ αθ(1−α)
(
lj
1−lj
)
, maximization with respect to the flow of consumption, Cj , leisure time, lj , output, Yj ,
and the stock of capital Kj , yields the following four optimal conditions:
N−γj Cj/N
γ−1
j l
θγ
j (hjYj)
ηγ = λ
θN−γj Cj/N
γ
j l
θγ−1
j (hjYj)
ηγ = µ
α
1− α (Ag
α
j )
1
1−α (1− lj) α1−α−1Kj
ηN−γj Cj/N
γ
j l
θγ
j (hjYj)
ηγ−1gc + λ[1− gj − hj ] = µ
µ(Agαj )
1
1−α (1− lj) α1−α = −λ˙+ λp
The above equations can be re-arranged and combined with the aggregate resource constraint of the economy to
describe the equilibrium of this economy featuring a central planner:
1
Ω(lj)
(Cj
Yj
)
=
µ
λ
µ
λ
= (1− gj − hj) + ηCj
Yj
ψj =
1
1− γ(1 + η)
[(µ
λ
)( Yj
Kj
)
− ρ
]
ψj =
[
(1− gj − hj)−
(Cj
Yj
)]( Yj
Kj
)
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Yj
Kj
= (αgαj )
1
1−α (1− l) α1−α
The balanced-growth path equilibrium is then described by the RR and PP loci, discussed more at length in text,
which provide the equilibrium combinations of leisure time, lj , and the rate of return on capital, φj , for which the equality
of growth rates of consumption and capital, and product market equilibrium are ensured:
ψj =
1
1− γ(1 + η)
[
1− gj − hj
1− ηΩ(lj) (Ag
α
j )
1
1−α (1− lj) α1−α − δ
]
ψj = (1− gj − hj) 1− ηΩ(lj)
1− (1 + η)Ω(lj) (Ag
α
j )
1
1−α (1− lj) α1−α
In order to derive optimal government expenditure, the above Hamiltonian expression can be optimized for gj and hj
tp yield:
g∗j =
α
1− α
µ
λ
h∗j = η
Cj
Yj
These expressions simply express that, at the optimum, the marginal productivity of productive government expendi-
ture equates to the marginal value of (foregone) private consumption (µ∂Yj/∂gj ≡ Yj), and the marginal utility of public
consumption equates to the marginal utility of private consumption (∂U/∂Hj ≡ ∂U/∂Cj). Finally, combining these with
the optimality condition for the shadow value of output, the following condition can be written:
g∗j = α
(
1 + h∗j − hj
)
Hence, the optimal values for government productive and consumption spending can be obtained:
g∗j = α
258
h∗j = η(1− α)Ω(l∗j )
Put simply, the optimal level of government productive expenditure depends upon the share of government consumption
expenditure. If this is set at the optimum (i.e. for h∗j = hj), then the optimal share of government production expenditure
is g∗j = α, which corresponds to the first-best government expenditure share, with a relative price of output (µ/λ) = 1−α.
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Appendix D Tables (Chapter III)
Table D.1: Federal spending
τK τL τC hj gj lj ψj ∆W
hj = 20%
τK ≥ 0%
0.00 0.00 0.90 - 0.18 0.73 3.17% -1.35%
0.00 -0.90 0.90 - 0.14 0.61 3.24% 4.02%
Capital subsidies
-0.10 -0.90 0.90 - 0.08 0.63 3.46% 10.57%
-0.15 -0.20 0.90 - 0.08 0.72 3.57% 6.86%
-0.16 0.00 0.90 - 0.08 0.75 3.56% 9.21%
τK = 10% + τL = 20%
- - 0.50 - 0.15 0.76 2.51% 4.76%
- - 0.70 - 0.20 0.76 2.63% 6.60%
- - 0.90 - 0.25 0.76 2.73% -10.64%
τK = 10% + τC = 40%
- 0.00 - - 0.10 0.73 2.40% 12.04%
- 0.20 - - 0.11 0.77 2.38% 12.45%
- -0.45 - - 0.08 0.66 2.40% 7.91%
τL = 20% + τC = 60%
0.00 - - - 0.11 0.78 2.87% 11.03%
-0.05 - - - 0.08 0.78 2.96% 8.73%
-0.08 - - - 0.06 0.79 2.97% 9.25%
Table D.2: Federal spending
τK τL τC hj gj lj ψj ∆W
hj = 20%
τC = 50%
-0.02 0.20 - - 0.07 0.78 2.74% 9.77%
-0.02 0.19 - - 0.07 0.78 2.75% 8.79%
-0.03 0.25 - - 0.07 0.79 2.73% 10.45%
τC = 45%
0.00 0.16 - - 0.06 0.77 2.62% 9.88%
-0.01 0.25 - - 0.06 0.79 2.61% 9.60%
-0.01 0.16 - - 0.05 0.77 2.61% 9.26%
-0.02 0.40 - - 0.06 0.82 2.60% 9.05%
τC = 40%
0.00 0.32 - - 0.05 0.81 2.47% 8.21%
-0.01 0.32 - - 0.05 0.81 2.46% 7.61%
0.00 0.41 - - 0.06 0.83 2.47% 8.02%
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Table D.3: Limited EU budget with common consumption vs. capital income taxes
τK τL τC hj gj lj ψj ∆W
Benchmark 0.31 0.38 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.78 1.48%
Optimal policy 0.00 -0.55 0.55 0.17 0.08 0.66 2.91% 17.94%
hj = 3%
τC = 19%
0.00 0.00 - - 0.08 0.75 2.78% -14.84%
0.00 0.15 - - 0.09 0.77 2.78% -15.04%
-0.01 0.00 - - 0.07 0.75 2.78% -15.17%
-0.01 0.10 - - 0.08 0.77 2.80% -16.24%
-0.02 0.20 - - 0.08 0.79 2.80% -16.32%
-0.03 0.30 - - 0.08 0.81 2.78% -15.80%
τK = 16%
- 0.00 0.00 - 0.08 0.73 1.99% -18.41%
- 0.00 0.15 - 0.19 0.72 2.35% -25.90%
- -0.90 0.90 - 0.41 0.58 2.83% -69.27%
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Appendix E Figures (Chapter IV)
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Figure E.1: Value-added tax (VAT) and top statutory personal income tax (PIT) rates in 21 OECD countries (1995-2016). The figure shows
a downward trend in top PIT rates across OECD countries, with some exceptions of PIT rate increases, mostly in EMU countries under fiscal
stress. Normal VAT rates, although broadly stable over the period, seem to follow a slight upward trend.
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Figure E.2: Top statutory corporate income tax (CIT) rates in 21 OECD countries (1995-2016). The figure shows a downward trend in top
CIT rates across OECD countries, with mild temporary increases in EMU countries under fiscal stress.
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Figure E.3: Local autonomy index (1995-2016). The figure shows the evolution of sub-national autonomy over the last two decades, along
three key dimensions: financial autonomy, effective political discretion and policy scope.
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Appendix F Tables (Chapter IV)
Table F.1: Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): baseline results. Dependent variable: cyclically-
adjusted primary balances (CAPB). Estimates are based on a bias-corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC)
estimator developed for autoregressive (unbalanced) panel data models, using bias approximations developed in Bruno
(2005). Bias corrections use the standard Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. Bootstrap standard errors, provided in
brackets, are derived through the numerical derivation of a variance-covariance matrix for LSDVC using 100 repetitions.
Normality of errors is assumed.
s
i
,t
(C
A
P
B
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
s
i
,t
−
1
0
.7
0
9
*
*
*
0
.6
9
1
*
*
*
0
.6
7
2
*
*
*
0
.7
0
8
*
*
*
0
.6
9
4
*
*
*
0
.6
9
0
*
*
*
0
.6
7
2
*
*
*
0
.6
8
8
*
*
*
0
.6
9
4
*
*
*
0
.7
0
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
4
5
)
(0
.0
3
6
)
(0
.0
4
3
)
(0
.0
3
6
)
(0
.0
4
2
)
(0
.0
5
1
)
(0
.0
4
2
)
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
4
9
)
(0
.0
4
1
)
b
i
,t
−
1
0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
0
.0
4
2
*
*
*
0
.0
3
6
*
*
*
0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
0
.0
3
5
*
*
*
0
.0
4
0
*
*
*
0
.0
3
6
*
*
*
0
.0
3
1
*
*
*
0
.0
3
7
*
*
*
0
.0
3
5
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
(0
.0
1
1
)
(0
.0
1
0
)
yˆ
i
,t
−
1
-0
.0
6
4
-0
.0
5
9
-0
.0
7
2
-0
.0
6
4
-0
.0
7
1
-0
.0
8
0
-0
.0
7
7
*
-0
.0
8
7
-0
.0
8
1
-0
.0
4
4
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
4
3
)
(0
.0
4
8
)
(0
.0
4
4
)
(0
.0
4
5
)
(0
.0
5
6
)
(0
.0
4
4
)
(0
.0
5
4
)
(0
.0
5
5
)
(0
.0
6
2
)
D
e
b
c
i
t
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
-0
.0
0
1
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
f
e
x
p
i
t
0
.0
7
0
*
*
(0
.0
3
2
)
f
r
e
v
i
t
-0
.1
4
8
*
*
(0
.0
6
3
)
f
v
f
i
i
t
-0
.0
0
3
(0
.0
5
7
)
f
la
i
i
t
-0
.0
8
4
(0
.0
7
2
)
f
e
x
p
i
t
×
f
la
i
i
t
0
.1
1
3
(0
.0
7
2
)
f
r
e
v
i
t
×
f
la
i
i
t
-0
.1
9
7
*
(0
.1
0
6
)
f
v
f
i
i
t
×
f
la
i
i
t
-0
.2
6
9
(0
.3
1
4
)
b
i
,t
−
1
×
f
v
f
i
i
t
×
f
la
i
i
t
-0
.4
6
2
(0
.5
4
2
)
yˆ
i
,t
−
1
×
f
r
e
v
i
t
×
f
la
i
i
t
-0
.3
9
1
(0
.4
7
9
)
*
1
0
%
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
le
v
e
l,
*
*
5
%
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
le
v
e
l,
*
*
*
1
%
si
g
n
ifi
c
a
n
c
e
le
v
e
l
265
Table F.2: Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): potential debt service thresholds. Dependent
variable: underlying primary balances (UPB). Estimates are based on a bias-corrected least squares dummy variable
(LSDVC) estimator developed for autoregressive (unbalanced) panel data models, using bias approximations developed in
Bruno (2005). Bias corrections use the standard Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. Bootstrap standard errors, provided
in brackets, are derived through the numerical derivation of a variance-covariance matrix.
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Table F.3: Fiscal reaction functions of 24 OECD countries (1995-2016): baseline results. Greece excluded from the sample.
Dependent variable: underlying primary balances (UPB). Estimates are based on a bias-corrected least squares dummy
variable (LSDVC) estimator developed for autoregressive (unbalanced) panel data models, using bias approximations
developed in Bruno (2005). Bias corrections use the standard Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. Bootstrap standard
errors, provided in brackets, are derived through the numerical derivation of a variance-covariance matrix.
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Table F.4: Fiscal reaction functions of 24 OECD countries (1995-2016): debt thresholds. Greece excluded from the sample.
Dependent variable: underlying primary balances (UPB). Estimates are based on a bias-corrected least squares dummy
variable (LSDVC) estimator developed for autoregressive (unbalanced) panel data models, using bias approximations
developed in Bruno (2005). Bias corrections use the standard Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. Bootstrap standard
errors, provided in brackets, are derived through the numerical derivation of a variance-covariance matrix.
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Table F.5: Fiscal reaction functions of 25 OECD countries (1995-2016): sub-national autonomy. Dependent variable:
underlying primary balances (UPB). Estimates are based on a LSDVC estimator developed for autoregressive (unbalanced)
panel data models (Bruno 2005), based on the standard Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. Bootstrap standard errors
in brackets.
si,t (UPB) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
si,t−1 0.838*** 0.842*** 0.843*** 0.838*** 0.820*** 0.840*** 0.821***
0.033 0.032 0.033 0.043 0.032 0.042 0.041
bi,t−1 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.026*** 0.025***
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
yˆi,t−1 -0.060** -0.065*** -0.071*** -0.068** -0.069*** -0.071** -0.082***
0.026 0.026 0.027 0.033 0.026 0.032 0.032
Debcit -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
f
lai(fa)
it -0.047**
0.022
f
lai(epd)
it 0.045
0.032
f
lai(ps)
it 0.043
0.029
fexpit × f(fa)it -0.003
0.031
frevit × f(fa)it -0.093
0.058
fvfiit × f(fa)it -0.049
0.055
fvfiit × f(ps)it -0.108*
0.066
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